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A B S T R A C T
Customs and border officers are overwhelmed by the hundreds of millions
of cargo containers that constitute the backbone of the global supply chain,
any one of which could contain a security- or customs-related threat. Search-
ing for these threats is akin to searching for needles in an ever-growing field
of haystacks.
This thesis considers novel automated image analysis methods to auto-
mate or assist elements of cargo inspection. The four main contributions of
this thesis are as follows.
Methods are proposed for the measurement and correction of detector
wobble in large-scale transmission radiography using Beam Position Detect-
ors (BPDs). Wobble is estimated from BPD measurements using a Random
Regression Forest (RRF) model, Bayesian fused with a prior estimate from an
Auto-Regression (AR). Next, a series of image corrections are derived, and it
is shown that 87% of image error due to wobble can be corrected. This is the
first proposed method for correction of wobble in large-scale transmission
radiography.
A Threat Image Projection (TIP) framework is proposed, for training, prob-
ing and evaluating Automated Threat Detection (ATD) algorithms. The TIP
method is validated experimentally, and a method is proposed to test whet-
her algorithms can learn to exploit TIP artefacts.
A system for Empty Container Verification (ECV) is proposed. The system,
trained using TIP, is based on Random Forest (RF) classification of image
patches according to fixed geometric features and container location. The
method outperforms previous reported results, and is able to detect very
small amounts of synthetically concealed smuggled contraband.
Finally, a method for ATD is proposed, based on a deep Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN), trained from scratch using TIP, and exploits the ma-
terial information encoded within dual-energy X-ray images to suppress
false alarms. The system offers a 100-fold improvement in the false positive
rate over prior work.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Each year, almost 7×10
8 Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) of cargo The TEU is a
common unit for
measuring cargo
volume. Each TEU is
equivalent in volume
to a standard 20 ft
ISO container. Thus,
a full 40 ft ISO
container is
equivalent to two
TEUs.
container transactions occur globally [1], with a total approximate
worth of 30 trillion US Dollars (USD) [2]. Assuming that each con-
tainer is half full (the majority are fully packed), this amounts to a total
of 2.4×1010m3 of traded goods. And that is just for cargo containers; the
number grows larger if bulk carriers, vehicles and other vessels are included.
This is an impossibly large amount of goods to be physically inspected by
humans, and it continues to grow each year [1]. Thus, the search for con-
traband is like searching for needles in an ever-growing field of haystacks
(Figure 1.1).
Do any of these containers contain smuggled contraband?
Figure 1.1: An illustration of the task that a human operator is faced with - a stream
of cargo container thumbnails. Seven of the loaded containers contain
threats, and two of the ‘empty’ containers actually contain smuggled
loads. In this thesis, automated methods are developed which are cap-
able of handling this task.
As such, customs and border agencies have to prioritise which cargoes to
inspect based on a risk analysis or specific intelligence from policing opera-
tions. The vast majority of cargo is not inspected at all [3]. This lack of sur-
veillance is regularly exploited by Organised Crime Networks (OCNs), terror-
ists, and even ‘legitimate’ companies. It is surprising how, to date, research
on automating cargo inspection has been so limited. Most work has been
kept in-house at large security scanner manufacturers, and there has been
little headway in the academic arena. This is in contrast to image analysis in
1
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aviation security, where there has been far more government funding which
has in turn stimulated academic research in the area. This is probably due
to the more perceivable and imminent threat from terrorism, particularly in
the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
This thesis is motivated by the current lack of research in automated cargo
security, and the scale and importance of the task to the world economy and
security.
1.1 disciplinarity
The work herein, first and foremost, proposes engineering solutions to cargo
security problems. The work spreads a diverse range of subject areas includ-
ing, most prominently; X-ray physics, image processing, machine learning,
computer vision, and security science. Thus, it meets the multi-disciplinarity
requirements of the UCL SECReT doctoral training centre.
1.2 current state of the field
Research into automated analysis of X-ray cargo imagery is scarce, espe-
cially in comparison to passenger baggage in aviation security. This is due
to the difficulty of obtaining suitably large datasets and the propensity of
security scanner manufacturers to keep research private. However, from the
body of work available, it is apparent that automated image analysis in
cargo is following a similar development pattern to mainstream machine
learning and computer vision.The state of the field
and how this thesis
fits in is discussed in
depth in Chapter 4.
Initial research proposed algorithms that were rule-based, in that threats
were identified based on a hard-coding of the researcher’s intuition or mater-
ials were classified based on methods derived from the physics of X-rays [4,
5]. Recently, methods have been developed that use hand-crafted features
and Machine Learning (ML) approaches to combine features and to form a
decision about the cargo container [6]. This thesis, begins with this latter
approach and then aims to push the field forward through the use of end-
to-end Deep Learning of features and their optimum combination scheme
to realise automated image inspection.
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1.3 contributions
This thesis makes the following novel contributions.
literature review The first review of the field of Automated X-ray
Image Analysis for Cargo Security. Due to the relevant infancy of the field,
no previous review has been published in the literature. The review covers
all aspects of image analysis, including image pre-processing and image under-
standing. The published version of the review [7] is longer than the version
presented herein, with more analysis on the future direction and promise of
the field.
wobble measurement A novel method of measuring detector wobble
in large-scale transmission radiography is developed. Wobble is estimated
based on measurements from four imaging detectors rotated by 90◦ to meas-
ure the profile of the X-ray beam across its width. In this thesis, these ro-
tated detectors are referred to as Beam Position Detectors (BPDs). During a
scan BPDs are obscured by arbitrary objects in the scene, and thus obtaining
wobble estimates is difficult. The proposed solution uses a Random Regres-
sion Forest (RRF) model to obtain an instantaneous wobble estimate, and an
Auto-Regression (AR) model to determine an estimate based on previous es-
timates. The RRF and AR estimates are then fused using a Bayesian approach
to form a superior estimate of wobble. This is the first attempt, according to
the literature, of measuring wobble in large-scale transmission radiography.
wobble correction A novel method for correcting image intensity
variation due to detector wobble is presented. The method is derived by con-
sidering a model of image formation in the presence of a wobbling detector.
Wobble correction also relies on the estimation of misplacements and rota-
tions of individual imaging detectors that can complicate wobble correction.
This is the first attempt, according to the literature, of correcting wobble
in large-scale transmission radiography. The correction method, when com-
bined with the measurement method, is able to correct for 87% of image
intensity variation due to wobble.
tip, data augmentation, and eip A method for Threat Image Pro-
jection (TIP) in cargo is proposed and validated experimentally. TIP is typ-
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ically used in aviation security to blend threat items into benign X-ray im-
ages, which are then used to train and evaluate human operators. Here, we
propose that a similar approach can be used to train and evaluate threat de-
tection algorithms. The TIP method relies on the Beer-Lambert law, and the
experimental validation shows that there is no qualitative or quantitative
difference between a real threat image and its equivalent TIP image. Meth-
ods of injecting natural variation into TIP imagery are proposed as a form of
data augmentation, useful for training ML-based algorithms. Moreover, due
to concerns that ML systems can learn subtle cues from artefacts present in
TIP imagery, an Empty Image Projection (EIP) method is proposed that can
be used in various ways to improve confidence that this is not occurring.
The aim of EIP is to project just the TIP artefacts and not the actual threat.
empty container verification The first ML-based method for Em-
pty Container Verification (ECV) is presented. ECV classifies whether a cargo
container is empty or non-empty, which is most useful for detecting contra-
band, fraud and errors within empty containers which constitute 20% of the
global container fleet. The method works by Random Forest (RF) classifica-Stream-of-
Commerce (SoC)
containers are
containers imaged in
real-life, and not in a
laboratory
experiment.
tion of individual image patches. The features used include fixed geomet-
ric features and the coordinates of the patch within the image. The use of
window coordinates as a feature allows the RF model to learn the location-
specific range of appearances of an empty container and overcomes the need
to segment the image and apply a separate classifier to each image region.
The method is trained on TIP-generated non-empty examples and real empty
examples from the SoC. The proposed ECV method outperforms a previous
method reported in the literature when tested on the SoC, and is also tested
for very small TIP-generated adversarial loads that are representative of sm-
uggled cocaine.The threats in
question are censored
to prevent keyword
searching, but have
recently been used to
commit a range of
so-called
Mumbai-style
terrorist attacks [8]
and are explicitly
considered in Roomi
and Rajashankari [9].
dual-energy automated threat detection A method for detect-
ing Small Metallic Threats (SMTs) in complex dual-energy cargo imagery is
presented. According to the literature, it is the first time in cargo that Auto-
mated Threat Detection (ATD) has explicitly operated on images measured at
different energies. The motivation is that the algorithm can learn to suppress
false positives by using material information derived from the dual-energy
measurement. The method employs a trained-from-scratch Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN), trained on TIP imagery with data augmentation, and
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significantly improves on the prior work in the literature [10]. The system is
also validated using EIP.
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Some of this work has been presented at the House of Commons, as
part of the SET for BRITAIN competition, where it was awarded Silver and
ranked top out of all Engineering PhD projects. Recently the Economist [23]
featured an article on the ATD work.
Some passages and figures in this thesis have been quoted verbatim, with
permission, from Refs. [7, 12–14]. All text and figures originated from my-
self, unless indicated.
1.5 thesis structure
The context for the technical work in this thesis is set out in Chapter 2,
through a taxonomy of the different ways in which the containers that com-
pose the global supply chain are exploited by OCNs and terrorists. In addi-
tion, an overview is provided of the current security infrastructure in place
to help detect and deter such activity, and how the technologies developed
in this thesis can fit into this infrastructure. This chapter also serves as an
extended motivation for this thesis.
The fundamentals of large-scale transmission X-ray imaging are presented
in Chapter 3. This includes: the fundamentals of X-ray generation, interac-
tions with matter, and detection; the practical deployment of cargo X-ray
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scanners; and the typical properties, noise and artefacts of x-ray cargo im-
agery. It provides a physics underpinning for the technical work in this
thesis.
A review of the literature on automated cargo image analysis is presen-
ted and dissected in Chapter 4. The review covers the themes of image pre-
processing and image understanding. It ends with a discussion on how this
thesis, and other PhD publications not presented herein, fit into the existing
literature.
In Chapter 5, detector wobble and its effect on image quality are described.
A model of image formation in the presence of a wobbling detector is de-
duced, and from this a number of image corrections are derived. Next, a
ML-based method for the measurement of wobble is proposed and tested.
Finally, the wobble estimation and image correction methods are combined
and tested on wobble-effected images.
Chapter 6 introduces a framework for the synthesis of threat imagery by
TIP. The TIP framework can equally be used to train humans and machines.
The method is validated experimentally. In addition, the concept of EIP is
introduced, and a method proposed to implement it. Both TIP and EIP are
used for training, evaluating and probing ML-based image understanding in
the next two chapters.
Chapter 7, the first on image understanding, proposes a method for auto-
mated ECV. The method is tested on both real images of cargo containers
from the SoC, and against small adversarial loads generated using TIP. TIP
is also used to better characterise the performance of the system as a func-
tion of the location within the container, and the volume and density of the
adversarial load.
Chapter 8, the final technical contribution of this work, addresses the de-
tection of SMTs in complex dual-energy X-ray images. Several dual-energy
CNN architectures are trained from scratch, using TIP and data augmentation,
and tested on TIP imagery. The method is also validated using EIP to ensure
that it is not gaining a major advantage over real threat data by learning to
exploit subtle artefactual cues from the TIP process.
Finally, a critical review and discussion of the research contributions of
the preceding chapters is given in Chapter 9, as well as proposals for future
directions of research.

2
S U P P LY C H A I N C R I M E A N D S E C U R I T Y
This chapter lays out the real world context of this research, describ-ing the scale and importance of the global supply chain and howOrganised Crime Networks (OCNs), terrorists, and even legitimate
businesses seek to exploit its vulnerabilities. The cargo crime and security
landscape is quite complex, and this chapter aims to distil it into a taxonomy
of its main elements.
2.1 the global supply chain
The global supply chain is a complex network of suppliers, factories, ware-
houses, distribution centres, ports and retail outlets [24]. The supply chain
converts raw materials into finished products which are eventually delivered
to the consumer. Over time, the supply chain has evolved to become increas-
ingly efficient and resilient, as stakeholders have sought to extract greater
profits and reduce risk [24].
The major breakthrough in network efficiency came in the mid-twentieth Intermodal
containers go by a
number of names,
including: ISO
container; shipping,
sea or ocean
container; cargo or
freight container.
These are used
interchangeably
throughout this
thesis.
century, with the introduction of standardised and discretised units; inter-
modal containers. These units, originally developed by the US military, can
be carried across different modes of transport in the supply chain; by ship,
rail, or truck [25]. Intermodal containers have the benefit that they can be
stacked efficiently (Figure 2.1) in large numbers at ports or on container
ships, and carried individually on land by truck or rail. The standardised
system of containers revolutionised the supply chain, and today, 90% of
world cargo is shipped in containers [26]. Since the inception of intermodal
containers, stakeholders have invested large sums of money on optimising
container routing and security. Initially, most security investments focused
on reducing the number of containers lost through theft and misrouting,
as this has direct commercial implications on stakeholders in the private
sector [24].
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the attention of security prac-
titioners shifted onto the risks that containerisation can pose. The global
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53 ft
48 ft
45 ft
40 ft
2×20 ft
Figure 2.1: Illustration of a stack of intermodal containers of increasing volume.
Cargo containers range in size from 10 ft to 60 ft, whilst 90% of all con-
tainers are either 20 ft or 40 ft long. The ability to stack discretised units
at ports or on ships, or carry them individually by rail or road has revolu-
tionised the efficiency of the global supply chain.
supply chain is the backbone of global commerce and the system has suffi-
cient redundancy to make it extremely unlikely that some event will grind it
to a halt; if it did, the result would be a catastrophe for the world economy.
However, localised attacks can still cause serious damage, particularly to
the countries in which they occur. In 2002, the 10-day US West Coast port
lockout caused economic damage worth between 4.7 and 19 billion US Dol-
lars (USD) [27, 28]. Particularly in the US, governments have been concerned
about attacks or hoax attacks bringing ports to a standstill and causing un-
told economic damage [24].
Governments have invested significant sums to develop Non-Intrusive In-
spection (NII) techniques to detect tell-tale threat signatures or to visualise an
image of the cargo contents. Most research initially focused on the detection
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) or their precursors [24]. ParticularA WMD is any
nuclear, radiological,
biological or other
weapon that can
cause mass loss of life
or injury, or
significant damage to
man-made or natural
structures, or the
biosphere.
attention was paid to the detection of nuclear materials through radiation
monitoring. Over time, the NII methods have improved enough to allow cus-
toms and border officers to search containers for contraband or shipping
fraud, with transmission X-ray scanners the most common [29].
From 2004 to 2014, and despite the 2008 global economic crisis, the num-
ber of Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) transactions more than doubled to
reach almost 7×108 TEU per annum [1]. During this time, the US Container
Security Initiative (CSI), proposed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
has encouraged 100% screening of containers [30], but has yet to be fully
realised [31]. With the increasing number of containers and the increased
screening requirements, providing high levels of cargo security is becoming
evermore difficult.
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2.2 a taxonomy of cargo crime
As legitimate businesses have invested money to improve the efficiency of
the supply chain, OCNs have invested money to learn how to best exploit There is no legal
definition of
organised crime in
the UK, although it
is considered as
‘serious crime
planned, coordinated
and conducted by
people working
together on a
continuing bases’ in
the UK Serious and
Organised Crime
Strategy [32].
it. OCNs are similar to a business in that they seek to maximise benefits
and minimise costs. Indeed, OCNs can be modelled using the rational choice
theory of economics, where actors make decisions based on a cost-benefit
analysis [33]. And like a business, an OCN has a product to sell, and a lucrat-
ive market to sell it to. To get their product into international markets, the
OCN must use logistics. Based on this, it is evident that criminals would seek
to exploit the already highly optimised global supply network and the inter-
modal containers that constitute it. There are even OCNs that work solely on
providing logistics to other OCNs by establishing safe smuggling routes [34].
A Hierarchical Holographic Model (HHM) [35] taxonomy of the modus
operandi used in cargo crime is given in Figure 2.2. OCNs use a range of
sophisticated methods, often in tandem, when committing crimes. These
include:
(i) Smuggling - the act of physically concealing smuggled contraband
within the container.
(ii) Manifest fraud - the act of falsifying container manifests to facilitate
smuggling.
(iii) Container routing fraud - the act of concealing the shipment route from
authorities to facilitate smuggling.
(iv) Use of agents - the use of human resources, often people involved
with enforcing cargo security, and who can be manipulated to facilitate
smuglling.
The goal of these crimes is to facilitate the criminal logistics of illicit
products.
2.2.1 Smuggling
As of 2007, it was
estimated that
1.95%, by value, of
world trade was of
counterfeit goods.
Counterfeit items
were worth an
estimated 2.5×1011
USD [36].
Smuggling bypasses customs controls, allowing criminals to: avoid duties
on legitimate goods (e.g. cars, alcohol, cigarettes); trade prohibited or coun-
terfeit items; or transport prohibited items such as stowaways, counterfeit
goods, animals, and stolen goods [37]. A taxonomy of contraband examples
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sabotage
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infiltration
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false destination
hidden
camouflaged
deterrence
unhidden
S M U G G L I N G
hidden camouflaged deterrence unhidden
within cargo
amongst cargo
false partition
legit partition
as cargo
as packaging
disassembled
odours
difficult
dangerous
rip-on/rip-off
in lieu of cargo
Figure 2.2: Hierarchical Holographic Model (HHM) of the modus operandi of cargo
container smugglers.
C O N T R A B A N D
high duty prohibited stowaways counterfeit animals stolen
alcohol
tobacco
cars
narcotics
weapons
refugees
criminals
terrorists
slaves
clothing
cigarettes
currency
electronics
endangered
ivory
skins/hides
aliens
cars
metals
household
Figure 2.3: Hierarchical Holographic Model (HHM) of smuggled contraband.
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is given in Figure 2.3. Successful OCNs take a scientific approach to smug-
gling; they will invent new techniques, test and refine them to find the ones
that bring most success. Often a team of ‘surgeons’ is employed for this
purpose [38].
The smuggling techniques range in sophistication, aiming for a balance
between the cost of the smuggling technique, the likelihood of the goods
being seized, and the potential cost to the OCN if the seizure occurs. The least For lack of a better
word, we use
‘unhidden’.
sophisticated methods hide contraband in plain sight (unhidden) and hope
that the container is not inspected at all. With increasing cost, methods may
conceal contraband amongst legitimate cargo, or within individual items of
legitimate cargo. Tactics may also be used to deter customs officers from
physical inspection.
(a) 1×106 Cigarettes (b) 514kg Cocaine
Figure 2.4: Examples of concealment within a legitimate (a) and a false partition (b).
Source: EU Commission [39].
hidden contraband Contraband can be hidden within container par-
titions, and amongst or within legitimate cargo. Container partitions can be
legitimate or false. Examples of legitimate partitions include the container
cross-beams, the refrigeration unit in refrigerated containers, or compart-
ments in the container roof and floor (Figure 2.4a). OCNs retrofit false parti-
tions to the container. Typically false walls or bulkheads (Figure 2.4b) are in-
stalled, sometimes with a hidden entrance on the top of the container so that
it can be loaded with contraband. Even declared-as-empty containers have
been found with contraband stashed in false and legitimate partitions [39].
Contraband may also be hidden within legitimate items (Figure 2.5c), or
amongst legitimate cargo (Figures 2.5a, 2.5b and 2.5d).
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(a) Appears to be household goods (b) A stolen car is revealed
(c) Counterfeit cigarettes hidden in sofa (d) Missile hidden in pickled cucumbers
Figure 2.5: Examples of concealment within legitimate cargo shipments. Sources: UK
National Crime Agency and EU Commission [39].
camouflaged contraband One of the most sophisticated smug-
gling modus operandi is to disguise contraband as legitimate items. Cocaine
is often mixed with liquid cosmetics or oil [38]. There have been seizures
where cocaine has been mixed into plastic during the manufacturing pro-
cess of replica commercial products. In these cases the cocaine can be very
difficult to detect, particularly when mixed with plastics, even during phys-
ical inspection. However, it is unclear how efficiently the contraband can be
recovered. In addition to visual camouflage, substances such as naphthalene
may be used to disguise the scent of narcotics.
deterrence Often, OCNs experiment with new ways to deter customs
officers from physical inspection. This can include the use of unpleasant
odours such as excrement, making the cargo difficult or laborious to un-
pack by planting heavy loads, or by placing items in the container that are
dangerous if touched [40]. However, it is unclear whether such tactics work
because they can often arouse the suspicions of the inspector. Figure 2.6a
shows an example of where criminals experimented with using a beehive to
deter inspectors.
unhidden contraband If there is high confidence that a shipment
will not be inspected, OCNs can save money on the costs of hiding contra-
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(a) A beehive deterrent (b) Rip-on/rip-off bag
Figure 2.6: Examples of deterrence and unhidden contraband. The beehive was used
to deter border officers from inspecting the box which contains cocaine
bricks and trousers. The rip-on/rip-off bag contains 40kg cocaine, and
attached is a fresh seal (inset) so that the container can be resealed after
extraction. Source: EU Commission [39].
band. For example, they may have used agents to ensure that the shipment
is not inspected, or falsified manifest information to make the shipment ap-
pear ‘low risk’. Another reason to leave contraband unhidden is so that it
can easily be planted and extracted from the container in what is known
as a rip-on/rip-off attack. This relies on breaking into the container during
transit, when it is least likely to be inspected. It is essential that this is done
fast to reduce the risk of getting caught, and this is possible if contraband
is left unhidden. In rip-on/rip-off attacks, contraband is usually stored in
a sports bag so that it can be easily carried away (Figure 2.6b). Since 20%
of all containers are declared-as-empty and often left unlocked, they are This thesis aims to
address this issue, as
well as hidden
contraband in
otherwise empty
containers, in
Chapter 7.
particularly vulnerable to rip-on/rip-off attacks.
2.2.2 Use of agents
In addition to the method of concealment, OCNs employ deception, inside
agents, sabotage, bribery, blackmail, and corruption. Without too much ima-
gination, a number of fictional scenarios can be constructed based on global
experience in the area [34], as listed below.
deception A lorry driver is asked to smuggle duty-free cigarettes in
his lorry. With the monetary incentive offered by his contact, and believ-
ing that smuggling duty-free cigarettes is not too unethical because they
are too highly taxed, he agrees. After a year of smuggling cigarettes, they
are swapped for heroin without him knowing, and so he inadvertently
smuggles huge volumes of a Class A narcotic, something he would never
have agreed to originally.
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inside agents A UK port hires an ex-convict as a cleaner. After a few
years, the ex-convict is promoted and trained to operate cranes, but is not
allowed to inspect cargo due to his criminal history. The ex-convict moves
a cargo container to a quiet part of the port where it is forgotten about and
avoids inspection. A few months later the container is found and opened by
another port worker and it is found to contain 30 stowaway cadavers. The
container was supposed to be picked up by truck, but it was found too risky
due to the surveillance at the port.
blackmail A port worker has been monitored for several months by
an OCN and found to be using prostitutes. The OCN threaten to tell his em-
ployers and family, unless he does a job for them. The job is simply to open
up a container, retrieve a locked metal case and to take it to a public toilet at
20:00. The case contains two AK47s, ammunition, and grenades. A month
later, there is a Mumbai-style terrorist attack in London, with 61 people
killed. The weapons were purchased by the terrorists on the Deep Web.
bribery A port worker is in financial difficulty with several unpaid
credit card debts, and he needs to replace his broken car. He meets a person
in the pub who says he will pay him £10,000 to falsify a container inspec-
tion. The container is from Columbia and contains shoes as well as 100kg of
cocaine with a street value of £4,600,000. The next day there are reports that
a truck has been hijacked and the driver missing. The port worker is found
dead in his basement the next day, and believed to have taken his own life.
The £10,000 was never paid and the worker was actually murdered.
2.2.3 Document fraud
Harmonized
System (HS) is also
known as the
Harmonised
Commodity
Description and
Coding System.
Each cargo container has an associated manifest document that describes
broadly what is contained, including the mass, value, and types of cargo.
The type of cargo is characterised by a HS code. The codes are hierarchical.
For example, the HS code for a typical wine is constructed as:
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22 =⇒ Beverages, spirits and vinegar
2204 =⇒ Wine of fresh grapes, including fortified wines
2204.21 =⇒ In containers holding 2 litres or less
2204.21.4210 =⇒ Of alcoholic strength by volume 6 13%.
Criminals, individuals and businesses can intentionally falsify manifests
in order to avoid tariffs and duties. The types of falsification include [37]:
false HS codes (tariff); undervaluation; over-valuation; under-declaration;
and over-declaration. Such methods can also help evade import restrictions
and exchange controls, and enable false claims for export refunds, remis-
sions and drawbacks. Moreover, false licenses and permits may be used to
help evade quotas and prohibitions. These can be obtained by theft, unau-
thorised completion of genuine blank documents, or forgery and alteration
of existing documents [37].
Finally, the recorded cargo origin and destination can be falsified, giving
entitlement to preferential duty rates for products from specified countries,
and allowing evasion of quota restrictions or anti-dumping regulations ap-
plied to certain countries. Falsifying the destination can allow evasion of
export restrictions to particular countries. This can be achieved by shipping
the cargo to a middleman, who forwards the consignment to the actual des-
tination.
2.3 spillover crime
Apart from the crimes listed in the taxonomy (Figure 2.2), cargo crime can
lead on to other forms of crime, in what is known as ‘spillover crime’ [41].
For example, smuggling brings in revenue for the OCN, which can be rein-
vested into other illegal activities. Moreover, the revenue from smuggling
helps the OCN survive, if not grow, and OCNs are heavily associated with
violence.
For OCNs violence is vital; it provides both a means for internal control
and a weapon that is highly visible from the outside [42]. Often, unlike a
legitimate business, OCNs cannot use the law to settle disputes with rivals,
and so have to resort to violent turf war. OCNs are also highly paranoid that
they have been infiltrated by law enforcement, or rival networks [42]. And
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since an OCN operates to reduce risk, if they have the slightest suspicion
about a member, then they take the lowest risk solution; murder.This is often referred
to as the ‘9mm rule’
by law
enforcement [34].
The proceeds from smuggling are often laundered and concealed within
front business activities. OCNs have to avoid the scrutiny of bank regulat-
ors and investigators, which requires them to have in-house specialists in-
cluding financial advisers, accountants, and bankers [42]. Often bribery and
blackmail is used to hire specialists, however they can also be deceived, or
fully cognisant but motivated by a large salary. Even bankers in major fin-
ancial centres have been found to work for OCNs [42].
By targeting and disrupting the logistics of OCNs, one can harm their
profits, and in turn reduce spillover crime.
2.4 terrorism
There is a nexus between organised crime and terrorism [43].
Firstly, for terrorists to execute attacks they need to obtain a weapon. Typ-
ically, home-made explosives were used, however, there has been recent in-
spiration from the 2008 Mumbai attacks where terrorists used firearms in-
discriminately on soft targets. In recent years, the number of Mumbai-style
attacks [8] have increased as evidenced by the attacks on Paris [44] and on
the beaches of Tunisia [45]. It is argued that most of these weapons come
from the Balkan states, which are awash with illegal firearms left over from
conflicts in the 1990s [43, 46]. So there is a direct connection between organ-
ised arms traffickers (a type of OCN) in the Balkans and terrorist attacks com-
mitted elsewhere in Europe. The firearms may not intentionally be sold to
the terrorists, however the trafficking increases the pool of weapons within
a country, giving terrorists more opportunity to obtain one.In fact, opportunity
is seen by many
crime theories as the
key driver for
crime [47, 48]. A
would-be terrorist
might know someone
with a weapon and
purchase, borrow, or
steal it.
There is also a link between terrorism and OCNs specialising in narcotics
trafficking [43], due to the borderless aspect of crime. For example, the Re-
volutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), whose annual income from
narcotics is as high as 3 billion USD per annum [49], often make transac-
tions with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in narcotics. In return, the IRA
provides the FARC with training in terrorist and guerilla techniques [43].
The IRA has been found to trade narcotics with Croatian arms traffickers.
Another example is the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) who have also used
narcotics as barter for weapons from the Balkans to support their terrorist
endeavours [43]. The ETA have also been known to receive heavy weapons
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from the Camorra OCN in Italy, and to have provided explosives to Hamas
in Palestine [43]. In Northern Ireland, it was found that over half of gangs
have links to republican or loyalist paramilitary groups, and it is estimated
that 66% of gang members are involved in narcotics, 55% in counterfeiting
and 50% in money laundering [43].
Due to this complex nexus between OCNs and terrorism, a robust ap-
proach to reducing the risk of terrorism is to target and disrupt all types
of organised crime, including cargo smuggling, and not just the movements
of terrorist implements.
2.5 container screening
Cargo screening is performed in three parts: (i) selection of containers for
inspection; (ii) NII of the container contents; and (iii) physical inspection of
the container and its contents. These components increase in cost, and so
nearly all containers are passed through selection, few of these are selected Some figures suggest
only 4-5% of
containers currently
undergo NII [3].
for NII, and even fewer are physically inspected.
2.5.1 Container selection
Containers are selected based on a risk analysis, specific intelligence from
ongoing criminal investigations, or at random. The container risk is often as-
sessed by an automated system based on the shipping manifest information.
Risk indicators can be associated with [40]:
• Involved parties – absence of cooperation from the economic operator,
use of a carrier with dubious reliability, or involvement of suspicious
companies; Companies may be
deemed suspicious if
they; are
newly-formed, have a
weak financial
structure, have
previous history of
fraud, or if the
shipment originates
from a known high
risk geographical
region [40].
• Involved goods – goods systematically labelled as ‘others’, dubious or
absent labelling, discordance between the weight and number of pack-
ages, and inadequate packaging for the type of goods;
• Shipment route – unjustified route involving transshipment, or an un-
economic route.
Since the risk analysis is usually informed by prior seizures, criminals may
purposefully use low risk countries or manifest details. Therefore it is im-
portant to randomly select a fraction of low risk containers for inspection.
New discoveries can be used to update the risk analysis.
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2.5.2 Non-intrusive inspection
There are a wide range of image-based NII technologies available to customs
officers, which fall into two general categories; active and passive radio-
graphy. In active radiography, the container is probed using a radiographic
source and detectors. The main types of active radiation used are γ-rays, X-
rays, and neutrons. Passive radiography exploits natural radiation sources,
such as neutron or γ radiation emitted from goods inside the container or
muons from cosmic radiation.
Of the active radiation systems, transmission γ- and X-ray radiography
are the most common [29]. Such systems are well developed and can comeIn this thesis
single-view, and
single- and
dual-energy
transmission X-ray
scanners are
employed. These
systems are described
in detail in
Chapter 3.
in a number of different configurations, including multiple views to make
apparent heavily obscured objects, and multiple source energies to help dis-
criminate between different materials.
The type of photon sources differ between γ- and X-ray based systems;
X-rays are usually created as Bremsstrahlung radiation from colliding ac-
celerated electrons into a metal target, and γ-rays are emitted from a ra-
dioactive source. X-ray cargo systems operate at higher energies than γ-ray
cargo systems, thus offering greater penetration. However, γ-ray sources
emit photons at discrete energies making material discrimination more strai-
ghtforward, in theory, than when using continuous Bremsstrahlung spectra.
With multiple views it is possible to reconstruct 3D information about
the container and contents [50], however due to the size of containers and
the number of views needed to reconstruct an accurate 3D image, these
systems are not in wide use. More recently, backscatter X-ray systems have
been developed, which operate at lower energies, and measure X-rays that
are scattered back towards the source. Backscatter systems are useful for the
detection of low atomic number signatures, such as narcotics and cigarettes.
Research is ongoing into the possibilities of forming 3D images by measur-
ing the time-of-flight of individual X-rays [51].
Passive imaging systems are less common for cargo screening, although
non-imaging systems such as radiation monitors are commonplace. Neutron-
based systems can be designed to exploit different neutron interactions in-
cluding scatter and thermal neutron capture. The benefits of these systems
over X-ray, is that they give a much greater degree of material discrimin-
ation, particularly for organic materials. However, neutron-based systems
offer less penetration than X-ray or γ-ray systems [29]. Another passive tech-
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nology is muon tomography, which uses natural muons from cosmic rays.
By detecting the momentum and trajectory of muons, a 3D image of the
container contents can be reconstructed and it is possible to achieve mater-
ial discrimination [52]. The technology is still in its infancy, but offers some
promise.
(a) 300 kg of cocaine (b) Cigarettes hidden behind shoes
(c) Hidden hunting rifles (d) Handgun
Figure 2.7: X-ray images of smuggled contraband. Images courtesy of Dutch Cus-
toms.
The captured image is inspected by a customs officer, who generally
looks for two things when detecting threats; tell-tale silhouettes and an-
omalies [53]. When searching for tell-tale silhouettes, operators search for
objects in the image that are similar in size, shape and density to known
threats. For example, weapons and military equipment have a distinctive
silhouette in comparison to common legitimate items. Anomaly detection
is useful if the image is very confusing due to clutter, the threat is very
small, or if the adversary has masked the threat with dense materials. An-
omalies can be indicated by breaks in symmetry, or changes in density or
texture. Additionally operators may look for wavy or turbulent patterns
which may indicate illegal liquids sloshing around [53]. Figure 2.7c gives an
example where a weapon can be found by searching for a tell-tale silhou-
ette and Figure 2.7d by looking for an anomaly. The narcotics and cigarettes
in Figures 2.7a and 2.7b can be found either by looking for silhouettes or
anomalies.
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In addition to searching for specific threats or anomalies, customs of-
ficers also compare the image appearance to the manifest document. This
is known as Manifest Verification (MV). The simplest form of MV is to check
whether a declared-as-empty container is actually empty and does not con-
tain smuggled contraband, or has been declared-as-empty to avoid tariffs
on legitimate items. Moreover, more advanced MV could include estimat-
ing the HS code types, numbers and masses of objects in the container and
comparing with the manifest.
If a threat, anomaly, or manifest discrepancy are discovered in the image,
the container is sent for physical inspection.
2.5.3 Physical inspection
Physical inspection is a long and arduous process, and can lead to shipment
delays of between a day and several weeks [54]. Before the container is even
opened, the exterior of the container is carefully checked. Particular atten-
tion is paid to the locks and seals, signs of container repair and tampering,
new paintwork or mastics, and alterations to the container numbering [40].
Sniffer dogs are often used to scout out the container exterior for drugs or
explosives. Sometimes, if the container is padlocked, a locksmith is required
to gain access. This process is all carefully documented and photographed
in case it is needed as evidence [40].
Next, officers open the container carefully checking that the cargo is not
leaning against the door. The condition and arrangement of items in the
container is carefully documented, in case there is a later claim for dam-
ages. Heed is given to the warning signs (e.g. flammable, toxic) placed on
the goods to ensure the proper precautions are taken. Officers pay atten-
tion to unusual odours such as excrement or naphthalene, which can be
used to camouflage drug odours or deter officers [40]. If possible all of the
goods are removed from the container and undergo individual inspection.
The officers will compare the weights of ‘identical’ packages, and inspect
them for visual irregularities, such as damage or glue that might indicate
tampering [40]. Officers often use hand-held devices to non-intrusively test
individual packages.
After goods inspection, the container interior is checked for signs of false
partitions or tampered-with legitimate partitions. For example, a tape meas-
ure can be used to check the interior dimensions, if they are shorter than
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expected then this indicates a possible false partition [40]. Some containers
are more difficult to inspect, such a refrigeration units where the insulation
should be removed and inspected for hidden contraband [40].
When a smuggling attempt is discovered, the customs officers consult
with law enforcement on the next actions. Sometimes it is best to leave the
contraband in place, or substitute it for dummy contraband, and keep the
container under surveillance [37]. This can help the authorities gather more
intelligence on the OCN or terrorist network, helping them inflict maximum
damage to the network. It is worth noting that not all smuggling attempts
have to be detected, since an OCN may make many attempts, and detecting
just one of them can take out large parts of the network after further invest-
igations. At the same time, it is important to limit false positive searches
since physical inspection is expensive and time-consuming.
2.6 the future of supply chain and border security
Due to the importance of a high throughput to the world economy, invest-
ments are being made to automate parts of the supply chain. In the UK, a
recent example is London Gateway, which uses fully automated cranes and
traditional artificial intelligence task planning and optimisation strategies to
pick and stack cargo containers, as well as route trucks to the correct region
of the port to pick up a container [55]. In the future, to cope with increasing
throughput demands, automation is likely to stretch to security too. Indeed,
the UK Government has recently announced plans to increase the amount
of automation in its National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and
Security Review [56]. In particular, the government is concerned about the
illegal movements of firearms and their potential use in terrorist attacks and
by OCNs:
‘We will strengthen our ability to detect the movements of people and goods such
as illegal firearms that present a threat, through detection technology and better
data on land, sea and air passengers and cargo, and through intelligence and
targeting. We will modernise and introduce more automation to enable us to
deploy our border officers where they are needed most, including an enhanced
presence at our sea ports.’ — hm government [56]
At present, there is a compromise between security and throughput. High
security, without automation, inevitably leads to a reduction in throughput.
This is particularly evident in airports, where all passengers and baggage
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are screened, but this takes time, leading to queues and frustrated passen-
gers. Cargo is currently in the opposite paradigm. Throughput is typically
very high, but security is weak because only a small fraction of selected
containers are inspected even non-intrusively.
For cargo, there are a number of systems that can scan all containers auto-
matically at high speed. For example the high-speed Rapiscan Eagle® R60,
can scan containers carried by rail at 60km/h and automatically detects
when containers are passing through the scanner to form individual con-
tainer images, and turns off when the driver’s cabin is passing through. If
such scanners were used at all ports for cargo entering or exiting the port
by land, potentially every container can be imaged automatically. However,
with images taking up to 15 minutes for a full inspection [57], the number of
images is overwhelming for human operators. Automated security, through
automated image analysis, can help to negate the security-throughput com-
promise. Particularly if automated inspection can be performed at a similar
or better performance than humans in terms of accuracy and speed.
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Figure 2.8: Process diagrams showing the cargo inspection process and possible uses
of automated image analysis; Assisted Inspection, and Assisted Selection.
In Assisted Inspection, annotations (e.g. bounding boxes with a labelled
confidence score) determined in the Image Understanding step are ad-
ded to the image so that the operator can more quickly identify threats.
In Assisted Selection, image analysis is used to inform the risk analysis
so that cargo is selected for inspection with greater accuracy, and thus
reducing the burden on human operators.
Automated image analysis can help with cargo screening by Assisted In-
spection or Assisted Selection (Figure 2.8). Currently most research has been
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geared towards Assisted Inspection, with algorithms designed to assist the
operator, such as by annotating the image with a Region-Of-Interest (ROI) All commercial
products are
currently geared
towards Assisted
Inspection.
to prompt the operator of a potential security- or customs-related threat.
Furthermore, image analysis can be used to improve image quality or com-
pute material properties that can help operators identify threats. The goal
of Assisted Selection is to use automated image analysis to inform the risk
analysis used for cargo selection, but relies on the ability to scan all contain-
ers at high throughput rates. When high-throughput scanners are widely
deployed, Assisted Selection has the potential to increase true positive and
reduce false positive cargoes in the selected sample. In doing so, it should
allow for human resources to be allocated more efficiently.
Automated image analysis has other advantages. Firstly, typical inspec-
tion algorithms give more consistent decision times than humans. For ex-
ample, and in theory, a window-based inspection algorithm running on a In a window-based
algorithm, the image
is split into a number
of ROIs (windows)
and each one is
analysed
individually, before
the results are
aggregated to
determine the overall
processing output for
the image.
dedicated computer system, will make a decision in a time
Nw × tw + ta, (2.1)
where Nw is the number of analysis windows in the image, tw is the time
taken to analyse each window, and ta is the time taken to aggregate the
The assumption that
tw is fixed, is true
for most algorithms,
however there are
some CNN
architectures that can
exit early if the
analysis is
straightforward [58].
In this case, tw is
variable.
window results to come to a decision on the whole container. And since the
size of each container is known, the number of windows is known, and so is
the analysis time for a given container. This is independent of the difficulty
of the image content. Human speed, however, can vary due to a number
of different factors, for example if they are tired, distracted, or the image
is particularly complex, then image inspection can take longer. Consistent
inspection times are beneficial for planning and budgeting resource alloca-
tion.
Secondly, it is easier to tune the Detection Rate (DR) and False Positive
Rate (FPR) of an algorithm. This is important operationally, since the system
can be tuned for different purposes. For example, if there was intelligence
about an imminent terrorist threat using weapons, the system could be set
to detect almost 100% of weapons but with a relatively high false alarm rate.
Alternatively, a customs agency might be satisfied with detecting only 30%
of cigarettes, so long as there were very few false positives. With automated
inspection algorithms, the DR and FPR can be set using a tunable confidence
threshold. With humans, it is much more difficult to control the DR and
26 supply chain crime and security
FPR, but one might be able to achieve it by controlling the amount of time
allowed for image inspection. Even so, this is difficult in practice.
Thirdly, computing power is easier to scale-up than human power. It just
requires purchasing additional hardware and installation of relevant soft-
ware. And it is easier to determine the extra resources available because of
the more consistent analysis times in automated systems. Employing more
humans can take time, and requires expensive training.
Finally, inspection algorithms do not suffer from a number of human
factors and potential rogue external influences as outlined in Section 2.2.2.
2.7 summary
This chapter has identified the key security vulnerabilities in the cargo sup-
ply chain. Since high container throughput is of great economical import-
ance, the thoroughness of container inspections has been restricted to only
a small fraction of the container fleet. Security is weak, particularly when
compared to aviation security, where all goods and people are inspected
before transportation.
Historically, one aspect of the security protocol that has limited inspec-
tions was the use of NII to scan containers and their contents. However,
recent advances in high-throughput scanner technologies will remove this
limitation if such systems become widely adopted. The new limitation, is the
sheer volume of images that need to be visually inspected, and the limited
human resources available to do so. There are other limitations to relying
solely on humans, including, that they are error prone, are inconsistent with
themselves and with each other in terms of inspection speed and accuracy,
and are vulnerable to external rogue influences.
In this thesis, methods of automated image analysis are proposed, which
have the potential to reduce these limitations, whilst improving the through-
put of containers.
3
L A R G E - S C A L E T R A N S M I S S I O N X - R AY I M A G I N G
This chapter introduces the principles of X-ray imaging, and howthese are practically implemented at large-scale to image cargocontainers and vehicles for the purpose security screening. X-ray
vehicle and cargo scanners are different to typical X-ray devices used in
medical imaging or for screening baggage at airports. For example, the re-
quired physical size of the apparatus introduces sources of noise not seen
in other systems, and much higher X-ray energies are required to probe the
container contents, meaning that the nature of the dominant X-ray interac-
tions with matter are different to typical X-ray scanners from the medical or
aviation security domains.
3.1 a brief history
X-rays were accidentally discovered by several Physicists in the 1880s, as
they often manifested as unexplainable fogginess or shadows on photo-
graphic plates placed near Crookes tubes [59]. However, it was not until Röntgen referred to
them as ‘X-rays’ to
indicate that they
were a new,
unknown type of
ray [60]. The name
has become
permanent.
1895 that the first paper was published on X-rays by Röntgen. The paper
excited the global Physics community, and many researchers had repeated
Röntgen’s experiments in a matter of weeks. Industry was quick to catch
up, and before long several private X-ray imaging facilities were set-up and
adverts for X-ray equipment began to appear in newspapers [53].
As little as a year later, in Paris, Dr. T. Bordas suggested that X-rays could
be used to interrogate the interiors of suspicious packages to check whether
they were ‘infernal machines’ [53]. By 1897, customs houses in France had
begun using X-rays to screen passenger belongings for contraband [60]. So
surprisingly, the use of X-rays by customs officials began much earlier than
many have reason to believe. Since then, there have been numerous techno-
logical advancements to reach today’s X-ray instruments that are common-
place at ports around the world.
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3.2 x-ray physics
X-rays can, as can other types of electromagnetic radiation, be partly de-
scribed in terms of waves and partly in terms of particles. This is known as
the wave-particle duality. Each X-ray photon has an energy E determined by
the Plank-Einstein relation
E = hν =
hc
λ
, (3.1)
where h is Plank’s constant, c is the speed of light, and ν and λ are the asso-For example X-ray
diffraction imaging
exploits the wave-like
nature of X-rays [61].
ciated wave frequency and wavelength respectively. X-rays exhibit a number
of particle- and wave-like phenomena which are exploited in a range of X-
ray image devices.
In large-scale transmission radiography for cargo and vehicle screening,Although
high-energy ‘X-rays’
and ‘γ-rays’ can
have similar energies,
they are
distinguished by the
fact that X-rays arise
from electron
transitions, whereas
γ-rays arise from
nuclear transitions.
energy cut-offs in the range 1-10MeV are employed which is much higher
than the energies of typical X-rays which range from 100 eV to 100keV.
3.2.1 X-ray generation
The high X-ray energies are required in cargo screening to provide sufficient
penetration. To achieve this, cargo scanners typically use a LINear ACceler-
ator (LINAC). The basic LINAC principle is as follows. Electrons are emitted
by a cathode, and a high voltage source pushes the electrons through a hol-
low pipe vacuum chamber. Cylindrical electrodes of increasing length are
placed within the vacuum chamber and given alternating charges. As elec-
trons pass through they are repelled by the negatively charged electrode and
then attracted towards positively charged electrode. In this way the electrons
are accelerated until they collide with a tungsten target. In the collision they
rapidly decelerate and create X-rays through the Bremsstrahlung process.Bremsstrahlung is a
German word, which
roughly translates to
‘braking radiation’.
The resulting X-ray energies fall into a continuous spectrum bounded by
the voltage used to accelerate the electrons, which is known as the cut-off
energy. An example of typical Bremsstrahlung spectra for 4MeV and 6MeV
sources are shown in Figure 3.1.
A metal collimator is used to shape the beam into the required geometry.
For cargo screening, a fan-beam geometry is often used to provide coverage
of the whole cargo container or vehicle. A fan-beam has an approximately
Gaussian-shaped cross section, and the width of this Gaussian, as determ-
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Figure 3.1: Simulated photon energy spectra for 4/6MeV dual-energy X-ray cargo
scanner; the two energies used in the scanners employed in this thesis.
Generated using code supplied by James Ollier, Rapiscan Systems.
ined by the collimator, is chosen dependent on the configuration of the de-
tectors. For systems with a linear detector array, it is important to make the
width small so that the maximum number of photons hit the detectors, how-
ever, if too small and the detector is wobbling, the beam may miss the array
completely. For systems with a planar detector array, the Gaussian width is The effects of detector
wobble are addressed
in Chapter 5
increased to give approximately uniform signal across the array’s width.
Cargo scanners are operated in a pulsed mode, which means that a pulse
of X-rays is emitted in a short period of time to sample the aligned point
in the scene. For dual-energy, systems the pulses alternate between high
and low energy, and the pulses are untangled to form both a high and low
energy image. The pulse frequency is typically around 100Hz, meaning A linear array is
used in Chapter 5
and a planar array in
Chapters 7 and 8.
that a typical dual-energy scan of a 40 ft container takes approximately one
minute if a 1D linear detector array is employed. A high-speed scanner with
a planar array can scan a 40 ft container in less than a second.
3.2.2 Interactions with matter
An X-ray beam passing through a material can be attenuated through a num-
ber of different particle interactions, including absorption and scatter. The
amount of attenuation can be described by the Beer-Lambert law. Consider
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X-rays of intensity Iz that are incident on a thin slab of homogeneous mater-
ial with cross-sectional area A, thickness dz and concentration C. The num-
ber of atoms illuminated by X-rays is given by CAdz. The atoms have a cross
section σ, which is an effective area that quantifies the intrinsic likelihood of
an attenuating interaction with the beam. Therefore, the total effective area
of the attenuating constituents in the material is given by σCAdz. From this,
the change of intensity dIz across the material slab can be expressed as
dIz = −Iz
σCA
A
dz. (3.2)
Integrating both sides yields the well-known Beer-Lambert law
I = I0e
−σCl = I0e
−µl, (3.3)
where l is the thickness of the material and µ is the attenuation co-efficient.
Since the probability of interactions vary as a function of the energy of the
incident X-ray photons, σ, and thus µ, have an energy dependence. Addi-
tionally, µ varies by the atomic number Z of the material. For inhomogen-
eous materials Z is dependent on z. So more generally, the Beer-Lambert
law is expressed as
I(E) = I0(E) exp(−
∫
µ(E,Z(z))dz). (3.4)
This is the basic principle that underpins X-ray imaging. Thick and dense
(concentrated) materials attenuate more photons and appear darker in the
image.
X-ray photons interact with matter via scattering and absorption by sev-
eral mechanisms each with their own interaction cross section. Scattering
alters the trajectory of the X-ray photon, whilst absorption destroys the ori-
ginal photon. The interactions most relevant to cargo X-ray imaging are pho-
toelectric absorption (σpe), Rayleigh scatter (σrs), Compton scatter (σcs) and
pair production (σpp). For each interaction, the cross section is dependent
on the photon energy E and the characteristics of the material being imaged.
The total cross section is the net effect of these different types of interaction,
such thatThere are many other
possible interactions,
but these have small
probabilities (cross
sections).
σ(E,Z) =
∑
i
σi(E,Z) (3.5)
≈ σpe(E,Z) + σrs(E,Z) + σcs(E,Z) + σpp(E,Z), (3.6)
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where σi are the attenuation coefficients from the individual interactions.
A plot of the attenuation coefficient contributions for iron are plotted in
Figure 3.2. At low energies the most dominant interaction in photoelectric
absorption, and for higher energies pair production begins to dominate. In-
coherent scatter dominates for intermediate energies. Although the Beer-
Lambert law that underpins transmission X-ray image formation is the same
for baggage and cargo, the interactions involved in the formation differ due
to the difference in photon energies employed.
In the next sections, the interactions relevant to cargo imaging are de-
scribed: photoelectric absorption; Rayleigh scattering; Compton scattering;
and pair production. Note that in
Figure 3.2, the
contribution of
photoelectric
absorption and
Rayleigh scatter are
several orders of
magnitude less than
Compton scatter and
pair production at
cargo cut-off
energies.
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Figure 3.2: Attenuation coefficient (µ) contributions plotted for iron as a function of
photon energy E. The vertical lines indicate typical photon cut-off ener-
gies used in baggage and cargo screening. Estimation of µ, which can be
determined by the difference between images captured at two energies, is
more difficult at cargo energies since the total µ gradient becomes small
and large-scale commercial systems tend to suffer from severe noise. Data
source: NIST [62].
3.2.2.1 Photoelectric absorption
The photoelectric effect is where the incident X-ray is absorbed by a bounded
electron. The photon energy is imparted to the electron which results in an
increase in its kinetic energy. At high energies, this extra energy is enough Albert Einstein
explained the effect
in terms of quanta
(photons) and it lead
to his Nobel Prize in
1921.
for the electron to escape the potential well of the nucleus, resulting in the
ejection of the electron and ionisation of the atom. The electron will sub-
sequently dissipate its energy in the material. If the electron was ejected
from an inner orbital, it is often replaced by an electron from an outer or-
bital, emitting a photon as its energy is reduced.
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The photoelectric cross section can be approximated as shown in Equa-
tion (3.7) [63].
σpe ∼

Z4/E3 low energy
Z5/E high energy,
(3.7)
where Z is the atomic number. This equation implies that the probability of
photoelectric interaction is higher at low energies than at high energies.
3.2.2.2 Coherent scattering
Coherent scatter, also known as Rayleigh scatter, occurs when the potential
well is large relative to the energy of the photon. In other words, the electron
is too tightly bound to the nucleus. In this case, the photon is absorbed
and immediately re-emitted by the electron. No energy transfer occurs, but
the photon can change direction after the process. Since the energy, and
thus wavelength, of the photon does not change. This process is known as
coherent scatter.
At X-ray energies the Rayleigh scatter cross section can be approximated
as shown in Equation (3.8) [63].
σrs ∝ (Z/E)n, where 2 < n < 2.5. (3.8)
3.2.2.3 Incoherent scatter
Incoherent scatter, also known as Compton scatter, is where the photonCompton scatter was
discovered by Arthur
Compton in 1923.
collides with a free or loosely-bound electron. In this case some photon
energy is imparted to the electron, which is ejected if loosely bound. The
The cross section is
dependent on the
scatter solid angleΩ.
This differential cross
section dσcs/dΩ is
given by the
Klein-Nishina
formula, which can
be integrated to
obtain the total cross
section.
total energy and momentum of the photon-electron system is conserved,
however the photon often changes direction after the interaction. Inverse
Compton scatter can also occur, where the photon emerges with increased
energy.
In Compton scatter the change in photon wavelength is described by
∆λ =
h
mec
(1− cos θ), (3.9)
where me is the mass of an electron and θ is the scattering angle.
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The total cross section for Compton scatter is expressed as shown in Equa-
tion (3.10) [63].
σcs ∝ Z.
{
1+ 
2
[
2(1+ )
1+ 2
−
log(1+ 2)

]
+
log(1+ 2)
2
−
1+ 3
(1+ 2)2
}
,
(3.10)
where  = E/mec2.
3.2.2.4 Pair production
Pair production results in the complete attenuation of the incident photon. Note that pair
production can create
other
lepton-anitlepton
pairs, such as
tau-muon. However,
these have greater
mass and require
much higher energies
than used in cargo
screening.
It occurs when a high-energy photon interacts with the strong electric field
around the nucleus, spontaneously creating an electron and positron. In
the process charge is conserved, and the photon energy is converted into
the mass of the electron-positron pair. For these interactions to occur in the
field of a nucleus, the photon energy E must be at least 1.022MeV, which
is twice the rest mass of the electron. For E>1.022MeV the excess energy is
shared, often unequally, between the electron and positron. Pair production
is relevant to cargo scatter since the X-ray energy cut-off exceeds 1.022MeV,
however this is not the case for other X-ray imaging systems, such as those E>2.044MeV in
the field of an
electron.
used to inspect baggage at airports or those used in medical imaging.
The pair production cross section can be expressed as shown in Equa-
tion (3.11) [63]. Radiation length
characterises how
photons (and other
radiation) interact in
a material, and
depends on the
density and charge of
the nucleus. It is
defined as the mean
path length required
to reduce the energy
of the particle by a
factor of 1/e.
σpp(E,Z) ∝

A log(E) for low energy,
A/X0 ∝ Z(Z+ 1) log(287/
√
Z) for high energy,
(3.11)
where X0 is the radiation length of the material and A is the mass number.
3.2.3 X-ray detection
For X-ray detection, most commercial scanners use scintillator-photodiode
detectors [64]. Scintillators are excited by the incident X-rays, and re-emit This excitation
process is known as
luminescence
the absorbed energy as light, which is detected by the photodiode. For high
energy X-rays, cadmium tungstate is often used [64]. The scintillating crys-
tals can be several centimetres long.
Choosing the size of the detectors is a balancing game between the num-
ber of photons captured, and the spatial resolution in the image. By captur-
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ing more photons, the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) can be improved but the
spatial resolution is reduced, and vice versa. For cargo screening, the detect-Note that we refer to
it as ‘Γ -shaped’
rather than the
‘L-shaped’ typical of
the literature.
ors are usually positioned in a linear or piece-wise linear (Γ -shaped) array
(Figure 3.3b). The scintillating crystals are orientated so that each points to-
wards the source. There are other systems which employ a planar detector
array (Figure 3.3a), these are particularly useful for high-throughput scan-
ning since rather than measuring a single image column at a time, it can
measure T , so essentially the scanning can be done T times faster. However,For each X-ray pulse
the scanned object
can be moved on T
pixels rather than
one pixel.
such systems are more expensive since they require more detectors.
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Figure 3.3: Traverse and portal mode scanner architectures. The portal mode scanner
has a planar detector array allowing for high-speed scanning, and the
traverse mode scanner has a Γ -shape piece-wise linear array.
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The detectors are connected to data acquisition electronics, which convert
the photodiode readings into a photon count. This usually includes signal
amplification, and analogue-to-digital conversion.
3.3 large-scale transmission radiography
Since the LINAC produces a continuous spectra of X-rays, the image form-
ation equation is given by integrating the Beer-Lambert law together with
the energy spectrum
I =
∫Emax
0
I0(E) exp(−
∫
µ(E, z)dz)dE. (3.12)
Often the response of a detector is dependent on the energy of the incident
photons, and thus a factor is included to incorporate this, so that
I =
∫Emax
0
I0(E)D(E) exp(−
∫
µ(E, z)dz)dE, (3.13)
where D(E) is the response of the detector.
3.3.1 Modes of deployment
Large-scale transmission radiography scanners operate either in portal or
traverse mode, and some systems are capable of both [65]. Illustrations of
portal and traverse mode scanning architectures are given in Figure 3.3.
In portal mode the scanner is stationary and the container/vehicle moves
between the source and imaging array at a controlled speed. In traverse
mode the detector and source move either side of the stationary container-
/vehicle. Portal mode is most useful in high-throughput scenarios; vehicles
can drive through the scanner arch without the driver having to exit the
vehicle or a rail-scanner can scan multiple cargo containers carried by train Some systems detect
the driver’s cabin
and only activate the
X-rays when they
have passed through
the scanning arch.
at up to 60 km/h.
Traverse mode is useful in security scenarios where an unoccupied vehicle
cannot be interfered with, such as if it is suspected to be a car- or truck-
bomb, or if it needs to be covertly inspected. The traverse mode is also useful
for scanning lines of stationary cargo containers at ports [65]. The traverse
mode has advantages in some cases: (i) the scanned vehicle is unoccupied,
so higher doses can be used, resulting in higher precision images; (ii) there
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is greater control over scanning speed and detector-object distance resulting
in less spatial warping of the captured image; and (iv) they have a compactAlthough some
systems account for
warping in image
pre-processing.
scanning footprint [66].
3.3.2 Noise, artefacts, and distortion
There are several types of noise, artefacts, and geometric distortions that
effect X-ray imagery and can reduce the ability of human operators or al-
gorithms to detect threats. Their origins can be due to the physics of X-rays,
or due to defects in the scanning equipment. Examples of different noise,
artefact, and distortion are shown in Figure 3.4.
(a) Salt-and-pepper noise (b) Dead detector (c) Source misfire
(d) Source variation (e) Source variation (f) Geometric wobble
Figure 3.4: Example of typical image artefacts, noise and distortion that appears in
large-scale transmission radiography. Red arrows indicate effects.
poisson noise The physics of X-ray imaging involves several random
processes, and when combined they result in Poisson noise in the imageThe Binomial or
Poisson selection of a
Poisson process is
also Poisson.
pixels. The random variation can include: the number of photons emitted
by the source; the number of photons that pass, unattenuated, through the
scene; and the number of photons captured in the scintillating crystal. Since
these random processes are Poisson or Binomial, the overall process results
in Poisson distributed noise. One of the consequences of Poisson noise is
that the variance in photon counts is equal to the expected photon count.
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This means that for a given homogeneous object in the scene, the SNR varies
as the square-root of the mean pixel count.
salt-and-pepper noise X-ray images in digital systems can also suf-
fer from salt-and-pepper noise. This can be due to pixels that go tempor-
arily offline, errors in analogue-to-digital conversion, or data transmission.
It presents itself as sparsely occurring white and black pixels. Some sys-
tems tend to suffer from more salt-and-pepper noise than others. Figure 3.4a In this thesis, the
railscanner system
employed in
Chapter 7 suffers
from more severe
salt-and-pepper noise
than the gantry
system employed in
Chapter 5.
shows an example of salt-and-pepper noise.
wobble Detector wobble only affects systems operating in traverse mode,
where the detector can wobble as the system moves due to mechanical in-
stability. It can manifest itself as noise, artefacts, and geometric distortions.
For example in Gantry systems, where the scanner moves along rails, the
pattern of wobble is generally consistent, affecting each image in a similar
way, and thus wobble creates image artefacts. In these systems, it is gener-
ally caused by the rails being bent or buckled, or due to irregularities in
the driving mechanism. In truck-mounted traverse-mode systems, wobble
is unpredictable due to heavy gusts of wind or variations in the ground
topology when scanning at different locations. Thus, wobble is a random
process which is different for each image, and wobble presents as image
noise. In cases of extreme wobble, there can be geometric distortions in the
image. This is most obvious where straight lines appear to be bent, when
they should not. Wobble artefacts and noise are addressed in Chapter 5, and
an example of geometric distortion due to wobble can be seen in Figure 3.4f.
source variation and misfire Since each LINAC pulse forms a col-
umn (or number of columns for planar arrays) of the scene, source variation
can manifest as vertical stripes in the image. This is observed in most cargo
systems. Examples of source variation can be seen in Figures 3.4d and 3.4e.
Source misfire occurs when the source does not fire for one or more pulses
during image acquisition, in this work this is particularly noticeable for the
railscanner used in Chapter 7, since it is a planar array; one missed pulse
leads to noticeable missing image content such as in Figure 3.4c.
detector artefacts Detector artefacts can lead to row artefacts in
the image. This can be due to the variable distance of the detectors from the
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source, variable detector orientation, variable detector displacement from
the array mid-line, or if groups of (or single) detector pixels are dead (Fig-
ure 3.4b). Variable distance, orientation and displacements are addressed in
Chapter 5.
scatter Scatter through the Compton process leads to a blurring ef-
fect in images, particularly noticeable at the edges of objects. Some systems
attempt to correct for this by using an anti-scatter grid to block photons
moving along scattered trajectories.
3.3.3 Image properties
Cargo X-ray imagery have some unique properties. Due to the large-scale
of the volumes that are imaged and the divergent X-ray fan-beam, a mag-
nification effect occurs. The magnification depends on the distance of an
object from the source. If it is close to the source it intercepts more lines of
photon flux, since they are bunched closer together near the source. If it is
further away, it intercepts fewer lines of flux as they have a longer distance
over which to diverge. This results in objects placed close to the source ap-
pearing taller than those placed further away, as shown in Figure 3.5. Thick
objects (e.g. the container itself) appear skewed in the image due to the rel-
ative magnification between the front and back of the object. Similarly long,
straight, thin objects can appear bent if oriented so that one end is close to
the source and the other is far way.
(a) Far from source (b) Close to source
Figure 3.5: Example of the magnification effect in X-ray cargo imagery. Weapons
placed furthest from the source (a) appear much shorter than when
placed close to the source (b).
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The projective nature of X-ray imagery is, in theory, beneficial over op-
tical imagery, since objects appear translucent. This means that if an object
occludes another, the information about both objects is encoded in the im-
age unless one is completely radiopaque. However, this can make images
very confusing, particularly if they contain lots of complicated overlapping
objects. This can limit the human operator’s capability to quickly locate and
identify potential threats.
Typically, cargo X-ray scanners capture 16-bit images with high dynamic
range and effective spatial resolutions of a few mm/pixel [64]. This means
that an uncompressed single-energy, single-view, X-ray image of a 40 ft con-
tainer consists of approximately 2600×850 pixels and occupies around 5MB
of disk space.
(a) Airport baggage
(b) Cargo container
Figure 3.6: Comparison of a typical dual-view X-ray image of baggage and a typical
single-view X-ray image of cargo. The red boxes indicate the approximate
size of a handgun in the image. In baggage, the handgun occupies a large
portion of the image, and there is little distracting clutter, so that there is a
strong visual signature. In cargo, there is typically a lot more clutter and
the handgun occupies a very small portion of the image, which makes
handgun detection difficult for both humans and algorithms.
3.4 comparison with baggage
Cargo images pose a difficult visual search task for the human operator, and
they are much more difficult to analyse than other types of border security
imagery such as airport baggage or parcels. This is because cargo scanners Determined based on
British Airways
cabin bag size
allowance of
56 cm×45 cm×25 cm.
have to operate at a much larger scale. For example, a 40 ft General Pur-
pose cargo container has a volume of 67.6m3 [67] and is made out of steel,
40 large-scale transmission x-ray imaging
whereas hand luggage volume is typically 0.063m3 and usually made out
of fabric or plastics. The physical scale of cargo scanners makes it difficult
to efficiently perform 3D Computed Tomography (CT) [51] but some multi-
view systems do exist. Moreover, for cargo it is more difficult to extract
material composition information due to the higher energies required for
sufficient penetration to obtain good image contrast (Figure 3.2). Cargo im-
ages are also far more cluttered, whilst small threats, such as firearms, have
a very small visual signature. A comparison between dual-view baggage
and single-view cargo imagery is shown in Figure 3.6.
3.5 summary
In this chapter, the main principles of X-ray physics have been introduced,
and their roles in image formation, noise, artefacts and distortions, were
described. Knowledge of these physical processes plays an important role
in the technical chapters of this thesis. In particular, understanding image
formation allows us to construct a model of image formation in the pres-
ence of a wobbling detector in Chapter 5, which is used in the correction of
wobble artefacts in cargo imagery. Further, the understanding of X-ray im-
ages and their natural variations leads to the development of a Threat Image
Projection (TIP) framework (Chapter 6) and image pre-processing methods
that are fundamental to Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.
4
L I T E R AT U R E R E V I E W
Here, we explore the prior literature on automated image analysisfor cargo. The literature can be separated into the themes ofimage pre-processing (Section 4.2) and image understanding (Sec-
tion 4.3). Image pre-processing is a broad category including any operation
made to an image in order to help image understanding by either humans or
algorithms. Image pre-processing includes: image manipulation; image correc-
tion and denoising; material discrimination and segmentation; and Threat
Image Projection (TIP). Image understanding methods make decisions based
on the image contents. Current methods for this can be split into Auto-
mated Threat Detection (ATD) and Automated Contents Verification (ACV).
Section 4.4 summarises the state of the field and highlights how this thesis
contributes towards moving it forward.
In some cases, the literature directly relating to cargo imagery is scarce.
This is due largely to commercial and security protection, and the difficulty
for academics to obtain access to commercial scanning hardware. Moreover,
the majority of funding goes towards aviation security, where search tasks
are more tractable, and there is a more obvious and immediate threat from
terrorism. In cases where cargo research is sparse, other domains such as
baggage can provide insight, since many of the findings there may be trans-
ferable to the cargo domain.
4.1 example x-ray imagery
Automated image analysis has been applied mostly to transmission X-ray
imagery, however some researchers have conducted research on joint trans-
mission and backscatter systems [68]. Examples of X-ray imagery from the
literature are presented in Figure 4.1 along with the imagery used in this
thesis.
Backscatter systems differ from transmission system in that they measure
X-rays reflected by the scene and back towards the source. This means that
the detector and source are located in close proximity. The reflections oc-
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(a) Zheng and Elmaghraby [68]
(b) Vogel [69] (c) Chalmers [70]
(d) Rapiscan Systems
Figure 4.1: Examples of cargo X-ray images, including: (a) triple-view backscatter
and single transmission images from an AS&E OmniView® Gantry; (b)
example of concealed cigarettes (indicated by red arrows) in a transmis-
sion X-ray image of refrigerated container; (c) transmission image of 20 ft
container carried by lorry; and (d) examples of (pre-processed) transmis-
sion images from the SoC captured by a Rapiscan Eagle® R60 railscanner,
and used for the work in Chapters 7 and 8.
cur primarily through Compton scatter. Backscatter images, do not provideSee discussion on
Compton scatter in
Chapter 3.
high penetration, but are more suitable for detecting low density contra-
band, such as narcotics or cigarettes. Due to the low penetration, the cargo
container often has to be imaged from multiple views, requiring extra de-
tectors and sources, thus making them more expensive than transmission
systems.
This review focuses primarily on single-view transmission X-ray imagery.
Such systems provide much greater penetration and high contrast, making
them more useful for detecting concealed items.
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4.2 image pre-processing
In this review, image pre-processing is defined as any process which is per-
formed before, and in order to improve the performance of, image under-
standing by humans or automated systems. Four topics from the literature
have been identified: image manipulation; image quality improvement; ma-
terial discrimination and segmentation; and TIP.
4.2.1 Image manipulation
Image manipulation is used to improve the performance of human operat-
ors and potentially automated image understanding algorithms. Most work
has been on studying the threat detection performance of human operators
under different image manipulation functions implemented in commercial
image viewing software. Manipulations include pseudo-colouring, edge en- Note that
pseudo-colour, in this
case, is not based on
material properties.
Material
discrimination is
discussed in
Section 4.2.4.
hancement, and intensity transforms such as Adaptive Histogram Equalisa-
tion (AHE), logarithm and square-root (Figure 4.2) [71].
(a) Raw single-energy image (b) Logarithm transform
(c) Square-root transform (d) Histogram equalisation
Figure 4.2: Examples of different image manipulations for an X-ray image of a car
with partial occlusion. There is still some debate over which manipulation
facilitates best human or algorithmic image understanding.
For cargo screening, Michel et al. [72] have found that image pseudo-
colouring does not lead to improved performance over the raw greyscale,
for humans searching for narcotics, weapons, Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs) and other explosives. Similar results have been found by Klock [73],
who tested human performance at detecting concealed IEDs, guns, knives
and other prohibited items in baggage. Evaluated manipulations included
pseudo-colour, intensity inversion, inorganic or organic material stripping,
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and a commercial Crystal Clear™ image enhancement. They found that theDetails of Crystal
Clear™ are difficult
to find, but the
function ‘optimises
image contrast and
resolution to bring
out picture details’
according to a public
verbal
communication by
Andreas Kotowski
(Rapiscan Systems
CTO) in 2001.
raw grey-scale image and the Crystal Clear™ enhancement enabled best
human performance.
Chen [64] reasons that although most X-ray cargo images are captured
and encoded in 16 bits, typical grey-scale displays only use 8 bits and so
useful information is lost, but with pseudo-coloured images, there are 8 bits
available for each colour channel, thus potentially preserving the informa-
tion. However, he argues that the effectiveness of pseudo-colour is in fact
limited by the ability of humans to detect subtle colour differences. The au-
thor also claims that edge enhancement techniques do not work well for
cargo due to the complexity of objects and high pixel noise. Chen [64] qual-
itatively evaluates linear, logarithm and AHE image transforms. He argues
that the log transform can be beneficial as it makes image brightness ap-
proximately proportional to object thickness, but thin items are sometimes
lost. Chen [64] states that the square-root transform can be beneficial since
the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) is proportional to the square-root of pixel
intensity, thus it is an equal-noise display method. Finally, the author ob-
serves that qualitatively AHE is the best method, but that information on
object thickness is lost.
To best knowledge, there have been no specific studies on the effect of
image manipulations on automated image understanding in cargo. However,
other researchers have applied different image manipulations before apply-
ing image understanding algorithms. These include: Gaussian blurring [6];
rudimentary segmentation algorithms to extract different image regions [6];
Weiner filtering and wavelet shrinkage denoising [74]; and intensity inver-
sion followed by z-score normalisation and Retinex filtering [68]. Retinex
filtering is an image enhancement method that aims to mimic human visual
perception, and the name ‘retinex’ is derived from the words ‘retina’ and
‘cortex’. The method adjusts local contrast whilst retaining global tonal qual-
ity.
4.2.2 Wobble and image quality improvement
Image quality improvement can include denoising methods to ameliorate
Poisson or salt-and-pepper noise, and methods to correct image errors that
arise during image acquisition. A major component of this thesis is dedic-
ated to the measurement and correction of detector wobble. There have been
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no previous publications addressing wobble in large-scale transmission ra-
diography. However, wobble leads to artefacts in a range of imaging devices,
including C-arm Computed Tomography (CT) micro-CT. The most relevant
works and how they relate to the wobble effect that this thesis attempts to
measure and correct in Chapter 5, are discussed here.
C-arm CT systems suffer from wobble as the gantry rotates. This means
that individual projections are translated relative to those captured by the
ideal wobble-free device. Researchers note that the wobble of the C-arm
gantry is often repeatable over periods of up to two years and so wobble
artefacts can be corrected by a one-off system calibration [75, 76]. This is
similar to some large-scale transmission systems, particularly those that are
in fixed deployment and the gantry moves along rails, where the wobble
effect tends to be systematic. However, in truck-mounted mobile systems,
wobble is much more unpredictable due to variable scan speed and due to
variations in the surface topology that the truck traverses and the dynamics
of the truck suspension. Moreover, in C-arm CT, the wobble artefacts tend
to lead to a blurring effect in the reconstructed image due to the misalign-
ment of individual projections, whereas in large-scale transmission systems,
wobble mostly leads to image intensity variations as the fan-beam comes in
and out of alignment with the detectors.
Silver et al. [75] propose a method for determining and correcting wobble
in C-arm CT. The authors assume that the wobbling motion of the C-arm is
identical for each image capture process, and so calibrate wobble correction
based on a phantom image. The phantom consists of a helical structure of
tungsten carbide spheres (pellets). The calibration computes wobble coef-
ficients that are used directly in image reconstruction to obtain an image
free from wobble artefacts. The wobble coefficients are determined by fit-
ting a mapping from physical space to projection space using least-squares.
Fahrig and Holdsworth [76] also adopt a calibration approach to determine
projection translations. They use a bicubic spline interpolation to determine
translated projections. Since the calibration process determines translations
at discrete gantry angles, they linearly interpolate between them to obtain
estimates for different projection angles if required.
Wobble is also observed in micro-CT systems, but the wobble manifests in
the rotation table since the detector and source are kept stationary [77]. In
this case, wobble again leads to a blurring effect in the image, quite differ-
ent to the effect observed in large-scale transmission systems. Authors have
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investigated image-based, calibration-based, and online methods to correct
for wobble.
Sasov et al. [77] investigate and evaluate both an image-based method and
a calibration-based method. The image-based method is an iterative com-
pensation scheme, which first does an initial reconstruction using filtered
back-projection, yielding a blurry wobble affected reconstruction. Estimates
for projection translations, to compensate for wobble, are determined by
comparing the original projections with corresponding forward-projected
image estimates. The comparison is done either by cross-correlation or least-
squares. Under these translations a new reconstruction is made and the pro-
cess is iterated until the reconstructed image is satisfactory. The calibration-
based method, measures wobble in a short reference scan directly before
or after image capture to determine the compensatory translations of indi-
vidual projections. They measure the position of the focal spot, relative to a
metal pin placed in the scene, by fixing a fine metal mesh to the X-ray source.
The authors claim that the second method is more suitable for slow drifts
(wobble) and that the approach is faster and less computationally demand-
ing than the iterative based method. However, the image-based method has
the advantage of working purely on measured image values.
Zhao et al. [78] propose an online method, which uses capacitive distance
sensors to measure the wobble of the rotation table in micro-CT. The meas-
urements are used to translate individual projections to compensate for the
displacement of the rotation table due to wobble. The authors report that
the methods improve image quality by 53.1% and 65.5% when calibrating
projections in the horizontal and vertical directions, respectively.
To best knowledge, there have been no published comparison studies on
different cargo image denoising techniques. However, in baggage, Mouton
et al. [79] perform a comparative study on a number of denoising techniques
applied to low quality baggage imagery. The techniques included:
(i) Total Variation (TV) denoising – an approach to image denoising that
uses total variation regularisation. The method smooths noise in the
image, whilst offering better edge preservation than simple techniques
such as median filtering.
(ii) Translation Invariant Wavelet Shrinkage (TIWS) – an approach to image
denoising that transforms the image into the wavelet domain, and then
applies a threshold on the wavelet coefficients. Translation invariant
4.2 image pre-processing 47
wavelets are used to help overcome visual artefacts that are induced
when using translation variant wavelets.
(iii) Non-Local Means (NLM) filtering – As opposed to local mean filter-
ing, a non-local mean filtering takes a mean of all pixels in an image
weighted by how similar each pixel is to the local pixel. In this way,
NLM, is able to preserve more detail than a local mean filter.
The authors assess performance by running a Scale-Invariant Feature Trans-
form (SIFT) point detector across image before and after the denoising. They
identify object feature points (located on an object of interest) and noise (not
on the object) within the image. Performance is then measured by taking the
number of object feature points as a fraction of the total number of feature
points, assuming that an increasing ratio is indicative of improved perform-
ance using a SIFT-based detection algorithm. They find that all methods offer
improved performance, over using just the raw image, with TIWS perform-
ing best. However, it is unclear whether these results would generalise to
algorithms that are not based on SIFT.
4.2.3 Threat Image Projection and data augmentation
TIP is a technique first developed for baggage [80]. Most TIP methods insert
a Fictional Threat Image (FTI) from a database into an existing benign im-
age. This can be used in Computer-Based Training (CBT) of operators, to
assess performance [81], or improve it by increasing an operator’s exposure
to rare threat scenarios [82]. Similarly, in cargo, researchers are exploring
how TIP imagery can be used to increase the competency of operators, how-
ever, so far they have relied on using screening experts to manually merge
threat and benign images to form the TIP image using X-ray image merging
software [72].
In CT baggage, TIP is complicated by the 3D nature of the images. TIP al-
gorithms typically search for realistic placement volumes (voids) [83, 84] so
that the projected threat does not intersect other objects which would create
an unrealistic visual cue for operators. Researchers have defined metrics for
View Difficulty, Superposition, and Bag Complexity [85–87]. Such metrics
could be used for adaptive CBT algorithms, where the difficulty of a given
search task can be controlled. For example, if an operator is poor at finding
threat items in certain contexts, such as complicated clutter, the algorithm
can present more of these examples to improve performance under those
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contexts. Other researchers have noted that TIP imagery appears unrealistic
unless realistic noise and artefacts, that match those of the other objects in
the baggage image, are synthesised. For example, Megherbi et al. [83, 88]
generate realistic metal artefacts in CT baggage, to ensure that artefacts in
the threat are consistent with those in the rest of the baggage, and are not
a visual cue for operators. Similar ideas may be useful in cargo TIP, for ex-
ample ensuring that magnification and pixel noise is consistent between the
threat and the rest of the image.
In cargo, some authors have proposed image synthesis methods for other
purposes, but which could be used for TIP. White et al. [89] introduce a
method for generating synthetic γ-ray cargo images, and use it as surrog-
ate data for testing the effectiveness of different scanning systems, where
it is impractical to collect large amounts of empirical data. The authors de-
rive an empirical model of the imaging system response from real images
of well-characterised objects. They claim to incorporate system properties
such as sensitivity, spatial resolution, contrast and noise. To synthesise a
threat image, the authors simulate photon transmission using a commer-
cial ray-tracing package, and then apply smoothing and Gaussian noise
consistent with their empirical measurements. The ray-tracing software al-
lows for simulation of complex-object models, such as those developed in
Computer Aided Design (CAD). After simulating the photon transport and
detector-response model the synthetic threat images are injected into real
images. They perform this injection by pixel-wise multiplication of the syn-
thetic threat image with the real image. It is possible, that synthesising threatTIP from 3D CAD
models is not
attempted in this
thesis, but is a
potential avenue to
explore in future
research.
images from 3D threat models could prove useful, particularly for adding
emerging threats to TIP libraries, for example CAD models of 3D-printed fire-
arms.
In the Machine Learning (ML) community, training data augmentation is
used to improve the performance of ML-based algorithms. Data augment-
ation reduces overfitting by using label-preserving transformations to arti-
ficially enlarge the dataset [90]. Transformations must be realistic for the
given imaging system, in order to make algorithms robust to natural vari-
ation. In visible spectrum imagery, examples of transformations include ran-
dom crops (translation invariance), random flips (reflection invariance), and
random addition of lighting (invariance to illuminance) [91]. In cargo X-
ray imagery transformations could include, for example, variations in dose,
perspective, material composition, and object orientation. Data augmenta-
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tion is particularly useful in representation-learning methods, such as deep
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), which are prone to overfitting if
datasets are limited in size and variety.
So far there is no evidence that TIP has been used as a form of data
augmentation for training and evaluating ML-based image understanding al-
gorithms.
4.2.4 Material discrimination and segmentation
Material discrimination aims to identify the type of material at each pixel
in the image. There is some crossover with image understanding, but it is
included as an image pre-processing method herein, since image understand-
ing methods using features derived from the material information might
be helpful in improving performance. This has been the case in multi-view
X-ray baggage, where material information is more complete [92]. The best
performing methods of material discrimination also use segmentation ap-
proaches to refine the discrimination [5]. This is because high levels of noise
make pixel-wise discrimination inaccurate, unless the material discrimina-
tion is averaged over segmented images regionsd.
The interactions of X-rays with a material varies depending on the type
of material and the type of radiation (Section 3.2.2). By studying the types
of interactions occurring, it is possible to identify the type of material by
some characteristic such as its atomic number. To do this, it is required
that measurements at multiple energies are made on the material either by
illuminating it with multiple radiation sources [5], or by using a continuous
spectrum of radiation energies and a detector that can resolve the difference
in the energy spectrum after interaction [93].
Often the high-throughput requirements of commercial systems prevents
more than two energies being used, permits at most a few views being
acquired, and requires short exposures leading to substantial image noise.
The combined effect of these restrictions makes the signal insufficient for
discrimination of individual atomic elements [74]. Instead researchers at-
tempt to discriminate between groups of materials such as organics, light
metals and heavy metals [5, 94]. Alternatively some researchers attempt to
only identify high-Z materials [74, 95, 96] as they can indicate the smug-
gling of radioactive materials or their shielding. Even in these simple cases,
researchers have found it difficult to accurately discriminate materials from
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raw measurements on a pixel-wise basis, finding that it is necessary to in-
corporate spatial information into discrimination [5]. Thus, researchers have
applied a number of image segmentation approaches to aid with discrimin-
ation.
The majority of the cargo material discrimination literature uses dual-
energy X-ray systems and are based on the α-curve [97, 98], R-curve [5], or
H-L curve [99] methods. The physics behind these methods are described in
more detail in Chapter 8 There has been little influence in cargo work from
the baggage or medical domains, due to the much higher energy regime
(see Figure 3.2). Take, as an example, the seminal work in CT by Alvarez and
Macovski [100], which expands the attenuation coefficient as a set of intu-
itive basis functions. This approach works in the CT energy regime where
the photoelectric interaction, which depends strongly on atomic number, is
dominant. However, it is subservient to pair production and scatter in the
cargo energy regime.
The α-curve [97, 98], R-curve [5], and H-L curve [99] methods attempt to
estimate the effective atomic number (Z) grouping (i.e. organic, light metals,
heavy metals) by combining high and low energy radioscopic transparencies
T to form a value that can be mapped to effective Z grouping using a lookup
table. Authors tend to define the transparency T by normalising the image
by the total number of photons (integrated over the range of energies E)
emitted by the source and the detector response D(E).
The R-curve method is motivated by capturing transparencies T1 and T2
at energies E1 and E2, and taking the ratio of their logs
R(E1,E2,Z0) =
log(T1)
log(T2)
=
µ(E1,Z0)
µ(E2,Z0)
D(E1)
D(E2)
. (4.1)
For the monochromatic and single material case, the R-ratio is unique to the
material atomic number Z0 and so materials can be discriminated, at least
in theory. This method is well-suited to γ-ray imaging where the photons
are emitted with quantised energies. However, in cargo, the X-ray source is
not monochromatic and has a continuous Bremsstrahlung distribution. In
this case R varies as a function of the material mass thickness. Nevertheless,
one can attempt to recover the effective atomic number grouping at a pixel
by experimentally measuring the R-ratio as a function of mass thickness to
create a lookup table. There are difficulties at low mass thickness where the
R-ratio versus mass thickness curves for different materials overlap.
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The α-curve method uses the quantities:
α1 = − log T1, (4.2)
α2 = − log T1 + log T2. (4.3)
Again a lookup table is determined through experimentation. Note the change in
notation from the
original publications
where α1−α2 was
used in place of
α2 [97, 98].
Finally, the H-L curve method simply uses a lookup table of the high (H)
and low (L) energy transparencies T1 (H) and T2 (L).
The seminal work for dual-energy material discrimination for cargo was
by Ogorodnikov and Petrunin [5] and Ogorodnikov et al. [94]. The authors
introduce the R-curve method and attempt to classify materials into four
groups: organics (hydrocarbon, Z∼5.3); organics/inorganics (aluminium, Z ∼
13); inorganics (iron, Z∼26); and heavy substances (lead, Z∼82). They use a
prototype inspection system, with a 4/8MeV cut-off Bremsstrahlung beam
and a lead beam filter. They identify that the R-ratio crossover of iron and
lead can be translocated by use of the filter, thus allowing improved discrim-
ination for small mass thickness [5]. The authors first study the error, when
discriminating iron from hydrocarbon, as a function of mass thickness, and
find discrimination is optimal at 40-60g/cm2. They reason that discrimina-
tion error increases for lower mass thickness because there is not sufficient
contrast between low and high energy images, and for larger mass thick-
ness due to the decreasing SNR. The authors note that, when discriminating
between all four groups, material recognition is unreliable. In particular, the
water-aluminium discrimination error reaches 40% even at the optimal mass
thickness. As a remedy, they incorporate spatial information using a spatial
clustering algorithm. All pixels within a given cluster are labelled as a single
material based on a lookup of the R-ratio table of the cluster mean values.
Coloured material discrimination images, with and without incorporation
of the spatial information, are shown in Figure 4.3. Qualitatively, it is evident
that the use of spatial information greatly improves image quality.
A few years later, Zhang et al. [99] proposed the H-L curve method. They
introduced a material intrinsic difference measure, defined as This is similar to a
measure introduced
by Ogorodnikov and
Petrunin [5] and
Ogorodnikov et al.
[94] but for the
R-ratio.
diff =
H2 −H1
(H2 +H1)/2
× 100%, (4.4)
where H1 and H2 are the high energy measurements for two different ma-
terials. They use diff for evaluating the material discrimination abilities of
a dual-energy system. The authors argue that if the image noise has mag-
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(a) Material discrimination on individual pixels
(b) Material discrimination on spatial regions
Figure 4.3: Source: Ogorodnikov and Petrunin [5]. Material discrimination based on
spatial regions provides improved image quality. This is particularly no-
ticeable for the pistol, whose details are revealed in (b).
nitude less than diff , then materials can be accurately discriminated. They
give a table of results showing the measured diff for different adjacent-Z
materials and find diff to be a decreasing function of L. The authors do not
show any results of applying the H-L curve method to whole images.
Since these initial works, other researchers have largely focussed on high-
Z detection, claiming that multi-group material discrimination is infeasible
for commercial systems. For example, Fu et al. [74] claim that identifying
the effective Z of the scanned objects is not practical because it requires
high precision measurements and the noise in commercial systems is too
large. Most have focussed on the detection and segmentation of suspicious
or high-Z objects.
Fu et al. [101] attempt to segment suspicious, shielded objects. They in-
troduce a hybrid clustering approach which does not require a prior on the
number of clusters or the size of clusters, but a prior on the step level, which
determines the number of quantisation levels in the clustered image given
the maximum image value. Hybrid clustering performs clustering followed
by region growing. For clustering, each pixel is first compared to the mean
of its neighbourhood, if the pixel is close to the mean then its value is as-
signed as the quantisation of that mean. If it is not close, then they split the
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neighbourhood into quadrants, compute the means, and set the pixel value
to the nearest quadrant’s quantised mean. They claim that this is faster than
recursive K-means clustering and the Leader clustering used by Ogorod-
nikov and Petrunin [5, 94]. After clustering they do region merging, using
the highest intensity region as the seed. To segment shielded objects, the au-
thors iterate through the different quantisation levels, binarise the image by
quantisation level, and then region fill based on gradients. If the intensity of
a filled region is greater than the surrounding, then it is regarded as a shiel-
ded object. The method is tested on a cargo image with various amounts of
shielded lead and tin. No quantitative measure of the performance is given,
but the method appears to work well on the single test image presented.
In a separate paper, Fu et al. [95] attempt to improve detection and re-
duce false alarms for high-Z detection. They apply their hybrid clustering
approach described in [101]. After identifying regions that are shielded by
low-Z materials, they attempt to separate the shielded object from the back-
ground by subtracting the shielding attenuation from the shielded attenuation.
The authors claim that the approach yields improved high-Z detection. In
a further paper [74], they identify several sources of error, namely; the edge
effect at object edges due to scatter, misalignment, analogue-to-digital con-
version, and Poisson noise. They propose a wavelet shrinkage denoising
approach, which reduces false negatives and false positives, but no quantit-
ative measure of performance is determined. The authors state that similar
results can be achieved by use of a Weiner filter, but that it needs to be
combined with morphological filtering.
Chen et al. [96] also focus on detecting high-Z material, using a 6/9MeV
commercial system. No substantial details of the methods are given, al-
though they state that the high-Z signature is generated using ‘dual-energy
information processing, machine vision and topology analysis, and back-
ground object stripping’ [96]. They show an example of lead detection against
a piece-wise varying background density, but no quantitative measure of
performance is given.
In a more recent paper, Ogorodnikov et al. [102] refer to their original
work [5] and echo the sentiments of other researchers; that their previous
approach to material discrimination is labile, unstable and not repeatable in
practical implementation. In this paper, although their algorithmic methods
are not detailed in full, the authors attempt 3-group (organics, mineral/-
light metals, metals) material discrimination, but this time with a 3.5/6MeV
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Bremsstrahlung beam. Additionally, they attempt to calculate the mass of
the object under inspection. They claim a mass precision of <10% and ef-
fective atomic number precision of ±1 for materials in the optimal mass
thickness range.
Recently, Li et al. [98] have proposed a solution to improve material re-
cognition in cargo, when two materials overlap in an image. The method
requires prior information about one of the overlapping materials, which
the authors argue is available in a commercial setting from the shipping
manifest, or if trying to separate container and contents an assumption can
be made about the container material. Their algorithm firstly performs a
pre-classification based on the α-curve method, they then determine if a
region is more likely composed of a pure material or two overlapping ma-
terials. If composed of two materials, the next step decomposes the material
into the two overlapping contributions. The final step is to perform recog-
nition on the materials. To decompose overlapping materials, the authors
use a method originating from Dual-Energy X-ray Absorptiometry (DEXA),
which is used for measuring bone mineral density and soft-tissue compos-
ition of human bodies. The method uses quadratic approximations of the
polychromatic transparencies of the high and low energy images. The au-
thors test the algorithm on synthesised data and real data captured in a lab
experiment, and achieve good qualitative results.
Other researchers have used simulations to investigate the possibility of
material discrimination on systems that are not dual-energy. For example,
Gil et al. [93] use Monte Carlo simulation to investigate the possibility of
single-shot material discrimination. The single-shot method assumes that the
detectors can measure the energy spectrum of the beam and can split it into
a low and high energy component to determine the R-ratio. The authors
simulate a Bremsstrahlung beam with 9MeV cut-off, and a low-high divi-
sion chosen at 4MeV. They compare the one-shot R-ratio to a 4/9MeV dual-
energy simulation. Comparing the R-ratio for silver and tissue-equivalent
plastic, it appears that the one-shot method has a greater discriminative ef-
fect, whilst having the potential benefits of lower X-ray dose and higher scan
rate. However, it is unclear whether the system model results in a realistic
level of noise when compared to a commercial system.
Fantidis et al. [103] investigate potential mixed γ- and X-ray system ar-
chitectures, and their ability to discriminate materials, through Monte Carlo
simulation. They simulate three γ sources (60Co, 137Cs, and 88Y), and a
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4/9MeV dual-energy Bremsstrahlung beam. They test material discrimina-
tion performance on 165 materials and using different dual, triple and quad-
ruple combinations of the sources. They assess the potential performance of
the system using the number of R-overlaps between different materials. They
claim that the optimal selection of sources are 4MeV Bremsstrahlung and
137Cs for dual, and 4/9MeV Bremsstrahlung and 137Cs for triple. The op-
timal quadruple source system, although not specified, offers only a slight
improvement over the optimal triple source system. There is no evidence
that the authors attempt to model system noise and its effects on discrim-
ination performance. Other researchers have found that R-values alone are
not a good indicator of performance due to noise in the R-estimates when
interrogating materials with small or large mass thickness [5].
4.2.5 Segmentation for CT baggage
For CT imagery of baggage, there have been several proposals for single-
and dual- energy segmentation, with some based on ML, which are reviewed
here. The algorithms are designed for segmenting 3D volumes, but aspects
of the approaches may be transferable to 2D cargo. In CT baggage segment-
ation, algorithms must cope with a variable and unknown number of bag-
gage items, each with a wide range of possible shapes and sizes [104]. This
is in contrast to the medical domain, where segmentation tasks are pre-
specified, for example a segmentation of a particular organ [104]. Therefore,
baggage researchers have looked to design unsupervised algorithms that
make no assumptions on the number of objects or on their composition.
The approach taken by Grady et al. [104] for single-energy CT, first iden-
tifies object voxels, then identifies candidate object splits using the Isoperi-
metric Distance Tree (IDT) method [105], and finally evaluates good splits ac- IDT is a graph-based
clustering algorithm
which is based on an
exact clustering of a
minimum spanning
tree relative to a
minimum
isoperimetry
criterion.
cording to a novel Automatic QUality Assessment (AQUA) metric learnt from
a large training set. The initial coarse segmentation uses a Mumford-Shah
based method [106] applied to a pre-processed (denoised and artefact re-
duced) CT image. The AQUA method is based on a 42-dimensional descriptor
from the prior literature on object segmentation, which includes features
based on geometry, intensity, and gradients. To learn the AQUA model, the
authors use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce dimensionality,
then fit a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) over the PCA coefficients of all the
segments in the training set using Expectation-Maximisation (EM). AQUA is
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used both to select best candidate splits, and to select the best segmentation
over three different parameter settings.
Mouton and Breckon [107] introduce a material-based segmentation for
low resolution Dual-Energy Computed Tomography (DECT) images repres-
entative of the aviation security environment. After pre-processing to reduce
metal artefacts, the authors first perform a coarse segmentation based on the
Dual-Energy Index (DEI) and connected component analysis. The DEI com-
bines the high and low energy linear attenuation coefficients at each voxel to
give a crude estimate of the material characteristics. The authors use a Ran-
dom Forest (RF) model to guide the segmentation process by assessing the
quality of individual object segments and the entire segmentation. For indi-
vidual object segments, the trained RF model uses the same 42-dimensional
descriptor proposed by Grady et al. [104]. The authors claim that using the
RF approach outperforms AQUA in their aviation setting. The quality of full
segmentations is assessed using the RF score of constituent objects weighted
by the error in the number of segmented objects. The authors demonstrate
that their approach outperforms three state-of-the-art segmentation tech-
niques, including: IDT [105]; Symmetric Region Growing (SymRG) [108]; and
3D Flood-Fill region growing (FloodFill) [109].
In cargo, material-based segmentation is much more challenging due to
overlapping of materials and objects, and the difficulty in reconstructing lin-
ear attenuation coefficients that encode material information. However, the
α-curve [97, 98], R-curve [5], and H-L curve [99] methods can provide crude
(more so than DEI) material information that could potentially be used to
initialise coarse segmentations. Methods similar to AQUA [104] and the RF
approach of Mouton and Breckon [107] could be used to identify object
splits and to assess overall segmentation quality. However, it is likely that
extra metrics would be required to deal with overlapping objects without
a priori information on the number of objects overlapping or their charac-
teristics such as thickness and material type. Methods have been proposed
in multi-view baggage for layer separation that may be applicable to multi-
view cargo [110]. To best knowledge, there have been no proposals for cargo,
or indeed single-view baggage, that can convincingly address these issues.
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4.3 image understanding
Automated image understanding tasks in cargo can be split into the themes
of ACV and ATD. An overview of the most pertinent works in the literature
is given in Table 4.1.
Study Task Methods Notes
Chalmers [4, 70] ECV
Intensity histogram features
(min, max, and mean);
compare with historical
database example.
No QE given
Orphan et al. [66] ECV Segment floor, walls & roof;rule-based object detection 97.2% accuracy; 0.4% FPR
Andrews et al.
[111]
anomaly
detection
& ECV
Down-sampled images;
sparse auto-encoder;
hidden layer features;
RBF-SVM
99.2% accuracy; For
features, hidden
representation >
normalised squared
residual
Zhang et al. [6] MV
Leung-Malik filter
codebook; SIFT; dense
sampling; edge sampling
visual codebook
method>SIFT. Edge
sampling>dense sampling.
Tuszynski et al.
[112] MV
Median intensity hist.;
average absolute deviation;
weighted city block
distance.
48% accuracy and 5% FPR
Zheng and
Elmaghraby [68] ATD
Correlation coefficient;
threshold
No QE given, detected
anomalies may not
correspond to presence of a
threat.
Table 4.1: A summary of the literature on automated cargo image understanding re-
search. Abbreviations: Quantitative Evaluation (QE); False Positive Rate
(FPR); Convolutional Neural Network (CNN); Scale-Invariant Feature Trans-
form (SIFT); Radial Basis Function Support Vector Machine (RBF-SVM). The
> symbol denotes ‘performs better than’, and >> denotes ‘performs much
better than’.
4.3.1 Automated Contents Verification
ACV checks whether the cargo contents match those stated on the shipment
manifest. This can range from Empty Container Verification (ECV) to full
Manifest Verification (MV). ECV can be useful for increasing throughput,
since declared-as-empty cargoes (20% of all containers) can be sent through
a separate automated inspection lane. ECV examples are given in Figure 4.4.
Containers may be falsely declared as empty in shipping fraud, or may be
58 literature review
exploited in rip-on/rip-off smuggling operations. False declared-as-empty
cargo containers can also pose safety hazards during container stacking at
ports due to the unexpected additional weight. MV compares the X-ray im-
age to the Harmonized System (HS) codes declared on the manifest. Each
HS code defines a different broad category of cargo type, for example, live
animals, animal products or vegetable products (Section 2.2.3).
(a) Example of ECV detection
(b) Example of ECV false positive
Figure 4.4: Example ECV results of a rule-based algorithm. The colouring in image (a)
shows empty space (purple), roof and chassis (red), cargo walls (green)
and an object (blue). Image (b) shows a false positive caused by the ver-
tical spars. Sources: Orphan et al. [66].
The first work on ECV was Chalmers [4, 70], who uses ‘readily available’
algorithms to segment the container region and compute metrics that are
then compared with empty containers of the same size. The authors give no
specific details of the algorithms or their performance, but we interpret it
as follows. The container is classified by generating an intensity histogram
of the segmented cargo region and comparing to histograms from historical
empty images. The comparison is made using histogram features such as
minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation. Another method is
briefly described by Orphan et al. [66], which segments the image (e.g. floor,
walls, and roof) and then applies an unspecified rule-based object detection
algorithm. The authors report 97.2% accuracy (with 0.4% false negatives)
when classifying SoC images as empty or non-empty.
Andrews et al. [111] have recently used ECV as a test problem for anomalyAndrews et al. [111]
was published
subsequent to the
work presented in
Chapter 7.
detection using auto-encoders. They use cargo X-ray images of empty and
non-empty containers down-sampled to 32×9Px. In anomaly detection the
algorithm is trained on the normal class only. In one test they considered
empty containers as normal, and the non-empty as anomalies; in another
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test, the classes were reversed. The authors derive a number of features
from the hidden layer of a trained sparse auto-encoder, including: the hid-
den representation, the scalar residual magnitude; the signed residual (with
and without normalisation by the root-mean-squared residual); the abso-
lute residual; and the squared residual (with and without normalisation by
the mean-squared residual). The features are classified using a one-class
RBF-SVM. When considering non-empty containers as the normal class, they
find that the one-class RBF-SVM achieves best classification accuracy (92.99%)
when fed the hidden representation as a feature. When considering empty
containers as the normal class the best accuracy (99.2%) is achieved when
the normalised squared residual is used as the feature. No attempt is made
to extend the method to detect much smaller adversarial loads, where a
much higher image resolution than 32×9Px would be required.
There have been two published attempts at MV [6, 112]. MV is a multi-
class classification task, where cargo containers are classified according to HS
code. Tuszynski et al. [112] used the median grey-level image histogram of
each HS code in a training set. They then use a weighted city block distance
to compare a given example to each HS code model. This approach yields
an overall accuracy of 48% given a false positive rate of 5%. This result is
improved slightly by Zhang et al. [6], who use a Leung-Malik filter bank to
construct a visual codebook as a texture descriptor. They determine that this
outperforms SIFT when classifying cargo images according to their HS code.
Note that the authors ignore ‘non-classical’ examples, which they define
as those containers that are less than half filled with cargo. For real-life
deployable system, such examples should be included since an adversary
could purposefully choose to only half fill a container when smuggling or
avoiding duties.
4.3.2 Automated Threat Detection
Currently, much more work has been done on ATD for baggage than cargo
and vehicles. Both fields are discussed here.
Zheng and Elmaghraby [68] propose a method for ATD in vehicles by
detecting anomalous regions within images. They use backscatter images
(one top-view and two side-views) and a transmission image (side-view)
captured from an AS&E OmniView® Gantry (Figure 4.1). They perform a
window-wise correlation analysis comparing a fresh image of the vehicle to
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a historical image of the same vehicle stored in database. Images are split
into 64 rectangular 4×16Px windows, and the correlation between windows
in similar positions in the analysed and historical images are computed,
resulting in a 64×64 matrix of window correlation values. A given window
is deemed anomalous if the maximum of the corresponding matrix row is
below a threshold. No quantitative evaluation of the performance is given.
A criticism of this proposed method is that an anomalous region will very
rarely indicate an actual threat and so the false positive rate is likely to be
extremely high.
More ATD research has been carried out in baggage, and detailed sum-
maries can be found in the review by Mouton and Breckon [113]. A brief
overview of the points relevant to cargo, is now given.
Several different X-ray imaging modalities are used in baggage screen-
ing. These range from single-view [114], to multi-view [92, 115–118], to full
3D CT [119–122]. Classification performance typically improves from single-
view to CT as more information becomes available. The challenge is how to
best use this information.
The general consensus amongst the baggage image analysis community,
is that classification based on X-ray image data is more challenging than vis-
ible spectrum data, and that direct application of methods frequently used
in natural images, such as SIFT, Rotation Invariant Feature Transform (RIFT),
and Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG), do not perform well [123].False colour, in this
case, colours pixels
according to the type
of material i.e.
material
discrimination.
However, the performance can be improved by utilising the characteristics
of X-ray baggage images. For example researchers have found that object
detection can be improved by augmenting multiple views, using a ‘false
colour material image’ [124] or using simple descriptors such as Density
Histogram (DH) or Density Gradient Histogram (DGH) [119, 121] in the case
of CT.oriented Basic Image
Features (oBIFs), a
good feature for
texture description,
also worked well for
detection of cars in
cargo containers in a
co-authored,
concurrent work [20].
While it has been widely reported that texture descriptors in baggage
scans perform poorly due the lack of texture in X-ray examples [123–125],
the texture visible in cargo X-ray images does differ significantly between
images. Medium to low density cargo (e.g. tyres or machinery) often contain
a lot of complex articulated texture, while high density cargo (e.g. barrels
of oil or bulk coal) has a more uniform appearance. This is possibly why
researchers in cargo have enjoyed some success with texture descriptors
such as visual codebooks based on a Leung-Malik filter bank [6].
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Franzel et al. [118] propose a method of fusing detection results from mul-
tiple single views to exploit the extra information available from multi-view.
They use a voting-based scheme where detection confidence is increased
if rays from detection points from single views intersect in 3D. Their ra-
tionale is that it suppresses false alarms that do not coincide in different
views, whilst reinforcing detections that do. The detection confidence on
the individual single-view images are determined by sliding a window over
the image, computing HOG as features and using a linear Support Vector
Machine (SVM). They address in-plane rotations using a non-maximum sup-
pression scheme, since HOG features are not rotation invariant. Moreover,
the authors claim that the multi-view voting fusion scheme handles out-of-
plane rotations. They achieve significantly better detection with their multi-
view scheme (80%) over single-view (50%) for a 50% false alarm rate.
Multi-view fusion approaches similar to those proposed by Bas¸tan et al.
[92] and Franzel et al. [118] might be applicable to multi-view fusion in
cargo, however performance is likely to be far worse due to the additional
complexity. Perhaps, an approach to multi-view detection, for both baggage
and cargo, would be to feed the different views into a CNN as separate chan-
nels or separate streams. The CNN can learn to jointly use information from
the separate views to make better classifications. For 3D shape recognition,
Su et al. [126] have found that CNNs fed with multiple 2D views as inputs
performs better than using state-of-the-art 3D shape descriptors. It would
be an interesting study for ATD in CT, particularly if better performance can
be obtained without having to reconstruct the full 3D baggage image.
Since most approaches in baggage operate on the RGB material discrimin-
ation image, detection methods are, in some sense, utilising material inform-
ation if they utilise the colour information. Bas¸tan et al. [92] apply ATD to
both the RGB image and the raw high and low energy measurements. They
show that the additional information from dual-energy images significantly
improves object recognition. The authors, experiment with dual-energy vari-
ants of the SIFT and domain SPIN image descriptor (SPIN) descriptors. They
compute Colour SIFT (CSIFT) and Colour SPIN (CSPIN) descriptors, which
operate on the individual colour channels of the RGB image. In addition,
they compute Energy SPIN (ESPIN) descriptors which are computed directly
on the raw high and low energy images. They found both ESPIN and CSPIN
performed better than using SIFT or SPIN alone, with CSPIN achieving best
performance.
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Recently, Açkay et al. [127] have applied deep CNNs to ATD in dual-energy
RGB baggage imagery. They recognise that there is a problem with train-
ing CNNs from scratch due to the limited availability of data. Thus they
adopt a transfer-learning approach by taking a CNN, pre-trained for general
image classification tasks (ImageNet [128]), and then fine-tune it for ATD
in X-ray baggage. The pre-trained CNN follows the architecture introduced
by Krizhevsky et al. [90], consisting of 5 convolutional layers and 3 fully-
connected layers. The authors re-use the generalised feature extraction and
representation in the lower layers of the CNN, whilst fine-tuning the upper
layers. This achieves 99.26% detection and 4.08% false positives, which sig-
nificantly outperforms prior work in the field. The authors do not comment
on the possibility of training a CNN, from scratch, on data augmented with
TIP imagery and realistic variation.
For baggage imagery, it appears that utilising dual-energy, either by RGB
image or the raw high and low energy images, can boost ATD performance.
To best knowledge, there have been no prior publications on ATD using dual-
energy cargo images, or using CNNs directly on the raw high and low energy
X-ray images, in any field.
4.4 discussion
Automated Analysis of cargo X-ray imagery is still a relatively young field.
Over the last decade, more attention has been paid to aviation image ana-
lysis (such as baggage), since problems are generally more tractable, and be-
cause there has been more funding directed towards aviation, possibly due
to the more perceivable immediate threat from terrorism. Typically, most
work in cargo has been kept in-house by industry for commercial and secur-
ity reasons. However, academics are beginning to form relationships with in-
dustry partners, gaining access to large image datasets with which to work.
This includes the relationship with Rapiscan Systems for the work in this
thesis.
In comparison to natural images, cargo X-ray images offer an interesting
and difficult challenge for researchers, since objects are translucent mak-
ing occlusions difficult to disentangle, are usually very cluttered and noisy,
whilst appearing skewed in perspective due to the geometry of the X-ray
beam. Furthermore, image contents are often more varied than images from
the baggage or medical X-ray imaging domains, since a very diverse range
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of objects are shipped inside containers. It is possible that more researchers
would become involved in the field if data was easier to obtain, for example,
through the creation of large, labelled, and open datasets.
The general development pattern of research in the field follows a similar
pattern to that found in mainstream computer vision. The patten in main-
stream computer vision [129] has come in three phases:
(i) algorithms completely hand-crafted by experimentation and intuition;
(ii) features hand-crafted based on intuition and experimentation, with the
features classified using ML techniques;
(iii) the features and their classification learnt directly from data.
In cargo image analysis, a similar pattern is observed, however it has
not yet reached stage (iii). For example, the initial works relied heavily on
hand-crafting rule-based algorithms in the case of ACV, or hand-crafting
algorithms based on the principles of X-ray physics in the case of material
discrimination. In recent years, there are signs that a number of researchers
are beginning to apply ML techniques to such problems. It is apparent that
most work in baggage belongs to stage (ii), and more recently stage (iii) has
been reached in the application CNNs for baggage ATD [127].
Each of the technical chapters of thesis are now discussed in the context
of the existing literature.
4.4.1 Detector wobble
To best knowledge, no attempts have been made to address for the effects of
detector wobble in X-ray cargo imagery. However, wobble does effect other
imaging modalities such as C-arm CT and micro-CT, and there have been
several publications on the correction of wobble in these modalities. Such
methods can be characterised as being:
• Calibration-based – in systems where wobble is a systematic artefact
that effects each images in the same way, the system or an algorithm
can be calibrated to compensate for wobble;
• Image-based – if wobble is not a systematic artefact but a type of noise
that effects each image in a different way, algorithms can be developed
that operate only on the image in order to correct for the effects of
wobble;
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• Online – if an image-based approach cannot achieve then wobble is
measured and corrected online.
Due to the unpredictable component of wobble (e.g. wind, uneven ground
surface topology, or vibrations) in large-scale transmission radiography, it is
not possible to correct wobble purely by calibration. Image-based methods
(without using dedicated detectors or prior knowledge about large-scale ra-
diography), such as TV denoising or TIWS [130], may be applicable, however
they are difficult to use in practice without prior information on the severity
of the wobble artefact which is measured online in Chapter 5. In this con-
tribution, both a calibration procedure and an online method are employed.
The calibration procedure is used to estimate a number of parameters that are
fixed for a given system, including: misalignments of imaging sensors; the
collimated width of the fan-beam; and the sensitivities of individual sensors
due to housing attenuation and their intrinsic response. The online compon-
ent deals with the estimation of wobble and estimation of the fluctuation in
the photon flux, which can both vary stochastically during a traverse mode
scan.
4.4.2 Threat Image Projection
Machine learning is a class of computer algorithms that have the ability to
learn from data to tackle a task, without being explicitly programmed. In
computer vision, the amount of machine learning has increased through
time, both in terms of the numbers of learnt model parameters, and the
fraction of the typical computer vision processing pipeline that involves
learning. For example, initially, typical processing pipelines involved no
learning and relied on explicit programming to tackle a task. Later, fea-
tures were extracted from images using explicit programming and these
features were classified using machine learning algorithms. Recently, with
deep learning, state-of-the-art methods use machine learning at every step
in the processing pipeline, from learning feature extraction, to learning the
mapping of these features to an output.
A recent trend in mainstream computer vision, is that performance has
improved as more (machine) learning is involved. Initially, performance was
improved by learning the classification based on fixed image features, later
performance was further improved learning the features as well as the clas-
sification. Typically, as the learnt features increase in abstraction and com-
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plexity, performance too improves. However, with each improvement, larger
and larger datasets are required. As such, computer vision researchers of-
ten employ data augmentation, to boost the number of training examples
when data is limited. Data augmentation involves applying realistic trans-
formations to images, which preserve the class of the image. The aim is to
learn feature representations that are invariant to such transformations to
improve the generalisation ability of the system. Such a method can over-
come the data problem.
The data problem is particularly severe in security domains, since data on
real threat items is rare, and collecting large amounts of data on staged
threats is infeasible due to cost. The data problem has also affected human
operators, for example operators not exposed frequently to threats are less
likely to detect them when they appear [131]. A solution to this problem
with humans was the introduction of TIP ( Section 4.2.3), which boosts op-
erator performance by exposing them to more threats on-the-job or during
training, and is also used to assess operator performance. However, such
methods are not known to be in widespread use in cargo.
In this thesis, a simple method for performing TIP in cargo is proposed
and validated. The purpose of this method is to train and evaluate the per-
formance of ML-based algorithms rather than humans operators. Although
the methods could be equally applied to training and evaluating humans,
as is conventional within current aviation security screening operations.
4.4.3 Empty Container Verification
Verification that declared-as-empty containers are actually empty is an im-
portant problem in terms of security and throughput. Criminals frequently
attempt to smuggle inside empty containers, because it is cheap and con-
venient. Since, at any one time, 20% of the deployed container fleet are de-
clared as empty, an accurate ECV algorithm operating on those 20% can po-
tentially detect any type of crime, including shipment fraud and the smug-
gling of any item. A specific threat detector does not have to be developed;
only an algorithm that can confirm whether the container is truly empty.
ECV is non-trivial due to the large variation in both the class of empty
containers and possible loads, as discussed further in Chapter 7. Therefore
simple methods such as correlation and fourier spectral analysis do not
work well.
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To date a few methods have been proposed for ECV. Initially these were
rule-based [66] and the algorithm not fully documented or assessed (pos-
sibly due to commercial reasons). There has been one attempt [111], which
applied unsupervised ML methods by treating ECV as an anomaly detec-
tion problem. However, the images used in this work were massively down-
sampled from 2600×850Px to 32×9Px, and it is unlikely to work on small
amounts of contraband smuggled inside cargo containers, since most in-
formation is lost in the down-sampling.
In this thesis, a supervised ML-based method is proposed which oper-
ates on full-sized images, and the method is tested on (i) SoC imagery for
comparison with prior works, and (ii) small adversarial loads which are
synthetically concealed using TIP.
4.4.4 Dual-energy Automated Threat Detection
Of the cargo image analysis topics reviewed, the majority have focussed on
material discrimination. These methods are typically derived from physics,
and no ML techniques (similar to those used in baggage [104, 107]) have been
applied to the subject due to the difficulty of obtaining sufficient data with
accurate labelling. Furthermore, each author tends to use a different dataset,
making it difficult to compare the performance between different contribu-
tions. And most authors choose to evaluate performance qualitatively rather
than quantitatively, often using only a single image.
No work in cargo has attempted to exploit material information encoded
in dual-energy images to improve the performance of automated image un-
derstanding, including for ATD. Similar research has been performed in bag-
gage either by operating on the material-coloured RGB image or the raw
dual-energy measurements, where it was found that material information
can improve ATD. In this thesis, the best way to utilise raw dual-energy
measurements is investigated and a direct comparison is made between the
three material discrimination methods typically used in cargo. This is the
first time that the three methods have been compared, and the first time
that dual-energy have been utilised to improve ATD performance. In addi-
tion, to best knowledge, it is the first time that CNNs have been applied to
explicitly operate on two X-ray images measured at different energies, in
any field.
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4.4.5 Concurrent Related Work
There were several related pieces of research that were performed at the
same time as this thesis, and provided important input to this work. These
are summarised in this section.
4.4.5.1 Concealed car detection
The detection of cars in cargo containers is a good test case for the feasib-
ility of computer vision techniques on cargo X-ray imagery. Cars typically
occupy a large proportion of the container and are there easier to detect in
comparison to small threats in ATD. However, concealed cars can still be dif-
ficult for operators to detect when quickly flicking through large numbers of
container thumbnails. Several different Bag-of-Words (BoW) approaches [19,
20] were applied to automated car detection, including:
• Intensity histograms - a feature similar to DH used by Flitton et al.
[119, 121] in baggage, histograms of both the raw and log intensity
were tested;
• oBIFs - encode textural information by classifying image pixels into
one of 23 categories according to local symmetry and their quantised
orientation;
• Pyramid Histograms of Visual Words (PHOW) - a multi-scale extension
of dense SIFT and regarded as a state-of-the-art BoW approach.
Two machine learning algorithms were trialled for classification of BoW
features: RF and SVM. In addition to BoW, CNNs were also employed [19]
including (i) a CNN pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset and fine-tuned for
car detection, and (ii) a 19-layer very deep CNNs [132] trained-from-scratch
on X-ray cargo imagery. The main conclusions of this work were that:
• RF classification based on oBIF features provides significantly better
performance than using PHOW;
• Log transforming images improved the performance of the intensity
histogram method and CNNs;
• The best (trained-from-scratch) CNN approach yielded a modest, but
statistically significant, improvement over the oBIF approach.
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4.4.5.2 Single-energy Automated Threat Detection
Whilst, for car detection, CNNs provided only a modest performance im-The ATD network
was the same
architecture as the
car detection
network, and based
on the very deep
networks of
Simonyan and
Zisserman [132].
provement over oBIFs, for ATD the improvement was substantial. The CNN
was trained-from-scratch using the TIP and data augmentation framework
proposed in Chapter 6. The network provided 90% of threats with a 6%
false positive rate. It was found that using a two-channel network with the
raw image as one channel and the image logarithm as the second channel
achieved significantly better performance than using just the raw image in
a single-channel network.
4.4.5.3 Anomaly detection
Another way to overcome the data problem is to treat threat detection as a
one-class anomaly detection problem. In this, no threat data is required for
training, since the system is trained on the normal class only. The advantage
is that the system can detect never-before-seen threats since the system does
not need to be trained on them. However, accurately modelling the normal
class is difficult and an anomaly detection system suffers from high false
positive rates when used for threat detection.
Andrews et al. [21] relies on the use of (i) representation learning, and
(ii) anomaly detection based on the learnt representation using a Forest of
Random Split Trees (FRST). A number of different representations are tested
including: (i) a baseline representation using intensity histograms; (ii) a CNN
representation learnt on natural imagery from the ImageNet dataset; (iii) aThe Siamese network
was trained on
classifying whether
two input image
patches belonged to
the same container or
not. In this way, it
was reasoned, it
could build a good
representation of the
contents of cargo
X-ray images.
CNN representation from the car detection work [19]; and (iv) a represent-
ation learnt using a Siamese CNN.
The work shows that best representation for the purposes of anomaly de-
tection was that obtained by the Siamese network, which yielded an Area
Under the Curve (AUC) of 63.7% when the system was tested on an ATD
task. Moreover, separate testing of the FRST algorithm showed that it was
suitable for anomaly detection given a suitable representation with which
to work. For a deployable anomaly detection system, however, the represent-
ation learning needs to be improved to obtain results competitive with su-
pervised ATD approaches. Anomaly detection is not pursued as a topic in
this thesis.
4.5 summary 69
4.5 summary
In this chapter the state-of-the-art for automated cargo image analysis, prior
to this thesis, was explored and discussed. During this analysis, it was found
that research in cargo has not kept up to speed with other application areas
of image analysis, such as aviation baggage image analysis or medical image
analysis. The majority of algorithms for cargo are still based on intuiton- or
physics-derived methods, whereas in other fields machine learning based
approaches have become widely adopted and shown to offer much greater
performance. This phenomenon is probably due to the difficulty to obtain
sufficiently large datasets for training machine learning based algorithms.
In the rest of this thesis, we address four problems identified in this
chapter:
• In Chapter 5, the problem of detector wobble artefacts is addressed
using a machine learning based wobble estimation algorithm, and an
image correction algorithm based on these wobble estimates, which is
derived from the principles of X-ray physics introduced in Chapter 3.
There have been no prior publications on wobble correction in cargo
images, however there has been analogous work performed for other
imaging systems such as C-arm CT.
• In Chapter 6 we introduce a TIP framework for training and testing
machine learning based image understanding algorithms. The aim of
this is to overcome the problem of limited datasets for developing
such algorithms. The TIP framework is used in the final two technical
chapters to train machine learning based algorithms. A potential limit-
ation of training on TIP imagery is that the algorithm will overfit to TIP
imagery if there are cues present in TIP imagery that are not present
in real imagery. To this end, a number of methods (including Empty
Image Projection (EIP)) are proposed to verify that this does not occur.
• In Chapter 7, the problem of ECV is addressed using a machine learn-
ing approach. From the prior art, there have been two research groups
attempting to tackle ECV. Both of these have not used machine learn-
ing, can only detect large cargo container loads, and provide very little
evaluation of the methods. In Chapter 7, it is shown that a machine
learning based approach is able to outperform these previous meth-
ods for large loads, and is also extendible to the detection of very
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small loads, such as a few kilogrammes of cocaine smuggled in an
otherwise empty container (rip-on-/rip-off). This is an important step
since empty containers constitute 20% of the container fleet, and are
often left unlocked, giving criminals easy access.
• In Chapter 8, a deep learning based ATD algorithm is developed which
operates on dual-energy cargo images. This is the first use of dual-
energy images in cargo ATD algorithms in the literature, with the mo-
tivation being that it can help to reduce false alarms by implicitely
learning to exploit material properties as encoded by the raw dual-
energy measurments. The algorithm significantly outperforms prior
work of Jaccard et al. [10].
5
M E A S U R E M E N T A N D C O R R E C T I O N O F D E T E C T O R
W O B B L E
Here, we address the affect of detector wobble on large-scale trans-mission X-ray imaging. A series of corrections for wobble arte-facts and noise are derived by forming a model of image forma-
tion in the presence of wobble. A method of measuring wobble is proposed
which can be used in image correction. The measurement relies on the use
of Beam Position Detectors (BPDs), which are imaging detectors placed per-
pendicular to the imaging array. The methods are tested both qualitatively
and quantitatively on real images captured by a system modified by rotating
four imaging detectors to create BPDs.
5.1 motivation
Figure 5.1: A raw transmission X-ray image of a cargo container containing vehicles
and vehicle parts (top) and an intensity manipulated version (bottom).
Intensity manipulation is often used to reveal details in the image when
searching for threats.
For operators to quickly and accurately detect threats, high spatial res-
olution and accurate image values are required [133]. The former, because
threats may be small, and the latter because threats may be shielded by
other cargo or only revealed by subtle differential absorption. State-of-the-
art transmission systems offer imaging of vehicle contents at resolutions of
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a few mm/pixel [29] and precisions of 16 bits. In some systems, mechanical
instability (wobble) leads to effective loss of precision.Whilst large-scale
X-ray Computed
Tomography (CT)
could alleviate the
issues of wobble and
shielding, such
systems are not
widely deployed
because they are too
expensive and
inefficient to be
competitive [51, 134].
In Chapter 3, the concept of detector wobble was introduced and how
it can lead to artefacts, noise or geometric distortions depending on the
type of system used and the severity of the wobble. This chapter focuses
on induced noise and artefacts due to wobble; this presents in the image
as a variation in pixel intensity (Figure 5.2). In systems where the effect is
systematic between scans, wobble is an artefact. In systems where the effect
varies between scans due to stochastic factors, wobble is noise. Only traverse
mode systems are effected by detector wobble.
Rippling curtain eﬀect due to wobble
(a) Raw image
Variation in colour due to wobble
(b) Material discrimination
Figure 5.2: An X-ray image of a fork-lift truck from a mobile scanner with mech-
anical instability (left) and the same image with material discrimination
applied (right). The image grey-levels have been clipped to make visible
the small changes in image value due to wobble, which leads to a rippling
curtain effect across the image. Each rectangular test piece corresponds
to a single material of uniform thickness. The wobble artefact affects the
classification of material type; the classification of a single test piece can
change from plastic through to steel due to wobble. This results in a col-
our change across the test piece (indicated by red arrow) in the material
discrimination image, where there should be no change.
In the traverse mode, the imaging array may wobble as it moves across
the scene due to uneven ground or vibrations from the engine (truck sys-
tems), oscillations in the boom (truck and rail systems), or due to wind or
vibrations from traffic (truck and rail systems). This has a particular impact
when operators search for threats placed in dense scenes, since under intens-
ity clipping [135] the wobble artefact becomes apparent (Figure 5.2). Further-
more, wobble reduces the quality of material discrimination images [5] since
their computation is dependent on precise values. Discrimination of high
atomic numbers is particularly important as it can reveal smuggled nuclear
materials, or their shielding [66, 136]. Wobble occurs in both truck-mounted
and gantry systems. In truck-mounted systems wobble is variable from scan
to scan, but in gantry systems it is systematic. In this work a gantry system
is employed, since it allows determination of the wobble ground truth, but
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methods developed herein can equally be applied to truck-mounted sys-
tems.
t
source
wobble 
dir.
t
fan-beam
cross section
ID
BPD
image
y
yscene
Figure 5.3: An illustration of the experimental set-up employed in this work, includ-
ing the placement of four Beam Position Detectors (BPDs), created by ro-
tating imaging detectors by 90◦ relative to the imaging detectors. BPDs
allow the intensity profile across the beam width to be measured. Trans-
lation of the scene relative to the source and detector produces image
columns, whilst each image row corresponds to a single sensor position
in the imaging array.
In this work it is proposed that wobble can be measured using BPDs which
are placed perpendicular to the imaging array as in Figure 5.3. The BPD can
measure the profile of the X-ray fan-beam across its width, thus allowing for
determination of the beam centre. By tracking the movement of the beam
centre at different points along the imaging array, and relative to it, it is
possible to track detector wobble during a scan. These wobble estimates can
be applied to image correction. But to do so, a model of image formation in
the presence of detector wobble should be deduced.
5.2 a model of image formation with wobble
To describe image formation with a wobbling detector, three coordinate sys-
tems are defined (Figure 5.4):
• y ∈ Y – the coordinates of imaging sensor pixels along the Γ -shaped
imaging array (image vertical);
• t ∈ T – the time coordinates indexing each scanning moment during
image acquisition (image horizontal);
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• x ∈ X – the coordinates along the orientation of the BPDs (perpendic-
ular to the beam and imaging array). The origin x=0 is taken as the
vertical mid-line (dashed in Figure 5.4) of the imaging array.
imaging
sensor
IDs
BPD
Figure 5.4: Left: Part of the imaging array showing two misaligned ID, a BPD, and
a wobbling fan-beam. The magnitude of the wobble and the sensor mis-
alignments have been exaggerated in this figure. The offsets dy for in-
dividual imaging sensors are confined to a linear function determined
by the offsets {δl, δu} of the ID endpoints. The fuzzy bars illustrate the
fan-beam incident on the imaging array. The Gaussian (width βy and po-
sition bty) shows the profile of the fan-beam on the BPD. Right: A later
time point t2>t1. Due to wobble, the fan-beam has moved relative to the
imaging array so that the intensity recorded by the IDs has changed. This
leads to an effective loss of image precision. Correction requires estima-
tion of the beam displacements bty and the offsets dy to be estimated.
The bty, dense in t and y, can be interpolated from estimates dense in t
but computed at the sparse y values where BPDs are located.
The formation process of an image Ity∈R+ is described as follows. The
X-ray source emits a photon flux At∈N at scanning moment t. This flux is
collimated into a fan-beam of width βy, which has a spatial distribution on
the imaging plane according to
exp
(
−(bty − dy)
2/(2β2y)
)
. (5.1)
The parameters bty∈X define the displacements of the beam cross section
maximum from the vertical mid-line: when wobble occurs this varies with t
and y, without wobble only with y. The parameters dy∈X are the horizontal
offsets of the imaging sensors from the vertical mid-line.
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For a given linear ID with endpoint offsets {δl, δu}, dy is constrained to a It is assumed that the
individual imaging
sensors are perfectly
aligned within the ID,
but that each ID is
misaligned relative to
other IDs.
linear function
dy := (yu − yl)
−1((yu − y)δl + (y− yl)δu), where yl < y < yu. (5.2)
X-ray photons pass through the scene and interact via absorption and
scattering. Let the scene transmission, the fraction of unattenuated photons,
be denoted by Sty∈[0, 1]. This is dependent on the thickness and type of
material composing the scene. The final measured image is determined ac-
cording to a sensitivity factor Ry∈[0, 1], which incorporates (i) the fraction of
photons that are transmitted through the sensor housing and not absorbed
or scattered, and (ii) the fraction of photons impinging on the detector that
are counted (the intrinsic response of a sensor).
Therefore, the final image, assuming no cross-pixel effects such as photon This is similar to the
equation of image
formation presented
in Section 3.3, but
energy dependence
has been dropped and
R is similar to
D(E) but also
includes effects from
the detector housing.
scatter or detector cross-talk, is approximated by
Ity = At · exp
(
−(bty − dy)
2/(2β2y)
)
· Sty · Ry. (5.3)
The scene transmission Sty is the physical quantity that one is attempting
to measure, therefore the ideal image is
Sty︸︷︷︸
ideal
= Ity︸︷︷︸
raw
· (At · exp
(
−(bty − dy)
2/(2β2y)
)
· Ry)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
correction factor
. (5.4)
To obtain the ideal image, one must estimate the different components of
the correction factor. In the portal scanning mode, correction is straightfor-
ward. Absence of wobble means that bty=by, so that all that needs to be
dealt with is:
1. image column variations due to fluctuations of the photon source At;
2. image row variations due to sensitivity Ry, and the fixed position and
geometry of the beam exp
(
−(by − dy)
2/(2β2y)
)
;
3. image pixel variations due to Poisson noise in the number of photons Note that Poisson
noise can also be
ameliorated by
increasing the beam
intensity or exposure
time, but this has
implications on
safety and cost.
that reach an imaging sensor.
The image column and row variations (1 and 2) can be corrected by nor-
malising the columns and rows in the image respectively. In this work, no
attempt to correct Poisson noise (3) is made, however there are several de-
noising algorithms for Poisson-distributed noise [137, 138] in the literature.
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In the traverse scanning mode, where wobble does occur, the correction is
complicated. The beam position bty now varies with t as well as y, and
the imaging sensor offsets dy must now also be estimated. These and the
other parameters in the correction factor, in Equation (5.4), can be separated
into two classes; (i) system parameters (βy, {δl, δu} and Ry) that are estimated
in a one-off calibration described below, and (ii) dynamic parameters (bty,
At) that are estimated per time point (online). The source variation At is
straightforward to address by taking an image patch from a single ID close
to the source and averaging it over rows. In the remainder of this chapter,
At-corrected images are assumed. In Section 5.3, a method for estimating
bty is described.
In the one-off calibration, for each BPD βy (beam width at the BPD loc-
ation) and Rx (the sensitivity of the sensors along the BPD) are estimated.
For each ID, {δl, δu} (the misalignments of the ID at its endpoints) and Ry
(the sensitivity of the sensors along the ID) are estimated. The estimates are
determined by model fitting to data collected during a traverse (wobbling)
scan of an air-only scene. Although wobble has a detrimental effect on im-
age precision, one benefits from wobble in these estimations since it allows
one to disentangle (i) βy and Rx, and (ii) bty and {δl, δu}.
The calibration is two-step and summarised as follows. First, a Sum of
Squared Errors (SSE) minimisation model fit is performed using a Gaussian
model of the fan-beam incident on the BPD, masked by the sensor sensitiv-
ities. In the fitted model, the Gaussian centre is allowed to vary freely with
time but the beam width and sensitivities are unvarying. Having estimated
the unvarying beam widths and the time-varying beam positions at each
BPD, these are linearly interpolated to the positions of the sensors of the IDs.
With these estimated, next a model fit is performed to determine the ID para-
meters. A SSE fit is performed on the data from each ID to jointly estimate
{δl, δu} and Ry. The SSE is taken between the ideal image (raw image mul-The ideal air image
should be constant
modulo Poisson noise
and with pixel values
close to unity.
tiplied by correction factor, as in Equation (5.4)) and a uniform unit-valued
image. The correction factor is composed using the interpolated βy and bty
estimates (from step 1), and the estimated parameters {δl, δu} and Ry.
5.3 wobble estimation algorithm
To estimate wobble for inhomogeneous scenes, it is required to estimate bty
at the BPDs, and then interpolate between these values to obtain estimates
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at all ID locations. However, the simple model fitting of the previous section
is not applicable for inhomogeneous scenes. At some scanning moments
the beam will be distorted from a Gaussian shape, and at other moments
it will be undetectable due to dense objects in the scene. To cope with this,
the beam position at time t is estimated by fusing an instantaneous estimate
bˆinst (with uncertainty σˆinst), with an estimate bˆprior (with uncertainty σˆprior),
based on the previous n beam position estimates.
5.3.1 Instantaneous estimation
The profile (Dtx) measured at each instant by a BPD, is a multiplicative com- Gaussian (and
piecewise Gaussian)
model fitting have
also been tested for
instantaneous
estimation, as
described more fully
in [11], but it was
found that the
non-normal
distribution of the
errors makes
estimation of the
uncertainty
unreliable. The
method is not
presented in this
thesis.
bination of (i) the beam profile (Ptx), (ii) the scene transmission (Stx), and
(iii) the sensitivity (Rx). The beam profile is estimated from the measured
profile, fixed estimates of the sensitivity (Section 5.2), and dynamic estim-
ates of the scene transmission estimated from previous time-points of the
BPD signal, according to
Pˆtx = Dtx/(Rˆx Sˆtx). (5.5)
This estimation works well in cases where the scene is not too dense (Fig-
ures 5.5a and 5.5b); but when it is the estimated beam profile can be inac-
curate due to (i) the low (noise-dominated) sensor signal, or (ii) deviation of
photon trajectories due to scatter (Figure 5.5c).
The scene transmission function Sˆtx was estimated using measurements
of the BPD as it slides across the scene. A given pixel on the BPD samples
each point, at its y-value, in the scene (Figure 5.6). Plotting the response of
this pixel as a function of time gives an estimate of the scene transmission
function. Since each of the BPD sensors also sample each point in the scene,
one can construct a similar estimate for each sensor. The final estimate of
Sˆtx is obtained by taking a weighted average of the estimates from each of
the sensors. The weighted average is taken to reduce noise in the estimate
from sensors that are aligned with the low signal tails of the Gaussian cross
section.
With the estimate of the beam profile (Pˆtx), one can estimate the instant-
aneous beam position binst and its uncertainty σinst. The estimator should be
able to deal with non-linear relationships in the data and be able to produce
data dependent uncertainty estimates.
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x/Px x/Px
(a) Homogeneous scene
x/Px x/Px
(b) Inhomogeneous scene
x/Px x/Px
(c) Dense inhomogeneous scene
Figure 5.5: Examples of the estimated beam profile Pˆtx (green) computed by divid-
ing the measured BPD profile Dtx (black) by estimates of the scene trans-
mission Sˆtx (red) and the sensor sensitivity Rˆx (blue). Top: Example of a
homogeneous scene, and thus the estimate Sˆtx is flat, resulting in a Gaus-
sian Pˆtx. Middle: Example of an inhomogeneous scene, the resulting Pˆtx
is approximately Gaussian. Bottom: Example of a dense inhomogeneous
scene, where the resulting Pˆtx is non-Gaussian which and is probably
attribute to photon scatter.
In this work, a Random Regression Forest (RRF) [139] is used to construct
a robust estimator of the beam position from the beam profile estimates. A
RRF model is based on an ensemble of decision trees and is capable of mod-
elling non-linear relationships as required. Each tree in the RRF produces an
estimate of the beam position. Estimates of the instantaneous beam position
bˆinst and its uncertainty σˆinst are obtained by taking the mean and standard
deviation of the tree responses, respectively. It is observed, in this study, that
the standard deviation of the tree responses has a strong correlation with
the actual error in the beam position estimate. Other advantages of RRF is
that it is fast to train and deploy, and resistant to overfitting.
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...
BPD
...
Figure 5.6: Left: Illustration of a BPD being translated across a scene during a scan.
At consecutive time-points t = {1, 2, . . . , T } a given sensor (green) samples
consecutive points in the scene. Right: plotting these samples as a function
of t yields an estimate of the scene transmission. Each BPD sensor gives a
similar estimate, and weighted average of is taken to reduce the noise in
the final estimate Sˆtx. Sensors towards the ends of the BPD, which receive
low signal, are given a lower weighting in the average than those near
the Gaussian centre which receive a higher signal.
In the RRF, Nt trees are constructed top-down with bagging and random
subspace sampling. Internal nodes are split using standard thresholding,
and optimised according to the Residual Sum of Squares (RSS). At each split
m features (i.e. scene and sensitivity normalised BPD pixels; elements of
Pˆtx at fixed t) are randomly sampled. For stopping criteria, a minimum of
two samples per split is enforced with no limit on tree depth. To tune Nt
and m, first m is set to the recommended default (m=1/3×# features=5)
for regression. Nt is then varied and the Root-Mean-Square Error (RMSE) is
computed to choose a sufficient number of trees so that the RMSE is stabilised
but not too many that computation time is slow. With theNt fixed,m is then
varied from 3 to 12 to find the optimal RMSE, before verifying Nt again as
before. By this method, it was determined that Nt=500 was adequate and
the default m=5 was optimal.
The randomforest-matlab implementation of RRFs [140] is employed. For
training, the ground truth values of the beam displacement were obtained
by use of a gantry system in traverse mode, described later in Section 5.4.
Separate RRFs are trained for each BPD, using 1.4×105 measurements from
five independent scans so that there is no overlap with the test images used
in Section 5.4.
5.3.2 Estimation based on previous estimates
In cases where the BPD is heavily obscured, giving low Signal-to-Noise Ra-
tio (SNR), the RRF-based instantaneous estimate will give a poor estimate
of the beam position and a high uncertainty. In these cases, one wants the
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beam position estimate to be sensible, and to achieve this information about
prior beam positions was incorporated using an Auto-Regression (AR). The
wobble of the detector array is partly deterministic (consider a swinging pen-
dulum), but also stochastic due to the variable scanning surface, wind and
vibrations. An AR is capable of learning some of the deterministic wobble,
whilst allowing for stochastic variation. It is also simple to implement and
fast to compute. Moreover, it is observed that the beam position trace has
a low frequency component due to the wobble of the imaging array (Fig-
ure 5.7a); and a high frequency component due to either fluctuations in
detector response or of the photon source (Figure 5.7b). The high frequency
element makes simple estimation, based on the previous time point, un-
reliable. An AR, however, allows incorporation of n previous time-points,
where n can be tuned on data to achieve best performance. Moreover, the AR
approach effectively smooths out erroneous estimates from previous time-
points, but is beneficial over other smoothing filters (e.g. median filter) since
it is possible to propagate errors from previous time-points to be used in
fusion (Section 5.3.3) with the instantaneous estimate.
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
(a) Low frequency
800 850 900 950 1000
7.70
7.75
7.80
7.85
7.90
7.95
(b) High frequency
Figure 5.7: The beam position bty as function of time t during a wobbling air scan.
The low frequency component (a) is due to wobble. On zooming, a high
frequency component is also visible (b).
The AR model predicts the current beam position based on a linear com-
bination of the previous n beam positions with an added, normally distrib-
uted, perturbation
bt =
∑
t ′
wt ′bt−t ′ +N(0, 
2) s.t.
∑
t ′
wt ′ = 1, (5.6)
where 1 6 t ′ 6 n.
The AR weights wt ′ are determined by model fitting Equation (5.6) to an
independent air scan. The constraint
∑
wt ′=1 ensures that the model does
not have an unrealistic systematic drift. The uncertainty  is determined by
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applying the model to a second air-only scan and computing the RMSE. The
fitted model is used to generate the prior beam position estimate and its
uncertainty according to:
bˆprior =
∑
t ′
wt ′ bˆt−t ′ , σˆ
2
prior =
∑
t ′
wt ′ σˆ
2
t+t ′ + 
2. (5.7)
Note that the uncertainties from previous time-points are propagated when
forming this estimate, so that if the AR operates on previous estimates that
are highly uncertain they are incorporated into the AR uncertainty, which is
useful in the fusion step.
5.3.3 Fusion of estimates
To incorporate the information from the previous time-points, the estimates
from the AR and RRF models are first fused, according to their uncertain-
ties. The fusion should weight the final estimate more towards the AR if the
RRF-based estimate is more uncertain (e.g. due to low SNR). Equally, if the
AR uncertainty is high, because many of the previous n RRF-based estim-
ates were also uncertain, but the next instantaneous estimate is very certain,
then the fusion should weight more towards the RRF-based instantaneous The Bayesian fusion
is equivalent to a
Kalman Filter [141].
estimate. To achieve this, a Bayesian fusion was performed. This approach
is illustrated in Figure 5.8.
prior
fused
instantaneous
(a) Certain prior
prior
fused
instantaneous
(b) Equal certainty
prior
fused
instantaneous
(c) Certain instantaneous
Figure 5.8: Demonstration of Bayesian fusion of a prior estimate (black) and an in-
stantaneous estimate (red) to obtain a fused estimate (blue). The width
of the Gaussians correspond to the uncertainty on the estimate, and their
centroid to the estimate value. The x-axis can be imagined as the BPD. In
(a) the prior has a higher certainty than the instantaneous estimate and
so the fused estimate is weighted towards the prior, in (c) the opposite is
true. In (b) both estimates have equal certainty and so the fused estimate
compromises between the two.
To estimate the beam position bˆt and its uncertainty σˆt, the instantan-
eous estimate bˆinst and its uncertainty σˆinst (Section 5.3.1) were Bayesian
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fused with a prior estimate bˆprior and its uncertainty (Section 5.3.2). This is
expressed as:
bˆt = (bˆinstσˆ
2
prior + bˆpriorσˆ
2
inst)/(σˆ
2
prior + σˆ
2
inst),
with σˆ2t = (σˆ
2
priorσˆ
2
inst)/(σˆ
2
prior + σˆ
2
inst). (5.8)
This weights the two beam position estimates by their uncertainty, as re-
quired. If the uncertainty of an estimate is low then that estimate contributes
more to the fused estimate. In particular, if the instantaneous estimate is un-
certain because of dense shielding, the prior estimate will be relied on; but
when it is certain it will dominate the overall estimate.
5.4 results
For the purposes of this study, and to test out the methods described above,The data was
collected by James
Ollier, Rapiscan
Systems.
data was collected using a modified Rapiscan Eagle® G60 transmission X-
ray scanner. Four of the IDs were rotated by 90◦ to become BPDs. The BPDs
were placed at the extremes of the vertical boom and the horizontal boom,
so that there were two BPDs per boom. The wobble characteristics are differ-
ent at each location, for example wobble is most severe at the bottom of the
vertical boom. Note that in a commercial implementation of BPDs, the sys-
tem would have a full set of IDs with additional detectors for BPDs, but for
the purposes of these experiments this modification was adopted to reduce
cost. Air-only images in portal and traverse modes were collected, and sev-
eral traverse mode scans of objects (i.e. trucks, fork-lifts, scissor lifts) were
performed. The scanner operates at 90Hz and has a pixel size of 5.6mm,
giving an effective spatial resolution of approximately 3mm. The scanner
uses a Bremsstrahlung beam with a cut-off energy of 6MeV. This is the
same energy used in commercial systems, and gives enough penetration to
achieve reasonable SNR on the BPD for most objects.
A gantry set-up was adopted, since it provides a ground truth for wobble.
Wobble is observed in both gantry and truck-mounted systems, with a
similar amplitude and frequency composition. However, for a gantry sys-
tem, wobble is the same (modulo alignment) for each scan, but variable for
truck-mounted systems. The gantry system allows one to obtain an accur-
ate ground truth by aligning wobble estimates from an air-scan with the air
parts of an object scan.
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5.4.1 System parameter estimation
The system parameters βy (beam width), Ry (sensitivities) and dy (imaging
sensor offsets) were estimated according to Section 5.2, and are shown in
Figure 5.9. Small and large y-values correspond to the bottom and top of the
image, or the vertical and horizontal parts of the Γ -shaped imaging array,
respectively. The gaps in y-values are where an ID has been removed or
rotated to form a BPD.
The estimate of βy (Figure 5.9a) increases as you go along the horizontal
of the Γ -shaped imaging array and away from the source due to beam disper-
sion; it then decreases as you go along the vertical of the Γ -shaped imaging
array and slightly closer to the source. The sensitivities Ry (Figure 5.9b) have
a lot of variation between adjacent imaging sensors due to their intrinsic
response and due to variations in the housing of the Γ -shaped array. The
estimated offsets of the IDs (Figure 5.9c) are of the order of a few mm, which
when compared to their 10 cm length is plausible for a human engineer pla-
cing them during the construction of the scanner, and is indeed within the
manufacturing tolerance of a scanning device of this scale (6m tall). Note
that the piecewise-linear nature of dy is due to the linear constraint placed
on each ID, as in Equation (5.2).
5.4.2 Wobble estimation
The AR was trained on an air-only traverse mode image. Figure 5.10a shows
the RMSE performance of the trained AR on an independent air-only test
image as a function of the number (n) of previous time-points considered.
As n is increased the RMSE decreases, reaching a minimum at n=64, before
the RMSE begins to grow. When n gets too large the model overfits and
performance deteriorates. The point n=32 was chosen since the RMSE is near
optimal but requires half the number of parameters. The AR weights for
n=32 are shown in Figure 5.10b. It shows that more importance is placed
on the most recent b estimates as expected. The oscillating structure is the
AR system’s way of coping with the high frequency component of the beam
movement.
To assess the performance of the proposed beam position estimates, theThe Gaussian
method was a direct
model fit on the BPD
data as in [11].
performance was tested on easy (scissor lift, which occluded a single BPD, in-
termediate (fork-lift truck that occluded two BPDs) and difficult (a truck which
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(b) Learnt weights for n=32
Figure 5.10: AR model fit: (a) The RMSE performance of the AR for different numbers
of previous time-points n included in the model (dashed line indicates
the standard deviation of the beam position, red circle indicates the near-
optimal n=32); and (b) the learnt AR weights wt′ when n=32. The RMSE
decreases as the number of time points n included in the model in-
creases, it reaches an optimum at around n=64, before rising again due
to overfitting. The AR weights have larger magnitude for the most recent
time-points (t ′=− 1,−2) as expected, because these are most informat-
ive for predicting the next beam position. The oscillating structure in
the weights is the AR’s way of coping with the high frequency wobble
component.
occluded two BPDs throught entire scan, and contains a very dense engine
region which severely limits the SNR on the BPDs) scenarios from the col-
lected data. For each, the RRF-based method for instantaneous estimation is
compared to a Gaussian-based method. Also compared are the RRF-based
method instantaneous method, with the fused estimate which is referred to
as RRF-AR.
For the easy scenario (Figure 5.11), the RRF instantaneous estimate (green)
is mostly accurate, with most estimates close to the ground truth (black).
The Gaussian-based method (red) gives wildly inaccurate estimates when
the BPD is occluded by an object thus resulting in a non-Gaussian BPD pro-
file. However, the RRF yields estimates much closer to the ground truth, in
these cases. These estimates are made very accurate when fused with the
AR (blue), since the RRF trees give variable responses which results in a lar-
ger uncertainty, so the fusion gives more weight to the AR. In particular, in
Figure 5.11d, the fused estimate is much closer to the ground truth than the
RRF on its own.
In the intermediate scenario (Figure 5.12). The Gaussian-based method
does even worse, and again the RRF-based method appears relatively robust
to non-Gaussian BPD profiles, where the Gaussian-based method fails. In
this scenario, fusion with AR, does not give a large change in estimates over
just using the RRF since the RRF trees are confident in their estimate; there is
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Figure 5.11: Easy scenario wobble estimates. In (a) the RRF instantaneous estim-
ates (green) are compared to the Gaussian-based method (red), and
the ground truth (black). In (c) the RRF-based instantaneous estimates
(green) are compared to its Bayesian fusion with an Auto-Regression
(blue). Plots (b & d) show zooms for the most difficult region. In (d), the
fused estimator yields much more accurate estimates.
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Figure 5.12: Intermediate scenario wobble estimates. In (a) the RRF instantaneous es-
timates (green) are compared to the Gaussian-based method (red), and
the ground truth (black). In (c) the RRF-based instantaneous estimates
(green) are compared to its Bayesian fusion with an Auto-Regression
(blue). Plots (b & d) show zooms for the most difficult region. In (d), the
fused estimator yields much more accurate estimates.
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not a large amount of variability in their votes. However, an improvement
is seen in Figure 5.12d.
For the difficult scenario in Figure 5.13, the Gaussian-based method does
even worse. The RRF-based instantaneous estimator appears far more robust,
with estimates much closer to the ground truth, however the performance
is not as great as in the easy and intermediate scenarios. The fused estimates
exhibit a bias (see Figure 5.13f) where the RRF performs poorly over a long
time period. This happens where the total signal on the BPD is close to the
background noise level (it is very heavily occluded by a truck engine), and
hence the RRF finds it difficult to make accurate estimates of the beam posi-
tion. This is reflected in the RRF uncertainty, and so the fused estimate puts
full weight on the AR estimate, which results in a constant fused beam posi-
tion estimate until a good instantaneous estimate is achieved. Therefore, the
AR has forced the fused estimate into giving sensible estimates. Since the BPD
signal is so low in this object and it occupies a large number of time-points,
it would be very difficult to obtain an accurate instantaneous estimate by
any method based on the employed BPD set-up.
Scenario Meth. Acc. Bias Prec. 5% 1% 0.1%
Gauss. 0.105 0.003 0.105 0.300 0.818 2.085
Easy RRF 0.033 0.004 0.033 0.122 0.168 0.203
RRF-AR 0.030 0.006 0.029 0.104 0.140 0.167
Gauss. 0.470 -0.010 0.470 1.751 3.523 5.846
Intermediate RRF 0.019 -0.001 0.019 0.073 0.125 0.170
RRF-AR 0.021 -0.001 0.021 0.069 0.111 0.149
Gauss. 0.637 -0.135 0.623 2.012 3.329 5.670
Difficult RRF 0.052 -0.008 -0.052 0.188 0.262 0.310
RRF-AR 0.052 -0.014 0.050 0.191 0.253 0.284
Table 5.1: Performance metrics for: (i) the Gaussian (Gauss.) based instantaneous es-
timator; (ii) the proposed RRF-based instantaneous estimator; and (iii) the
Bayesian fusion of the RRF estimator with an AR (RRF-AR). The metrics
computed are: Accuracy (Acc.); Bias; Precision (Prec.); and the MAE for
the worst 5%,1% and 0.1% of estimates. RRF gives an order-of-magnitude
improvement over Gauss. for easy/intermediate scenarios, and 3-fold for
the difficult scenario. RRF-AR gives 3-15% improvement in MAE across scen-
arios.
For each of the scenarios (easy, intermediate, and difficult), the performance
of the methods was quantified in terms of: accuracy; bias; precision; and MAE
for the worst 5%, 1%, and 0.1% of time-points. For each scenario, two im-
ages (of scissor lifts, fork-lifts, and trucks for easy, intermediate and difficult,
respectively) were used for evaluation. Since each image had four corres-
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ponding BPDs, and each BPD measured >2×103, this amounted to >1.6×104
time-points per scenario for evaluation. The worst MAEs are included since
particularly bad time-points can be lost in the accuracy, precision, and bias
metrics, particularly if there are many air-only time-points where estimation
is straightforward. Moreover, wildly inaccurate wobble estimates could lead
to column artefacts in the image after correction so are undesirable. The res-
ults are given in Table 5.1. All metrics were averages over all time-points for
the given scenario.
For the intermediate and difficult scenarios, the RRF-based instantaneous es-
timation offers roughly an order-of-magnitude improvement across all met-
rics, over the Gaussian-based method. For the easy scenario, this improve-
ment is approximately 3-fold; the Gaussian method is already quite good
at dealing with simple objects. By fusing the RRF with the AR (RRF-AR), the
performance increases across most metrics, particularly for worst MAEs, how-
ever, there is little change (or a slight worsening for the intermediate scenario)
in the overall accuracy. In the easy scenario there is roughly a 15% improve-
ment in the MAE for the worst 5% of time-points. For the intermediate case
the improvement drops so about 5%. Finally, for the difficult scenario the
worst 1% MAE improves by about 3%.
Whilst these results show an improvement on the prior work [11], it is
unclear of how well these results generalise to different images, since only a
few images were available for the purposes of testing. Future testing should
include many more scans of more variable objects.
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5.4.3 Image correction
The image correction method was first assessed on an air-only scene. For
air-only images, wobble estimation is straightforward, since the BPD profile
is not distorted by obscuring objects in the scene. However, air-only images
allow one to visualise and fully quantify the improvement from wobble
correction. The image quality was assessed based on the fact that a perfect
(normalised) transmission air image would have all pixel values equalling
unity. Image precision can therefore be assessed by computing the Root-
Mean-Square (RMS) deviation or Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) from this
ideal.
Figure 5.14 shows air-only images from traverse and portal mode scans
and their full correction split into stages. The stages are: sensitivity Ry cor-
rection (Figures 5.14b and 5.14f); wobble and ID offset exp (−(bty − d2y)/2β2y)
correction (Figures 5.14c and 5.14g); and source variation At correction (Fig-
ures 5.14d and 5.14h). Images have been intensity clipped (to the same
range) so that the wobble effect is visible in Figure 5.14f. Note the visible
difference between the images in Figures 5.14b and 5.14f, this difference is
mostly due to wobble. The PSNR drops from 109dB to 77.2dB, from portal
image (Figure 5.14b) to traverse image (Figure 5.14f) due to the wobble arte-
fact. After wobble correction, to obtain Figure 5.14g, most of the wobble arte-
fact is visibly improved. Indeed, the wobble correction improves the PSNR
by 21.3dB but is unable to achieve the portal mode PSNR.
Scan mode Noise source Symbol Before After Reduction
sensor sensitivity Ry 0.2305 0.0000 100%
offset of ID endpoints {δl, δu} 0.0013 0.0000 100%
portal wobble bty 0.0000 0.0000 –
source variation At 0.0030 0.0000 100%
photon count – 0.0029 0.0029 0%
sensor sensitivity Ry 0.2305 0.0026 99%
offset of ID endpoints {δl, δu} 0.0013 0.0004 72%
traverse wobble bty 0.0185 0.0054 87%
source variation At 0.0030 0.0004 74%
photon count – 0.0029 0.0029 0%
Table 5.2: RMS deviation contributions from different noise sources before and after
corrections for: sensor sensitivity; ID offsets; wobble; and source fluctu-
ation. No attempt is made to correct Poisson noise in the photon counts.
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Figure 5.14: Correction of portal (a-d) and traverse (e-h) air scans: (a & e) raw im-
ages; (b & f) images corrected for for sensor sensitivities; (c & g) images
corrected for wobble (and sensor offsets); and (d & h) the image cor-
rected for source variation. Images have been intensity clipped so that
the wobble artefact is visible in (b), and the PSNR is given in decibels.
The wobble artefact is clearly visible in (f), but not in (b) since portal
mode is not effected by wobble. Wobble reduces the PSNR by 31.8dB.
After wobble correction (g) there is a significant visual improvement,
and improvement in PSNR of 21.3dB.
To make quantitative assessment of the effects visible in Figure 5.15, the
RMS deviations of the traverse and portal mode air-only images, before and
after the different corrections, were used to deduce the magnitude of the
noise sources before and after correction. Table 5.2 shows that wobble in-
creases overall image noise, and has also reduced the ability to correct for
sensor sensitivity, ID offset, and source variation. Although it is possible to cor-
rect for 99% of sensor sensitivity, the magnitude of sensor sensitivity is so large
that it is still the second most dominant source of noise in the corrected im-
age. Source variation was the least successfully corrected and this is appar-
ent in Figures 5.14g and 5.14h, since the corrected images have some slightly
visible column artefacts. Finally, it is possible to correct 87% of wobble, thus
outperforming the Gaussian-based method [11], which does not incorporate
sensor offset estimates into the correction.
The results for corrections applied to traverse mode images of a scissor
lift and a fork-lift truck are shown in Figure 5.15. Images have been intensity
clipped, to the same range, to make the wobble artefact visible. The wobble
correction is obtained using the Bayesian-fused beam position estimate. The
red boxes indicate image regions most effected by wobble, and the green
boxes show the same regions but after wobble correction. There is a visible
improvement in the wobble artefact after wobble correction, showing that a
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good level of correction is obtained even when the BPDs pass through dense
objects such as a fork-lift truck.
(a) Raw image of scissor lift (b) Raw image of fork-lift truck
(c) After sensitivity correction (d) After sensitivity correction
(e) After wobble correction (f) After wobble correction
(g) After source correction (h) After source correction
(i) Final image (j) Final image
Figure 5.15: Images of the easy scenario (left) and intermediate scenario (right), after
a series of corrections for: sensor sensitivities (c & d); wobble and ID
offsets (e & f); and source variation (g & h). Corrected images were
intensity clipped so that the wobble artefact is visible in (c & d). The
final images (i & j) are the non-clipped versions of (g & h). The red boxes
indicate regions where wobble is visible, and the green boxes indicates
these regions after wobble correction. There is a visible improvement in
the wobble artefact after correction, thus wobble correction works well
even when BPDs are heavily occluded by dense object.
Figure 5.16 shows image corrections on a truck image. Since the truck
occupies most of the image, it is more difficult to see the effects of wobble
and the corrections. The most obvious places are the steps up to the driver’s
cabin and the area surrounding the test object. These are indicated by the red
boxes in Figure 5.16b. After wobble correction (green boxes in Figure 5.16c),
the artefact is reduced so that the driver’s steps and the test object become
visible. Figures 5.16f and 5.16g show plots of a column and row of pixels,
respectively. In each, the red plot is from Figure 5.16b before wobble cor-
rection, and the blue plot is from Figure 5.16c after wobble correction. The
pixels are taken from image lines that should have approximately constant
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(a) Raw image of a truck
(b) After sensitivity correction
(c) After wobble correction
(d) After source correction
(e) Final image
After wobble correction
After sensitivity correction
t/Px
(f) Pixel column traces
t/Px
After wobble correction
After sensitivity correction
(g) Pixel row traces
Figure 5.16: Images from a traverse mode scan of a truck, after a series of corrections.
The red boxes indicate regions around the driver’s steps and a test ob-
ject, where wobble is particularly visible. The green boxes indicates the
same regions after wobble correction and one can see a visible improve-
ment in the wobble artefact. The plots (f) and (g) show traces of the pixel
intensities across a column and row in the image, respectively. The red
traces are uncorrected for wobble and taken from (b), whilst the blue
traces are corrected for wobble and taken (c). The red traces should be
approximately (piece-wise in g) constant, however they are distorted by
wobble. The wobble correction corrects most of this distortion.
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(or piece-wise constant) pixel values. However, due to the wobble artefacts
they are distorted from constancy. The wobble correction corrects a large
part of this distortion.
5.5 discussion
A series of image corrections to ameliorate detector wobble artefacts and
noise in large-scale transmission radiography have been proposed. The cor-
rections were derived by considering a model of X-ray image formation in
the presence of a wobbling detector. The correction relies on the estimation
of a number of fixed system parameters and dynamic parameters which
vary during a scan. The fixed parameters include sensor sensitivities, sensor
misalignments, and the width of the X-ray fan-beam. The dynamic paramet-
ers include the position of the beam at different points along the detector
array, and the fluctuation of the number of photons emitted by the source. A
method was proposed for estimating the fixed system parameters by model
fitting to an air calibration image.
Wobble is more difficult to estimate, and an online approach is adopted
using BPDs. BPDs are placed perpendicular to the imaging array, and meas-
ure the cross-sectional profile of the photon beam after interaction with the
scene, allowing the position of the beam to be determined and hence de-
tector wobble to be measured. In this chapter, an instantaneous estimator
based on a RRF was proposed. The true beam profile is first estimated, as
if the beam had not been attenuated by the scene, and then the beam po-
sition and its uncertainty are estimated by taking the mean and standard
deviation of the responses from a RRF, respectively.
To test the wobble estimation and image correction methods, image data
collected of several objects ranging in difficulty from a small scissor lift to
a large truck, was employed. A commercial scanner, modified by rotating
four IDs by 90◦ to act as BPDs, was employed. The RRF-based approach to
instantaneous estimation performs significantly (an order of magnitude in
most cases) better than a naive approach based on Gaussian fitting. More-
over, its fusion with an AR achieves results close to ground truth, even for
difficult objects, and performs better than the RRF by 3-15% in the worst
cases. It struggles when the object has a low SNR for long durations in the
scan, and this problem may not be solvable solved by wobble estimation
based solely on BPD readings, unless one can accurately predict future beam
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positions from a limited number of accurate prior position estimates. This
is unlikely due to the stochastic nature of wobble originating from uneven
scanning surfaces or wind. Incorporation of measurement devices, such as
accelerometers placed along the imaging array, may improve estimates even
where there is almost no BPD signal due to object occlusion.
The wobble and system parameter estimates were used to apply correc-
tions to images. Corrections were applied to traverse and portal mode air-
only images and resulted in a reduction of 87% of image error due to de-
tector wobble. This extends the work of Rogers et al. [11], which achieved
a wobble correction of 70% The wobble correction method was also ap-
plied to difficult images of objects and a notable qualitative improvement
in the intensity-clipped image quality was observed, clarifying dense re-
gions of the scene. The method should also allow for improved material
discrimination in images captured from dual-energy scanners in traverse
mode. State-of-the-art material discrimination, for cargo, is performed by
taking the log-ratio (or difference) of images at different energies, and relies
on subtle differences between the images [5, 102, 142]. But in commercial
traverse-mode systems material discrimination is often inaccurate due to
image noise, including from wobble (Figure 5.2). And so wobble correction
as a pre-processing step could help improve material discrimination accur-
acy.

6
T H R E AT I M A G E P R O J E C T I O N F O R C A R G O
This chapter proposes a method for Threat Image Projection (TIP) incargo. Rather than using it to improve and evaluate the perform-ance of human operators as is conventional, it is instead proposed
use is in the training and testing of Machine Learning (ML) based algorithms,
as it provides a means of data augmentation to overcome the data problem
which is particularly severe in security domains. It also allows manipula-
tion of testing conditions to evaluate the performance of the system in a
number of scenarios. The TIP method is validated both qualitatively and
quantitatively using images collected in an experiment with a commercial
X-ray scanner. In addition an ‘Empty Image Projection’ (EIP) is proposed to
test whether ML-based systems can learn to exploit potential TIP artefacts
to give a falsely boosted performance when tested on TIP threat imagery as
opposed to real threat imagery.
6.1 motivation
One major challenge for obtaining high human performance at visual screen-
ing tasks, such as Automated Threat Detection (ATD) for X-ray baggage
scans, is the rarity of real threats. Studies have shown that humans perform
much better in terms of detection and false alarm rates if threat items have
high prevalence [131]. This prompted research into TIP techniques, mostly in
Cabin Baggage Screening (CBS), whereby threat items are synthetically con-
cealed in baggage imagery to increase threat prevalence during live screen-
ing operations. TIP is also used in Computer-Based Training (CBT) [85, 143],
and for evaluating operator performance and vigilance [144].
Most TIP methods insert a Fictional Threat Image (FTI) from a threat data-
base into the image [80]. Researchers have focused on determining realistic
placement locations (voids) in baggage and generating threat noise and arte-
facts that are consistent with the rest of the baggage [83, 145, 146], so as to
reduce visual cues for operators. To best knowledge, there have been no aca-
demic publications on TIP methods for cargo. Authors have commented on
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possible cues caused by superposition-based TIP methods for single-view X-
ray baggage [146]. In this work a similar superposition approach is followed,
but it is demonstrated, experimentally, that it does not lead to any obvious
visual cues.
Researchers also face a similar threat prevalence issue when training ML-
based ATD algorithms. There is often a large imbalance between the benign
and threat classes. This can lead to learnt algorithms that are biased towards
the benign class with suboptimal performance on the threat class. This obser-
vation is similar, and possibly analogous, to the one found in humans. Class
imbalance can also affect performance evaluation, particularly simplistic ac-
curacy measures, in what is known as the ‘accuracy paradox’ [147].
To remedy the class imbalance problem, researchers often consider:
(i) dataset re-sampling [148, 149];
(ii) reformulating the problem as a one-class problem where only benign
data is required [150];
(iii) adjusting the algorithm cost function [151]; or
(iv) generating or collecting more data.
Recently, with the development of end-to-end learning methods such as
deep learning, which require very large amounts of training data, dataset
augmentation [152, 153] has become increasingly the focus of attention. In
dataset augmentation, class-preserving transformations are made to existing
training data to expose the ML algorithm to natural variation, which reduces
overfitting and improves generalisation to unseen examples. Such transform-
ations often include rotations, translations, reflections, and changes in illu-
mination and noise.
Cargo screening is faced with a major class imbalance problem since
threats are extremely rare in the wild. It is also expensive and time consum-
ing to collect large numbers of realistic staged threat examples. To this end,
it would be beneficial to develop a TIP framework for cargo. The framework
would allow generation of realistic synthetic threat images and the injection
of realistic variation derived from the characteristics of X-ray cargo image
formation. These variations include: (i) translations; (ii) rotations; (iii) pixel
noise; (iv) magnification; (v) illumination; (vi) volume and density; and (vii)
obfuscation. Whilst TIP is beneficial in training ML-based algorithms, it is
also useful for gaining a deeper understanding of algorithm performance
by controlling particular aspects in testing.
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The TIP framework is applied during training and evaluation of image
understanding algorithms in Chapters 7 and 8.
6.2 threat image extraction and projection
It is assumed that X-ray image formation obeys the Beer-Lambert rule so
that the pixel value Ixy at image location {x,y} is given by
Ixy = I0 exp
(
−
∫
µxy(z)dz
)
, (6.1)
where I0 is the beam intensity, x are horizontal image coordinates, y are
vertical image coordinates, z are depth coordinates, and µ is the attenuation
coefficient of the objects composing the scene. The TIP method derived here,
assumes no X-ray scatter. Although approximate, this allows rapid synthesis
TIP imagery, which is required when augmenting data on-the-fly for training
the ATD algorithm in Chapter 8.
The pixel value can be split into contributions from the threat T and its
background B, such that
Ixy = I0 exp
(
−
∫
T
µxy(z)dz
)
exp
(
−
∫
B
µxy(z)dz
)
,
= I0TxyBxy, (6.2)
Therefore, by estimating I0Bxy, one can estimate the threat attenuation Txy ∈
[0, 1].
Two methods are proposed for extracting the threat attenuation, depending
on the difficulty of the extraction. If the original threat is on an empty back-
ground, then it is simple to estimate this background by taking a small em- This method of
extraction is used for
generating a TIP
database for training
an ECV algorithm in
Chapter 7.
pty patch above the threat and computing the mean of each of its columns.
This is because cargo containers are uniform in appearance in the vertical
direction.
In more difficult cases, where the original threat is situated on some low-
density but non-uniform background, one has to perform a more involved
extraction procedure. This includes: This approach is
adopted in Chapter 8,
where staged threats
require supporting
fixtures for imaging.
1. Manually delineating the threat (threat mask);
2. Manually delineating background/benign structures (ignore mask);
3. Computing the mean pixel intensity of background pixels that are not
members of either the threat or ignore mask;
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4. Dividing pixels in the threat mask by this mean;
5. Setting all other pixels to unity.
This process gives an estimate of the threat attenuation, which can then be
projected into X-ray images by multiplication. Unlike TIP for baggage Com-
puted Tomography (CT) [88], one does not have to compute plausible threat
locations, unless the threat occupies a very large container volume. An illus-
tration of extraction using masks is shown in Figure 6.1.
threat mask
ignore mask
TIP imagestaged threat image
threat patch
threat 
attenuation
mean
background 
Figure 6.1: Illustration of Threat Image Projection (TIP) when the threat background
is complicated. An ignore mask and a threat mask are manually delineated.
The mean is computed for pixels not belonging to either mask. The pixels
belonging to the threat mask are divided by this mean, and all other
pixels set to unity. The threat attenuation can then be projected in new
images by pixel-wise multiplication. Original figure from Jaccard et al.
[17].
6.3 experimental validation
Since the proposed TIP method relies on assuming the Beer-Lambert law
and a monochromatic X-ray source, it is unclear how realistic TIP imagery is
without experimental validation.
It is important that TIP imagery is realistic, in particular the TIP process
should not generate any cues that may be learnt by a ML algorithm, espe-
cially if testing is performed on TIP imagery. To this end, the TIP method
was validated experimentally, using a Rapiscan® Eagle M60 operating in
interlaced dual-energy mode using Bremsstrahlung X-rays with 4MeV and
6MeV cut-offs for low and high energy, respectively. Images were captured
of containers, containing:
1. threat only (T ) as shown in Figures 6.2a and 6.2b;
2. threat and other cargo (TC) by leaving threats untouched and adding in
cargo as shown in Figures 6.2c and 6.2d;
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3. other cargo only (C) by removing the threats from the container and
leaving the background untouched.
Industrial tools (i.e. pipe wrench, electric drill, pipe bender) were used
as threat models and plastic cylinders and hula-hoops were used to sup-
port the threats in place. For the purposes of this experiment, the hula
hoop support structures were included as part of the threat since they were
only present in the threat image, and would require more complicated back-
ground removal than is proposed here. Moreover, it was impractical to re-
move the threats from their hula hoop support structures between experi-
ments, so that they could be imaged as background rather than threat.
(a) Wrench (b) Pipe bender and drill
(c) Added background (red) (d) Added background (red)
(e) Captured X-ray (f) Captured X-ray
Figure 6.2: The top row shows photographs of the industrial tools that were used
as threat models in this chapter. The second row shows the tools with
added background cargo (red). The final row shows the X-ray scans of
the threat and background. These X-ray images are compared with the
equivalent TIP imagery to assess TIP realism.
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Threats were extracted from the T images and projected onto C images
to create the TIP image (Figure 6.3). Images were first registered using affine
transforms so that the containers were aligned in the image.
(a) Cargo only, C
(b) Threat only, T (c) Threat attenuation (e) Threat and cargo, TC
(d) TIP image
Figure 6.3: Illustration of Threat Image Projection (TIP) used in experimental valid-
ation. Three images were captured of: (i) cargo only (C); (ii) threat (and
support structures) only (T ); and (iii) threat and cargo (TC). The back-
ground was removed from T by dividing by a background estimate leav-
ing the threat attenuation mask. The threat was then projected onto C by
multiplication. For evaluation the TIP image can be compared to the treat
threat image TC. Note that the threat support structures have been in-
cluded as threat in this experiment, but would be removed in practice.
Visual comparison of TIP images and TC images (Figure 6.4) shows that
TIP is realistic; one would not be able to distinguish which image is real and
which is TIP without being told. Furthermore, the TIP error can be quantified
by measuring the deviation between the TIP image and the TC image and
compared to the natural variation of the system. The natural variation was
estimated by taking the deviation of repeat TC scans. In both cases, one
can also study the distribution of deviations in a histogram and compute
the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR). This is shown in Figure 6.5. It was
observed that TIP does not give rise to large errors relative to natural image
variation (TIP error is less than natural variation in this case), and that the
errors, in distribution and spatial arrangement, are very similar to natural
variation. In addition, there are no obvious visual cues generated from the
TIP process.
6.4 injection of realistic variation (data augmentation)
Variation can be injected into the threat appearance, using transformations
that preserve the class of the threat. These transformations can be derived
by considering the nature of X-ray image formation. Here several different
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Figure 6.4: Qualitative comparison of real threat images (top) and TIP images (bot-
tom) for high and low energies. Industrial tools (i.e. pipe wrench, electric
drill, pipe bender) have been used as a threat model. The images corres-
pond to raw captured data and no additional processing (e.g. denoising)
has been applied.
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Figure 6.5: Comparison of natural system variation (a & c) with Threat Image Pro-
jection (TIP) errors (b & d) for high energy (HE) and low energy (LE).
Natural variation was computed as the deviation between repeat scans of
identical cargo and threat (TC). TIP error was computed as the deviation
between the TIP image and a TC image. Images show these deviations,
rescaled, so that they are visible. Histograms show the distribution of de-
viations. For each case, the PSNR was computed based on the deviations,
and are given in decibels (dB). TIP does not lead to large errors relative
to natural image variation and does not change the distribution of devi-
ations.
types of transformations applicable to X-ray cargo imagery are discussed.
These are class-preserving transformations and can thus be used for data
augmentation.
6.4.1 Translations
Translation variation can be injected either by controlling the threat insertion
position (Figure 6.6b), or by oversampling the threat item. Oversampling,
samples multiple windows that overlap the threat, but with a small displace-
ment. It is similar to random crops, which been used in the wider computer
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vision community [152] to encourage learning of small translation invariant
features and to achieve class balance. However, TIP also allows one to vary
larger scale placement of the threat (e.g. within a cargo container). It is pos-
sible to obtain full coverage of possible threat locations within the container.
Whilst TIP enables manipulation of threat placement, it also provides
ground truth labels for the threat Region-Of-Interest (ROI) within an image.
Such labels are essential for training and testing detection algorithms, and
avoids the inconvenience of manually labelling threat ROIs.
6.4.2 Magnification
In X-ray cargo scanners, the fan-beam geometry means that photon pathsThe magnification
effect was
demonstrated in real
X-ray images in
Section 3.3.3.
are divergent, rather than parallel, and so the appearance of an object varies
as a function of the distance from the source. When the object is close to
the source it appears taller in the image than when it is placed further away.
Therefore there is a natural variation in the vertical magnification of the
object depending on its location. It is proposed that magnification scale can
be approximated by
α = 1+ d
(
lf
ln
− 1
)
, (6.3)
where d∈[0, 1] is the distance away from the source normalised by container
depth, ln and lf are the vertical lengths (in pixels) of the same object placed
at nearest and furthest container wall from the source, respectively. The
container walls, themselves, can be used to measure ln/lf for a particular
system. The parameter d can be sampled randomly when generating TIP
examples for algorithm training.
Magnification variation is demonstrated in Figure 6.6a.
6.4.3 Rotations
A 3D rotation of a threat, has a corresponding 2D image appearance trans-
formation, which is non-trivial to determine, particularly for out-of-plane
rotations. For example, consider a TIP library image of a hand-drill, where
the drill piece is oriented toward the source. This appears as a dark rect-
angle in the image. If one rotated the drill through 90 degrees so that the
drill piece is orthogonal to the source, the drill in the image would appear
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L-shaped. Determining a 2D image transformation just from the original
image to obtain an L-shape is not trivial, unless one has more information.
Such information could include multiple images captured of the drill at
different, known, orientations. With this it could be possible to interpolate
between 2D images at different orientations to obtain the 2D image trans-
formation. Similarly, if one has 3D information about the drill (such as a CT
scan or a 3D model) it might be possible to create realistic 3D rotations.
The TIP libraries used in Chapters 7 and 8, do not have this information.
Instead, we only use 2D image rotations, which approximates in-plane ro-
tations. Adding random 2D rotations to threats during training encourages
the learning of rotation-invariant features. In case one is concerned that the
interpolation used in rotations provides subtle cues, one can apply flips to
the threat image instead. However, this restricts the amount of possible vari-
ation. Rotations are demonstrated in Figure 6.6b.
6.4.4 Noise
Cargo X-ray images are mostly affected by: (i) salt-and-pepper noise pos-Noise types are
discussed in
Chapter 3.
sibly from bit errors, dead pixels, or analogue-to-digital conversion; and (ii)
Poisson noise originating from the number of photons emitted. Both types
of noise can be added to TIP imagery for training ML-based algorithms, so
that they can become robust to such noise. It is particularly useful to vary
the noise on a threat item that is used multiple times in training.
6.4.5 Illumination
The illumination (mean number of X-ray photons emitted) can vary for dif-
ferent images due to slight differences between scanners. Illumination can
also vary within images due to detector wobble in mobile configurations or
due to X-ray source fluctuations [11].
Illumination variation can be injected into training data, by scaling the
intensity of an image by some random factor (typically 1±0.05). Variation
due to source fluctuation is often removed in an image pre-processing step,
but if required can be generated by scaling the intensity of individual image
columns by factors sampled randomly from a normal distribution.This is essentially the
reverse process to
wobble correction in
Chapter 5, but with
wobble randomly
generated rather than
estimated.
Illumination variation due to detector wobble is more difficult to generate,
as it varies as a function of image x and y coordinates. However, one could
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assume wobble is sinusoidal in x, and determine illumination variation in y
by the intersection of the detector array with the Gaussian cross-section of
the fan-beam.
6.4.6 Volume and density
In some cases, volume transformations leave the threat class intact, for ex-
ample with bulk powder or liquid narcotics. This is often not the case for
threats, where a shrunk sniper rifle does not look like a typical hand-held
gun and possibly more like a toy. The relationship between volume and im-
age appearance can be approximated by considering the Beer-Lambert law
in Equation (6.1). Scaling the volume V equally in each dimension by some
factor ν, i.e.
V → ν3V , (6.4)
leads to the transformation
Txy → (Tx ′y ′)v (6.5)
on the threat attenuation. The new in-plane coordinate system {x ′y ′} has also
been scaled by v in each dimension. When the volume decreases, the oc-
cupied image-area decreases and the threat simultaneously becomes less
visible (less attenuating).
In even rarer cases it is useful to scale the density of the threat, such as
when detecting container loads as a means of ECV as in Chapter 7. Adding
density variations during training makes the algorithm more robust to the
possible range of load densities. Scaling the density by p, i.e.
ρ→ pρ, (6.6)
approximately transforms the threat as
Txy → (Txy)p. (6.7)
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6.4.7 Obfuscation
When smuggling threats, criminals may attempt to obfuscate the threat with
benign items to confuse inspectors when performing physical or image-
based searches. Obfuscation can include (i) shielding by thick/dense ma-
terials so that the threat is barely visible in the image, or (ii) concealing the
threat within complex, textured, cargo to make the resultant image very con-
fusing. It is important that ML-based algorithms are exposed to such cases
during training, as much as it is for a human. To achieve this one can projectObfuscation is
different to occlusion
in natural imagery,
where opaque objects
in the foreground
block objects in the
background, and
information about
the occluded object is
lost. In cargo
imagery, many
objects are
translucent due to
the high beam
energies, and so
objects tend to be
obfuscated rather
than occluded.
threats onto a very diverse range of real Stream-of-Commerce (SoC) images,
or can use a database of extracted cargoes to project onto threat items during
TIP. The later approach is demonstrated in Figure 6.6c.
Controlling the attenuation and complexity of obfuscation can be useful
in both training and testing algorithms. For example, it can be ineffective
to train an algorithm on threats that are so heavily attenuated that there is
almost no information about the threat left. In addition, one might identify
that an algorithm is poor at distinguishing threats under certain obfuscation
complexities, and may want to encourage the algorithm to perform better
in these cases by including more of them in the training data. The mean
and variance of the obfuscating attenuation may be suitable measures of
difficulty, however this is not investigated in this thesis. Schwaninger et al.
[154] have introduced similar metrics in baggage, which may be applicable.
6.5 empty image projection
Although every effort has been made to validate, experimentally, that the
TIP methodology gives no artefactual cues that can boost the performance of
ML-based methods over testing on real data, there is still concerns that subtle
artefacts may lead to a small, but misleading, improvement in performance.
These subtle artefacts could include halo effects from the threat mask, or
slight differences (broadening) in the distribution of noise after projection.
The question is: can ML-based systems learn to exploit these subtle cues to
boost detection performance? If so, can one train the ML system in such a
way that it ignores these artefactual cues?
One way of approaching this problem is to create a TIP process that pro-
jects only TIP artefacts and not the threat itself. To achieve this, one can use
the same TIP process, but rather than extract threats from images, extract
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empty patches. Hence, the name ‘Empty Image Projection’. An illustration
of Empty Image Projection (EIP) is given in Figure 6.7.
threat mask
ignore mask
EIP imageempty image
subtle TIP 
artefacts
empty patch
mean
background 
Figure 6.7: Illustration of EIP. EIP is exactly the same as TIP in Figure 6.1, except that
it operates on an empty patch rather than a threat patch.
It is proposed that EIP can be used in a number of ways to investigate the
effects of TIP artefacts on system performance.
(a) Feature-level test: for ML-based systems that operate on hand-crafted im-
age features, one can directly test the features to determine if they are
vulnerable to TIP artefacts. For example, if the features are invariant un-
der EIP then there is no information on TIP cues in the features for the
ML to learn to exploit.
(b) ML-level tests: At the level of the ML algorithm, several tests can be run
to verify the extent to which TIP artefacts can be learnt to boost system
performance.
(1) Train on EIP versus benign, test on EIP versus benign. Train a system on
EIP as one class and benign as the other. If the system can learn to
detect EIP with greater than chance performance, then it is evident
that the cues can be learnt.
(2) Train on TIP versus benign, test on EIP versus benign. Test the TIP-trained
system on a test set where one class is EIP and the other is benign.
If the performance is greater than chance, then it implies that the
TIP-trained network has learnt to exploit artefactual cues from the
TIP process.
(3) Train on EIP versus benign, test on TIP versus benign. Train on EIP as one
class and benign as the other, and test on TIP as one class benign as
the other. If performance is greater than chance, then it implies that
it is possible to obtain some performance just from learning TIP cues.
(4) Train on TIP versus EIP, test on EIP versus benign. Use EIP as one class
and TIP as the other. The system will learn not to attend to artefactual
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cues because they are present in both classes. This can be confirmed
if the test yields chance performance.
(5) Train on EIP versus TIP, test on TIP versus benign. Same as previous but
tested on TIP. This gives an idea of true performance on real data.
Ultimately, the best test for the validity of TIP, is to train a classifier on
TIP versus real threats. However, a sufficiently large and rich dataset of real
threats under different concealments was not available for this thesis.
6.6 discussion
Training and testing ML-based ATD algorithms is complicated by the diffi-
culty of obtaining large datasets and the major imbalance between the threat
and benign classes. The described TIP framework can solve this problem. The
framework can be used to generate a very large number of training exam-
ples by adding realistic, random, variation during projection, including: (i)
translations; (ii) magnification; (iii) rotations; (iv) noise; (v) illumination; (vi)
volume and density; and (vii) obfuscation. This framework allows genera-
tion of very large numbers of unique training images from a few images
captured of a threat, thus enabling rapid addition of detection capability for
emerging threats. In addition, it also allows one to form a deeper under-
standing of algorithm performance by carefully controlling aspects of the
test data such as threat position or obfuscation. Both of these approaches
are used in the next two chapters.
The threat extraction and projection methods were validated on experi-
mental data and showed no significant qualitative or quantitative difference
between TIP imagery and real threat imagery. In particular, there was no
evidence that the TIP process created additional visual cues that could be
exploited by humans or ML algorithms. Although this is encouraging, there
are still concerns that the TIP method produces cues that can be exploited
by machine learning based computer vision systems in order to artificially
boost performance. As such an EIP framework was proposed to test whe-
ther computer vision systems are capable of learning exploiting the cues.
In the next two chapters, both TIP and EIP are used in the development of
algorithms for ECV and dual-energy ATD.
7
E M P T Y C O N TA I N E R V E R I F I C AT I O N
In this chapter, a method for automated Empty Container Verification(ECV) is proposed. The method operates on full-size cargo imagery andis trained using the Threat Image Projection (TIP) framework proposed
in the previous chapter. The main innovative aspect of the proposed system
is the use of window coordinates as a feature. This allows the Machine
Learning (ML) system to learn the range of appearances at different locations
within the container, thus helping to suppress false alarms due to container
fabric, damage, and detritus. The system is tested on both real Stream-of-
Commerce (SoC) imagery, and TIP imagery representative of small smuggled
loads. The Empty Image Projection (EIP) feature-level test also proposed in
Chapter 6 is employed to verify that the system is not capable of learning to
exploit TIP artefacts as they are not captured by the feature description.
7.1 motivation
After a completed shipment, containers are either refilled or sent back to the
owner empty. As such, a large proportion (20% [155]) of containers in the
network are declared-as-empty. Empty containers are often left unsealed,
allowing easy access for rip-off attacks.
The amount of contraband smuggled in declared-as-empty containers var-
ies considerably between attempts. Table 7.1 gives examples of foiled co-
caine smuggling attempts at the port of Antwerp. Reported seizures of co-
caine range from as little as 8 kg hidden in the roof of a declared-as-empty
container, to as much as 514kg hidden within a declared-as-empty refriger-
ated container [39]. There have also been cases of licit cargo or waste being
declared as empty in order to avoid payment of duties [156]. Undeclared
non-empty containers can also cause safety problems, for example stacks of
‘empty’ containers can become unstable and topple over.
Since such large numbers of containers are declared-as-empty, they are Throughput is
>1 container/s in
this work.
rarely, if ever, physically inspected at present. Recent advances in scanner
technology have enabled high throughput radiographic imaging of contain-
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Contraband Origin Concealment method
59 kg cocaine Columbia false partition
109kg cocaine Columbia false partition
4×106 cigarettes Estonia legitimate partition
514kg cocaine Columbia legitimate partition
8 kg cocaine Columbia legitimate partition
Table 7.1: Examples of foiled attempts to smuggle contraband into Antwerp using
an empty container or trailer [39].
ers, potentially allowing widespread visual inspection. However, the huge
number of images would still make this slow and expensive. Thus, an auto-
mated ECV system, capable of inspecting all declared-as-empty containers
would be highly beneficial. The system would flag suspicious declared-as-
empty images for visual inspection by a human operator.
ECV is non-trivial: (i) the container has inhomogeneous appearance within
the image and has parts (such as the corners of the container) that appear
similar to loads; (ii) the size and type of the container varies between images;
(iii) container damage is visible in the image; (iv) detritus such as garment
rails, strapping and empty packaging are often left in empty containers;
and (v) loads have a broad range of possible appearances. Figure 7.1 gives
some examples of container variation which an ECV system has to cope with
without triggering false alarms. In addition, there is a broad variation in the
the density, size, texture, and complexity of potential loads (Figure 7.2).
In this chapter, a system for automated ECV in cargo containers is de-
veloped. An innovative aspect of this system is the use of window coordin-
ates as a feature, which allows a classifier to implicitly learn the range of
appearances at different locations in a container, thus improving classifica-
tion performance.
7.2 data acquisition and pre-processing
In this work the algorithm was trained on realistic synthetic data created
using real loads, containers from the SoC, and the TIP framework presented
in Chapter 6. Tests were performed on:
(i) TIP data – to test the system on examples that are more difficult than
typical SoC images, and also to assess the performance of the system as
a function of the load difficulty (volume and density); and
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(ii) real SoC images – to check that the system has not overfitted to difficult
TIP examples and that the TIP examples are sufficiently realistic.
7.2.1 Stream-of-commerce data
The SoC dataset consists of raw dual-energy images from a Rapiscan Eagle®
R60. The R60 (Figure 7.3) is a state-of-the-art transmission X-ray system
which is capable of scanning containers carried by train, at speeds of up to
60 km/h. Images are warped to correct the effect of any small accelerations
of the train as it moves through the scanner. The scanner is fixed and oper-
ates in portal mode. The R60 is a dual-energy system which fires interlaced
high and low energy beams with 4 and 6MeV energy cut-offs, respectively. For ECV only the
6MeV is used,
however in Chapter 8
both the high and
low energy images
are utilised.
Each image is 16-bit, greyscale, and ranges between 1920×850 and 2570×850
pixels for 20 ft and 40 ft long cargo containers, respectively. The pixel size is
5.6mm, and the system has effective spatial resolution of the order of a few
mm. The image dataset contains a very diverse range of cargoes, including,
but not limited to, pallets of commercial cargo, heavy machinery and indus-
trial equipment, household goods, and bulk materials. Approximately 20%
of the images are of empty containers.
y
T
source
scene
t
t×T
y
Figure 7.3: Illustration of the geometry of the Rapiscan Eagle® R60 rail scanner. At
each time t a small segment of width T=20 is imaged. These are stitched
together over time to form the full X-ray image of the container. Source
variation [11] leads to vertical stripes (of width T ) in the image. The sys-
tem can scan a full 40 ft container in less than a second.
In total, the SoC dataset consists of 120,000 images. These were manu-
ally labelled as malformed, empty or non-empty. Images were labelled as mal-
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formed if they contained no practicable cargo information and were ex-
cluded from this study. Examples of malformed images are shown in Fig-Car images were also
labelled for use in
detection of concealed
cars [19, 20], which
is not covered in this
thesis. Tanker images
were removed.
ure 7.4. Images were labelled as empty if they contained no goods; so the
empty set contains images with other objects such as pallets, packaging and
strapping.
For the SoC testing of the system, 2×103 empty and 8×103 non-empty SoC
examples were collected for the SoC test of the system. The class imbalance
reflects the naturally occurring 1:4 ratio between empty and non-empty con-
tainers. An additional 6×103 SoC images were reserved for the creation of
TIP non-empty examples for training and testing. All training and testing
sets were kept disjoint, and empty sets used for TIP were kept disjoint from
the other empty sets.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7.4: Examples of malformed images that were removed from the training and
testing datasets. Malformed image contain very little practicable inform-
ation on the cargo region.
7.2.2 Image pre-processing
The raw image had several types of artefact and noise, including: (i) source
variation; (ii) sensor sensitivities; (iii) source misfire; (iv) salt-and-pepperThe black image
columns had
zero-valued pixels
and occasional
salt-and-pepper noise,
thus they were
straightforward to
remove by checking
consecutive image
columns with the
same dimension as
the planar imaging
array.
noise; and (v) inconsistent container detection. Since the R60 operates in
portal mode, no detector wobble occurs. Noise (i) and artefact (ii) are cor-
rected according to Chapter 5. Source misfire leads to black image columns
which contain no retrievable image information, and are therefore automat-
ically deleted from the image. To remedy salt-and-pepper noise, isolated
dark or bright pixels are replaced by the median of their 3×3 neighbour-
hood.
The R60 system is configured to automatically fire when a container is
entering the scene, and to turn off when no container is in the scene, so that
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each container is imaged individually. However, this detection is sometimes
inconsistent and a container is scanned as well as a fraction of the previous
or next container. Moreover, for the purpose of this work, the only required
image parts are those of the container. As such a simple method for seg-
menting the container region from the image is proposed and tested. The
method consists of four steps:
1. Initial segmentation – perform a binary segmentation of container (set
to one in binary mask) and air (set to zero) using a threshold on image
values;
2. Locate roof – compute the mode of each row in the binary segmentation,
locate the top of the container by searching from the top of image for
first image row with a mode of one;
3. Locate right wall – search columns to the right of the roof, if there are
columns with mode of zero, then set container right wall location as
furthest air-column from image edge, else set location at image edge;
4. Locate left wall – repeat step 3 for the left hand side of the container.
To test the performance of this simple segmentation algorithm, a total
of 480 images were manually segmented to form a ground truth. The auto-
mated segmentation was then scored against the ground truth. Since the con-
tainer is assumed to be rectangular and touching the bottom of the image,
the container region can be parametrised by three numbers: the y-position
of the roof boundary; and the x-positions of the left and right container
boundaries. A poor segmentation was defined as an error in any of the
boundary placements of more than 10Px. This corresponds to <6 cm of a
20 ft or 40 ft container. By this definition, two images, were poorly segmen-
ted, corresponding to 0.4% of images. These two examples are shown in
Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.6 gives examples of the pre-processing applied to a variety of 20 ft
and 40 ft containers. The pre-processing successfully deals with a number
of difficult cases, including: (i) tanker containers (not used in this work);
(ii) multiple containers in the same image; (iii) heavy errors from source
variation.
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Figure 7.5: The two examples where the container segmentation performed ‘poorly’.
The red rectangle indicates the manually segmented ground truth, and
yellow the automated segmentation. In the top example, the segmenta-
tion algorithm gets confused by the external refrigeration unit. In the bot-
tom example, the algorithm erroneously places the segmentation bound-
ary on the inside of the container wall.
7.2.3 Threat Image Projection
In the SoC, containers are often packed with goods so that shipping is cost-
effective. ECV in these cases is relatively straightforward, since the load oc-
cupies a large fraction of the image. In cases where only a small amount
of contraband is smuggled, the load is typically much smaller and more
difficult to detect. Since there were no difficult non-empty examples in the
SoC dataset, they were synthesised from SoC images using the TIP method
introduced in Chapter 6. The benefits of the method are that the volume
and attenuation of the loads can be controlled which means that (i) the per-
formance can be assessed as a function of load volume and density, and
(ii) non-empty examples that are more difficult than the SoC images can
be synthesised. TIP also generates a window-level ground truth of the load
position, which is convenient for training the system.
A database of SoC loads was created. In this case, loads were simple to
extract and no threat mask or ignore mask was required. The database was
partitioned into disjoint databases for training and testing, each with 100
different loads. These loads are projected into SoC empty containers to form
realistic non-empty examples. To increase the variation in the appearance of
loads, composite loads were formed by:
1. randomly generating a number of loads 1<n<4;
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2. selecting n loads at random from the test or train database;
3. for each, choose with probability 1/2 whether to flip the load from leftNo vertical flipping
was included as for
large loads this
would look
unnatural.
to right;
4. perform a pixel-wise multiplication to form a composite load;
5. transform the composite load to some target volume and density as
discussed in Chapter 6.
This procedure is demonstrated in Figure 7.7. By generating a test set with
multiple load volumes and densities, the performance can be assessed as a
function of load volume and density.
Figure 7.7: Illustration of image synthesis by TIP, performed by; (a) cropping a load
(green) and a small background patch (red) out of a non-empty SoC ex-
ample, (b) performing a pixel-wise division between the cropped load
and background leaving an attenuation mask for the load, (c) steps (a)
and (b) are repeated to form a database of load attenuation masks, (d)
loads are selected at random (dashed blue) and are given random offsets
and left-right flips, before pixel-wise multiplication to form a composite
load (solid blue), (e) manipulating the volume and density of the compos-
ite load before projecting into an empty SoC by pixel-wise multiplication.
Since the log-attenuation (or the probability that a photon interacts in a
small volume) is directly proportional to the load density, one can express
the load volume and density in SI units by measuring the mean pixel log-
attenuation of a load with a known volume and density. Cars were used
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for this purpose, since a car is rarely occluded by other loads as it occupies
most of the container, making it easier to make accurate measurements. The
calculations were based on a typical car having a volume of 12m3 and a
mass of 1.3 t.
When training the system, described in Section 7.3, non-empty windows
were sampled from the TIP images. Windows were defined as non-empty if
and only if they have 25% of their area occupied by load or contain at least
25% of the load area. In this way, it was ensured that the training windows
‘see’ enough of the load, and that the system of tiled windows will always
have at least one non-empty window whatever the size of the windows and
loads.
7.3 proposed ecv system
In this section the proposed system for ECV is described in terms of the local
window-wise feature encodings, their classification, and their aggregation
to determine a classification for the whole image.
7.3.1 Feature encoding
Each image was split into a grid of d×d pixel windows. Windows were
placed from the top-left of the image. If an integer number of windows
did not perfectly cover the whole image, extra (overlapping) windows were
placed tight against the bottom and right edges of the image. For each
window a local feature descriptor was computed. Experiments were also per-
formed with overlapping windows, where three additional grids (anti-phase
in y, anti-phase in x, anti-phase in both x and y) were employed, but there
was no noticeable improvement in performance.
A number of local feature descriptors were tested, including image intens-
ity histograms, intensity moments, histograms of Basic Image Features (BIFs), Image intensity
histograms are
similar to DH
descriptors used in
baggage [119, 121].
and histograms of oriented Basic Image Features (oBIFs) [157]. Moreover, ex-
periments were performed on using different window coordinates as a fea-
ture: including absolute coordinates, normalised coordinates and coordin-
ates measured from the nearest container end. The best performing combin-
ation of features was (i) window x-coordinate measured from the nearest
container end, and window y-coordinate measured from the top of the con-
tainer, (ii) oBIF histograms, and (iii) intensity moments. The inferior results
122 empty container verification
for BIFs, image intensity histograms or different coordinate systems are not
presented here. An illustrative overview of the feature encoding scheme is
shown in Figure 7.8. Typical performance of BIF driven approaches was 10%
lower than oBIFs in terms of detection rate.
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Figure 7.8: Example feature encoding for a 96×96 pixel window (blue) containing
a small load. Panels show: (a) the (x,y) location of the window within
the image, (b) a zoom of the window, (c) the corresponding BIF primal
sketches at different scales, (d) a further zoom of part of the window, (e)
BIF primal sketches at this level of zoom with quivers representing the
quantised orientation (oBIFs), and (f) the encoded feature vector compris-
ing of the window (x,y) coordinates, intensity moments, and histograms
of oBIFs at different scales.
7.3.1.1 Window coordinates
By using the window (x,y) coordinates as a feature, the classifier is able,
implicitly, to learn the range of background appearances at different loca-
tions in the container. For example, it might learn that background near the
top of the image should look like roof and that background near the bottom
of the image looks like floor, without explicitly being told where the roof
and floor are. This is particularly useful in this work since local parts of the
image background (container) may appear similar to load. For instance, the
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corners of the container appear similar to small dark rectangular loads, but
by including window coordinates the classifier is able to learn that small
dark rectangular signatures in those locations are likely to be part of the
container rather than a load.
It was found that the best performing coordinate system was to measure x
from the nearest container end. This reflects the container symmetry, namely
that the left-hand side of an empty container looks similar to a left-right
flipped version of the right-hand side. This effectively halves the number of
x-locations that the classifier needs to learn. The y-coordinate was measured
from the top of the container, although it could equally be measured from
the bottom.
Using window coordinates as features improves over two plausible altern-
ative methods of learning the container background. One method would be
to learn a separate classifier for each (quantised) location. This would re-
quire a large number of classifiers to be constructed and stored, and each
would be trained on only a fraction of the assembled data. The classifiers
learnt from similar areas of the container (e.g. the roof regions away from
the ends) would not get to benefit from the training data for the other loca-
tions. A second alternative method, which would address the training data
sharing issue, would be to segment the image into a system of location types
(e.g. roof midpoint, roof corner, container centre) and to learn a classifier for
each type. However, one would expect the success of this approach to be
influenced by the choice of location types and determining these optimally
is not simple. In this work, it is proposed that using window coordinates
together with Random Forests (RFs), which are capable of expressing highly
non-linear decision boundaries, implicitly selects an effective system of loc-
ation types and groups training data accordingly.
7.3.1.2 Oriented Basic Image Features
BIFs [157] are based on responses from a bank of Derivative of Gaussian (DtG) Implementations of
BIFs and oBIFs in
MATLAB are available
online [158].
filters up to second order. The vector of DtG responses at a point in the
image is known as a local jet. BIFs are derived by partitioning jet space into
seven intrinsic regions based on the local symmetry type of the image [159].
The seven BIF types correspond roughly to; flat, slope, minima, maxima,
dark line, light line, and saddle. There are two parameters that control the
computation of BIFs; σ and γ. The σ parameter corresponds to the scale of
the DtG filter bank used. The γ parameter is a threshold which determines
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the amount of structure tolerated before a region is no longer considered flat.
Example BIF primal sketches for an image window are shown in Figure 7.8c.
oBIFs are BIF augmented by their local orientation. The flat, minima and
maxima BIF types have no intrinsic orientation; slope-like BIFs are augmen-
ted by quantising the gradient into one of eight polarised directions; and
dark/light lines and saddles are augmented by quantising the second order
structure into one of four unpolarised orientations. With the added orienta-
tions there are a total of 23 different oBIF types. Example oBIFs for an image
window are shown in Figure 7.8e, the quivers indicate orientation.
BIFs and oBIFs have been used for a number of different tasks including; tex-
ture classification [160–163], recognition [20, 164–167], and segmentation [18,
168]. In this work, a local distributioon of oBIFs descriptor is formed by com-
puting oBIFs on a given image and within each window forming a 23-bin his-
togram. Each bin corresponds to a different oBIF type. In this work, integral
histograms [169] were employed to compute window histograms efficiently.
7.3.1.3 Intensity moments
Moments of the intensity distribution across the window were also com-
puted to encode some information about pixel intensity and its spatial dis-
tribution. This information is lost in the locally orderless oBIF histogram, but
is useful for the detection of loads particularly for dark loads that have little
texture.
For a given image window patchWx,y, the intensity moments are defined
as
M0,0 =
∑
x
∑
y
Wx,y
M1,0 =
1
M0,0
∑
x
∑
y
xWx,y
M0,1 =
1
M0,0
∑
x
∑
y
yWx,y
M2,0 =
1
M0,0
∑
x
∑
y
(x−M1,0)
2Wx,y
M0,2 =
1
M0,0
∑
x
∑
y
(y−M0,1)
2Wx,y. (7.1)
The coordinates x,y are taken relative to the window centre.The five integral
image were:Wx,y,
xWx,y, yWx,y,
x2Wx,y, and
yWx,y.
To compute the intensity moments efficiently for different image win-
dows, five integral images [169] were computed.
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7.3.2 Image classification
The system uses a RF classifier [170] to score each window. The score for
a given window is the fraction of trees that vote that the window contains
load. The image score is determined by taking the maximum of the window
scores in the image. A threshold is applied to the image score to determine
the classification of the image. By varying this threshold, a Receiver Operat-
ing Characteristic (ROC) curve can be determined.
In this work,
√
Nf, where Nf is the dimensionality of the feature vector,
variables at each split were sampled at random. The number of treesNT was
selected by finding the point where the out-of-bag error (versus number of
trees) plot plateaued.
The randomforest-matlab implementation of RF [140] was employed.
7.4 results
In this section the selection of the optimal window size and other system
parameters is discussed, next an attempt is made to build a picture of how
the system operates, and finally, a detailed analysis is presented of the per-
formance of the system described in Section 7.3 when tested on the SoC and
difficult TIP examples.
7.4.1 Parameter selection
For oBIFs, the parameter settings γ=0.01 and σ={0.7, 1.4, 2.8, 5.6, 11.2} were
used. It was found that using multiple γ did not improve performance, but
using multiple scales did. For each window the oBIF histograms, intensity
moments, and the window coordinates were concatenated to form aNf=122
dimensional feature vector. It was found that NT=512 was sufficient.
To determine a roughly optimal window size, a system, which uses win-
dow coordinates and intensity moments as features, was trained and tested
at a range of different windows sizes d={32, 64, 96, 128, 160, 192, 224, 356}. It
was not feasible to use oBIFs as a feature due to the additional computation
time required to perform the analysis for each grid size, but this optimum
window size selection should generalise (approximately) to the system with
oBIFs added. Note that the results of the oBIF system could possibly be im-
proved by repeating this analysis with oBIFs included.
126 empty container verification
32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
d/Px
FN
R
all object volumes and densities
large dense objects
small undense objects
Figure 7.9: The FNR (for fixed FPR of 1%) as a function of window size (d) for easy
(large and dense) loads (blue) and difficult (small and low density) loads
(green), using intensity moments and window (x,y) coordinates as fea-
tures. The mean FNR over a range of load difficulties is given in red. Error
bars show one standard deviation. The optimum performance occurs at
a grid size d=96Px.
Figure 7.9 shows the average performance as a function of grid size for
(i) difficult (small and low density) loads (green), (ii) easy (large and dense)
loads (blue), and (iii) a range of difficulties of load. The performance is taken
as the average FNR given a fixed FPR of 1%. The average and error bars are
obtained by 10 independent trains of the RF classifier. In all cases the best
performance is achieved when a window size of d=96Px is used. There is
a performance hit for very small or large windows: if the window is too
large, in some cases the load does not excite the features enough; and if too
small then windows containing load may appear similar to local parts of the
container.
For the rest of the results presented in this section a window size of d =
96Px was employed.
7.4.2 Empty Image Projection
The feature-level EIP test proposed in Chapter 6 was employed to test wh-
ether potential TIP artefacts are captured in the feature-encoding. EIP was
used instead of TIP and feature encodings were computed. These were then
compared to feature encodings of the empty container patch without TIP. It
was found that the oBIFs were invariant to EIP for the γ and σ settings used,
and that the image moments gave a slight difference between empty and
EIP patches. This difference was smaller than a pixel and so is unlikely to
provide any cues for the ML system to learn. However, to remove any doubt,
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the image moments can be rounded to the nearest pixel. An example, show-
ing the invariance of oBIFs to EIP is given in Figure 7.10. The system is also
tested on SoC images which adds further evidence that the system has not
overfitted to potential TIP artefacts.
EIP patch
background 
removal
target image EIP image
BIFs of EIP imageBIFs of target image
possible
artefacts
Figure 7.10: An example test of the invariance of the BIF features to EIP. An empty
patch is projected using the TIP framework into the target empty con-
tainer. BIFs were computed on the target empty container before and
after EIP and yielded the same result indicating that BIFs, and thus oBIFs,
do not capture TIP noise artefacts.
7.4.3 Testing on the stream-of-commerce
The system was tested on SoC data. It achieves state-of-the-art Detection
Rate (DR) of 99.3% given a 1% FPR, outperforming Orphan et al. [66], who
state an accuracy of 97.2% and FNR of 0.4%. This performance implies that
the classifier has not significantly overfitted to the TIP examples, and that
the TIP examples are sufficiently realistic.
Examples of SoC non-empty detections are shown in Figure 7.11. The
blue boxes indicate where a window has been classified as containing a
load. In most cases the algorithm is successful at detecting individual load-
containing windows, and there are no false positive windows within these
true positive image examples.
Score localisation heatmaps of the RF classifier scores were produced. The
benefits of heat maps are two-fold. Operationally, they can help an operator
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to focus on the image regions most likely to contain an adversarial load,
thus improving inspection speed. For this work, they can also help one un-
derstand how the system performs according to the local image appearance.
To construct heatmaps, a window was moved across and down the image
in steps of 16Px. At each step the RF score was computed. For each pixel the
heatmap pixel value was obtained by averaging the scores of the windows
to which the pixel was a member of. The average scores were then rescaled
according to the detection threshold. A value of zero implies that the clas-
sifier could not distinguish if the window was empty or not, and values of
+1 and −1 that the classifier was certain that the window is non-empty and
empty, respectively.
Figure 7.12 shows score localisation heatmaps for both true positives and
true negatives. For SoC loads the detections are well localised to the loads,
and the classifier gives a high score for dense loads. Less dense loads achieve
a lower, but still positive score. Note that the pallets in Figures 7.12a and
7.12b are given relatively low scores. Pallets should not be classified as loads
as there are examples of empty containers that contain left-over pallets. For
the true negatives in Figures 7.12g and 7.12h, the classifier yields a low score
for all parts of the container. These two examples are relatively straightfo-
rward and similar examples are common in the SoC dataset. Figures 7.12i
and 7.12j are more difficult because they contain garment rails which locally
appear similar to thin loads and are also relatively rare in the SoC. Never-
theless they are correctly classified as empty, but there is some signal where
the RF trees are not all in consensus.
Score localisation heatmaps are also given for false positives and false
negatives in Figure 7.13. The false negatives are loads that occupy the whole
container, and have low density and little texture, and therefore do not ex-
cite the features enough to be detected. There are some small excitations
where there are thin gaps in the loads. Note that the vertical spikes protrud-
ing from the floor in Figure 7.13b are fork-lift pockets and not loads. The
false positives are all relatively rare examples in the SoC, particularly the
detritus in Figure 7.13c. It is unclear what has caused the darkening of the
roof in Figure 7.13g. The false positives on the port holes in Figure 7.13c
and refrigeration unit in Figure 7.13d may be improved by augmenting the
training data with similar examples.
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Figure 7.12: Examples of detected SoC loads and their corresponding score localisa-
tion heatmaps. Note that the pallets, indicated by the red arrows, in (a)
and (f) have been ignored since they can be found in empty contain-
ers. In (i) and (j) the roof bows lead to a small detection signal but not
enough to trigger a false alarm.
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Figure 7.13: Examples of false positives and false negatives corresponding score loc-
alisation heatmaps. For the false negatives red arrows indicate cues that
the algorithm should pick up to recognised the container as non-empty,
this includes slight gaps between cargo in the case of (a) or large spaces
in (b). Note that the cargo in these cases occupies the whole container
and is very low density, making it difficult to see. The ECV systems has
picked up some small signals in these cases, but not enough to trigger
any alarms. Not that the thin dense spikes protruding from the floor in
(b) are fork-lift pockets and so are correctly classified as empty.
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7.4.4 Testing on difficult TIP examples
The performance of the system is plotted as a function of the load density
and volume in Figure 7.14 (left). Performance is measured as the negative
mean log FNR given a 1% FPR. The mean is taken over 10 separate trains of
the RF. The blue line indicates the 0.1% FNR contour, and the cyan line indic-
ates a 1% FNR. The density and volume of (i) an average car, (ii) 1L of water,
and (iii) 1 kg of cocaine, have been plotted for reference. As expected the
system performance drops as the load gets smaller and less dense, i.e. to-
wards the bottom-left of the plot. The system is able to detect >90% of loads
as difficult as 1L of water and 1 kg of cocaine, with <1% false positives.
90% DR given 1% FPR 99% DR given 1% FPR
1 kg cocaine (1.2 g/cm3)Average car 1L of water (1 g/cm3)
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Figure 7.14: Left: The system performance (negative log of the FNR given 1% FPR)
plotted as a function of the log-volume (logV) and log-density (log ρ) of
the load. The blue and cyan lines show the contour for 99% and 90%
detection respectively. Right: The detection contours when using all fea-
tures (solid); minus oBIFs (dotted); minus moments (dashed); minus co-
ordinates (dot-dashed). Results show that each feature class contributes
to performance.
Figure 7.14 (right) shows contours from three additional classifiers, each
excluding one of the classes of features: oBIFs, moments, or window co-
ordinates. From these results it is evident that the classifier that uses all fea-
tures (as in Section 7.3) performs best, and that each of the three elements
of the feature vector contribute to performance. In order, the greatest hit to
performance is when oBIFs are dropped, followed by window coordinates,
and then intensity moments.
To further understand how the system operates, the Gini feature import-
ance of the different features was computed. Gini feature importance is a
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Figure 7.15: The importance (mean decrease in Gini index) of each feature, oBIFs have
been colour coded according to their type. The window y-coordinate is
most important, it helps the classifier learn the difference in appearance
between the floor and roof.
measure of how useful different features are for the RF to make accurate
classifications. It relies on computing the Gini impurity for each feature at
each node in the RF. The Gini impurity, a computationally efficient approx-
imation to entropy, at a node, measures how well the data is split into separ-
ate classes. The Gini impurity for each feature is then aggregated across all
nodes in a given tree, and all trees in the Forest yielding an overall measure
of feature importance.
The feature importance is shown in Figure 7.15. The feature with largest
importance is the window y-coordinate (cyan). This is intuitive because
most of the spatial variation in the container occurs in the y-direction. For
example, the container changes from roof, to walls, to floor, to underfloor
as you go from the top of the image to the bottom. Due to this variation
in background appearance the classifier uses the y-coordinate to learn what
empty windows should look like at different y-locations in the image. It is
also interesting to note the increasing importance of the minima-like oBIFs
(black) at coarser scales. This indicates that the system is looking for broad
dark blobs in the image. Furthermore, the system finds light line-like (yel-
low) oBIFs useful, but dark line-like (blue) oBIFs less so. This may be because
light lines are usually an indicator of load (e.g. two loads placed next to
each other) and the container background has few light lines, whereas both
load and container tend to have a lot of dark lines.
134 empty container verification
Figure 7.16 shows cropped examples of difficult TIP loads (V=1× 103 cm3
and ρ=0.9 g/cm3 i.e. similar to 1L of water). Note that the system is able to
detect difficult TIP loads even where it is difficult to distinguish them from
background by eye, such as in Figures 7.16d and 7.16h. The false negatives
are difficult to see by eye, especially without the yellow bounding boxes
marked. In the false positives the system has incorrectly classified detritus
Figure 7.16i, a garment rail (Figure 7.16j), part of a refrigeration unit (Fig-
ure 7.16k), and container damage (Figure 7.16l) as non-empty. The example
in Figure 7.16i is so rare, that it would be very difficult to train the classifier
to ignore it. In Figure 7.16j the window only overlaps with the end of the
garment rail and so locally it looks like a small point load. This might be im-
proved by using fuzzy windows (e.g. Gaussian) or a classifier that combines
multiple window sizes.
Score localisation heatmaps for true positives are shown in Figure 7.17. It
is evident that the container background is given negative heatmap scores,
indicating that the classifier successfully recognised empty background pat-
ches. In slightly more difficult cases such as the roof bows in Figure 7.17a or
the corners of the container, the score is still negative, but the classifier is not
100% confident, there are a small fraction of RF trees that vote that empty
patches are non-empty. The TIP-inserted loads all have a positive heatmap
value, indicating that the RF is confident that the load is non-empty. For
the false negative examples in Figure 7.17e-h, the TIP-concealed loads each
lead to a small signal, however it is not large enough to trigger a detection.
At least, without reducing the threshold which would result in many more
false positives.
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Figure 7.16: Example detections for loads with V=1000 cm3 and (ρ=0.9 g/cm3, i.e.
similar to 1L of water. Blue rectangles indicate that a window was clas-
sified as non-empty. Images have been cropped. Yellow rectangles indic-
ate false negative load ROIs.
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For each volume-density point on the performance plot in Figure 7.14
(left), an ROC curve can be determined. Figure 7.18 shows ROC curves (True
Positive Rate (TPR) versus FPR) for loads similar in volume and density to dif-
ferent masses of cocaine. The density of cocaine has been taken as 1.2 g/cm3.
As the mass of cocaine decreases it is evident that the area under the ROC
curve, and thus the performance of the system, decreases. The system is able
to achieve >93% detection (with a 1% FPR) for loads with mass >1.25 kg of
cocaine (and the same density). For smaller masses the performance drops
steeply, for example the system is able to detect only ∼80% of loads (given
1% FPR) similar to 0.5 kg of cocaine.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.75
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Figure 7.18: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for different masses of
cocaine. A cocaine density of 1.2 g/cm3 has been assumed.
Heatmaps can also be employed to study the distribution of the false neg-
atives and false positives across the the container. False positive and false
negative heatmaps are shown in Figure 7.19 along with the mean empty
container. Note that the x-coordinate is in nearest-container-end coordin-
ates, and that the container height varies between images so that the con-
tainer floor is usually located between 500<y/Px<600. The false positives
are mostly due to refrigeration unit parts that look like load (Figure 7.16k),
or port holes. The false negatives mainly occur when the load is projected
onto a dense part of the image such as into the container wall, floor or
corners. Such examples are difficult to see by eye.
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Figure 7.19: Top: Heat map of false positive windows. Centre: the mean cargo con-
tainer. Bottom: Heat map of false negative windows. The x-coordinate is
the window coordinate taken from the nearest container end, and the
mean container image was computed accordingly. The y-coordinate is
measured from the top of the image.
7.5 discussion
Declared-as-empty containers are often used to smuggle contraband due
to lack of surveillance and ease of access. In historical smuggling cases,
amounts of contraband smuggled in declared-as-empty containers has var-
ied from as little as 8 kg to as much as 514kg [39]. A system for ECV in X-ray
images of cargo containers has been proposed and tested. Since there are
few examples of difficult loads in the stream-of-commerce, the TIP frame-
work from Chapter 6 was used to generate of realistic difficult non-empty
examples. The TIP framework also enables the performance of the system to
be assessed as a function of the load volume and density.
The system is based on using a RF classifier to distinguish non-empty and
empty windows in the image. For each window, oBIFs [157] and intensity
moments are used as feature descriptors. In addition, the window coordin-
ates are used as a feature, allowing the RF to implicitly learn variation in
the background (container) appearance as a function of position within the
image.
The system is able to achieve performance of 99.3% detection and 1%
false positives on real stream-of-commerce images, and thus outperforms
the work of Orphan et al. [66]. Moreover, it achieves >93% detection whilst
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raising 1% false alarms on difficult TIP examples that are similar in volume
and density to 1.25 kg of cocaine. The majority of false negatives are when
the load is placed in a dense region of the container, such as in the floor.
Such examples are difficult for even humans to see by eye, and future work
should focus on improving performance in such cases.

8
D U A L - E N E R G Y A U T O M AT E D T H R E AT D E T E C T I O N
In this chapter a method for Automated Threat Detection (ATD) is pro- In this chapter, theterm ‘small metallicthreats’ is used as the
research results
should not be easily
discoverable by
keyword searching.
However, the
smallest of the
threats in question
are similar in form to
hand drills, whilst
the largest are
similar in length to a
garden spade.
posed. The method exploits dual-energy measurements to implicitly
learn about material characteristics to suppress false alarms. Several
methods for exploiting dual-energy were explored, including three based
on material discrimination methods in the literature, and three novel vari-
ants. Thus it serves as a comparison between different material discrimina-
tion methods. The best performing system makes a 100-fold improvement
on the false alarm rate over the prior work [10]. The system is trained and
tested on Threat Image Projection (TIP), however the Empty Image Projec-
tion (EIP) validation proposed in Chapter 6 is employed to test whether the
system can exploit TIP artefacts to boost performance.
8.1 motivation
In recent years the threat from Mumbai-style terrorist attacks using Small
Metallic Threats (SMTs) on soft targets has increased. This is evidenced by
the attacks in Paris and on the beaches of Tunisia. In such attacks, a few per-
petrators, by acting as a well-organised unit striking simultaneously against
unprotected civilian targets in urban areas, can inflict mass fatalities and
casualties. To prevent such attacks, it is necessary to make it more difficult
for would-be terrorists to obtain SMTs. In countries, where SMTs are well con- They could be
obtained by theft,
loaned from a
criminal associate, or
purchasing from the
black market.
trolled or illegal to possess if too powerful, would-be terrorists rely on creat-
ing sophisticated smuggling networks, which is expensive, or on obtaining
SMTs from the existing pool.
This chapter builds on the work by Jaccard et al. [10], where it was found
that containers containing a single SMT could be detected in 90% of cases
whilst raising 6% false positives. Additionally, Jaccard et al. [10] found that
an oBIF-based system similar to that used for Empty Container Verifica-
tion (ECV) in Chapter 7 did not perform well. This work used a single energy
X-ray image acquired with a 6MeV energy cut-off. In this chapter, it is in-
vestigated whether the addition of an image acquired at an energy cut-off of
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4MeV can be exploited to improve detection performance. In theory, the use
of two energies should provide a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) with
some information about material types that can help to reduce false alarms.
Whether this potential information can be unlocked in CNNs is unclear.
To best knowledge, no other research has been performed on how to util-
ise raw dual-energy measurements in a CNN architecture, in any field. The
closest example was the use of colour-coded baggage images in aviation se-
curity by Açkay et al. [127], where the false colour information essentially
provides a denoised pseudonym for dual-energy information across three
colour channels.
8.2 convolutional neural networks
The historical roots to CNNs can be traced back to the simple model of the
neuron by McCulloch and Pitts [171]. Their artificial neuron is a simple
mathematical model of the biological neuron, and implements many of its
important features. The basic principles of an artificial neuron are that:
(i) it has a number of inputs each with its own weighting;
(ii) the weighted inputs are summed and compared to a threshold (bias);
(iii) if the threshold is exceeded then the neuron fires.
By building networks of neuron layers, each layer feeding into the inputs
of the next, these basic building blocks could be used to perform simple
pattern recognition tasks. Early researchers could hand-craft the weights
and biases to perform the desired task.
However, researchers found that such simple nets could not perform more
sophisticated tasks. So the perceptron and Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)
were eventually invented. In the MLP, rather than hand-crafting the weights
and biases, they were learnt directly from training data. The training re-
quired the use of backpropagation to determine at each training step, how
much the weights and biases in the network should be updated to reduce
the overall error of the network. The backpropagation requires a slight modi-
fication to the activation function; rather than a simple threshold a continu-
ous differentiable function is required such as a sigmoid function. The MLP
had some success in image recognition tasks, however it was clear that the
network suffered from the ‘curse of dimensionality’, due to the full con-
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nectivity between neurons. Since each network has a very large number of
parameters they were difficult to train and prone to overfitting.
CNNs have recently become the state-of-the-art for a range of visual tasks.
They are a type of Deep Learning method, and differ from traditional com-
puter vision methods since they learn an end-to-end mapping from the raw
image values to the image classification. As part of this, they learn image
features, instead of requiring them to be hand-crafted by researchers, as well
as their optimum combination to make a classification.
CNNs are variants of MLPs and are also biologically inspired. They differ
in two important ways: (i) local connectivity and (ii) shared weights. Local
connectivity implements the idea of receptive fields, which is motivated by
biological vision [172]. They exploit spatially local correlation by enforcing
local connectivity between neurons of consecutive layers. Each neuron ana-
lyses a small region (receptive field) of the preceding layer, and the receptive
fields are arranged in a lattice; this is equivalent to a convolution. Only one
set of weights and a bias has to be learnt and is shared between all of the
neurons in the lattice (i.e. a single filter). The convolution operation means
that there are fewer parameters to learn than in a fully connected network;
the weights are shared.
A CNN consists of multiple convolutional layers and often ends with mul-
tiple fully-connected layers and a classification layer. The first layer has been
shown to learn simple filters, similar to Gabor filters. The next layer will be
some combination of these simple filters. The level of complexity in the fea-
tures increases as more convolutional layers are added. By the later layers,
it has been visualised that, complicated features for whole objects, such as
faces or vehicles, begin to emerge.
Another important feature of CNNs are the use of Rectified Linear Units
(ReLU) and pooling layers (e.g. max pooling). ReLUs are the most commonly
used activation functions in CNNs and are defined as f(x)=max(0, x). In max
pooling layers, the preceding layer is split into non-overlapping regions and
the max pooling layer outputs the maximum in each region. The motivation
is that the operation preserves the most important features, but progress-
ively reduces the number of parameters in the network and the amount of
computation.
CNNs can be prone to overfitting particularly if trained on insufficient data.
Thus, a number of regularisation methods have been developed, with Dro-
pout [173] being the most popular until recently. In Dropout, a different
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random selection of nodes from fully-connected layers are silenced in each
training pass. Recently, Ioffe and Szegedy [174] have introduced batch nor-
malisation, which fixes the mean and variance of input distributions at each
layer. It acts as a form of network regularisation and can allow faster net-
work training and higher model accuracy.
LeCun et al. [175] give a complete overview of the fundamental concepts
of CNNs.
8.3 exploiting dual-energy
Cargo material discrimination works by performing image measurementsMaterial
discrimination was
introduced in
Section 4.2.4. Here
we move away from
the terminology in
the material
discrimination
literature, and refer
to the mappings of
theH and L images
as ‘feature spaces’ to
match common
terminology in
computer vision.
at two different energies. Based on these two images, simple features can be
computed such that different material atomic numbers (Z) are partitioned
in feature space. These methods operate on the radioscopic transparency, T .
Given the equation of image formation
I =
∫
I0(E)e
−µ(E,Z)τdE, (8.1)
the transparency is defined as
T =
∫
I0(E)e
−µ(E,Z)τdE∫
I0(E)dE
. (8.2)
In these two equations E is the photon energy, I0(E) is the initial intensity
of photons emitted from the source, µ(E,Z) is the attenuation co-efficient
for a material with atomic number Z for incident photons with energy E,
and τ is the material thickness. To keep notation simple for the rest of this
chapter, the high energy and low energy transparencies are denoted by H
and L, respectively.
In their seminal work for material discrimination in cargo, Ogorodnikov
and Petrunin [5] use the log-ratio R and 1/H as features. The log-ratio is
defined as
R =
log(H)
log(L)
. (8.3)
This is motivated, in part, by the observation that for a monochromatic beam
of energy Eγ such that
I0(E) ∝ δ(E− Eγ), (8.4)
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where δ(_) is the Dirac delta function, then the ratio of logs becomes
R ∝ log(e
−µ(EH,Z)τ)
log(e−µ(EL,Z)τ)
=
µ(EH,Z)
µ(EL,Z)
. (8.5)
So for a given material with atomic number Z, R is unique to that mater-
ial and does not depend on the thickness τ. R can therefore be used to
discriminate materials. However, for cargo screening, the X-ray photons are
generated by the Bremsstrahlung process, and thus the high and low energy
beams are not monochromatic, but a continuous spectra up to some cut-off
energy equivalent to the energy of the electrons used to generate the X-rays.
In this polychromatic regime, material discrimination is still possible, but
the log-ratio R is not unique for a particular material.
Analytic material curves in the Ogorodnikov and Petrunin [5] feature
space are given in Figures 8.1c and 8.1f, for monochromatic and polychro-
matic cases, respectively. No noise has been modelled in these examples. In
the monochromatic case, the curves are well separated in feature space, how-
ever, in the polychromatic case, they overlap for small 1/H values (as ma-
terials become thin). The material curves are also bunched closer together,
meaning that noise in the imaging system can more easily lead to material
misclassification. Ogorodnikov and Petrunin [5] note that material discrim-
ination is also difficult in the case of thick materials since noise begins to
dominate the image.
There are two other methods of computing features in the literature. These
are known as the α-curve [97, 98] and H−L curve [142] methods. The α-
curve method computes the features
α1 = − log(H) (8.6)
α2 = − log(H) + log(L), (8.7)
and the H−L curve method simply uses H and L as the features. Analytic
material curves for these approaches are also given in Figure 8.1. Note that
in the polychromatic case the H−L curves are bunched very close together
compared to the α-curve and R-curve methods, and so one would expect
this method not to perform as well.
To form an RGB image, authors typically perform a system calibration by
scanning known materials of varying thickness. The calibration image can
be use to determine how feature space should be partitioned such that pixels
can be classified into material Z groups. Each group is assigned a different
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Figure 8.1: Material curves in feature space for three different material discrimina-
tion methods in the literature. The materials, include: Boron (Z=5, or-
ange); Aluminium (Z=13, green); Iron (Z=26, blue); and lead (Z=82,
purple). Curves were computed analytically using Equation (8.1), assum-
ing a noiseless imaging system, and using attenuation coefficients from
the NIST XCOM database [62].
hue in the coloured X-ray image. Ogorodnikov and Petrunin [5], found that
system noise leads to a noisy RGB image and spatial information is required
to improve the quality of the RGB image. The authors apply a simple seg-
mentation algorithm and each segment is labelled as the average material
over the pixels in that segment. Since the original work of Ogorodnikov and
Petrunin [5], which used a controlled laboratory set-up, other researchers
have failed to replicate their accurate results for commercial systems. Some
authors have focussed on detecting only high-Z materials, which can be in-
dicative of nuclear material or adversarial shielding, citing that multi-class
material discrimination is infeasible due to the levels of noise in commercial
systems [74].
It is possible that machine learning approaches, and in particular deep
CNNs, can learn to perform material discrimination based on dual-energy
measurements and spatial information in the image. However, a major hurdle
to achieving this is the difficulty obtaining large datasets of different mater-
ials with pixel-level labelling. The aim of this work is to implicitly learn
material discrimination in order to boost performance in ATD.
For this work, the three feature spaces from the literature (Section 4.2.4)
and three novel variants, are explored.
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The first variant is referred to as the Σ−∆ curve method. This is similar
to the H−L curve method [142], but rather than using H and L as features,
Σ=H+L and ∆=H−L are employed. This approach yields a larger separation
between material curves in the feature space, and so one would expect better
material discrimination as a result. The material curves for the Σ−∆ curve
method are given in Figures 8.2b and 8.2e.
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Figure 8.2: Material curves in feature space for three novel variants of material dis-
crimination methods in the literature. The materials, include: Boron (Z=5,
orange); Aluminium (Z=13, green); Iron (Z=26, blue); and lead (Z=82,
purple). Curves were computed analytically using Equation (8.1), assum-
ing a noiseless imaging system, and using attenuation coefficients from
the NIST XCOM database [62].
The second variant is the log-log method, which is similar to the α-curve
method, but uses just − logH and − logL as features. This is convenient
since, when combined with the H−L curve method, it is a straightforward
dual-energy generalisation, i.e.
{− logH,H}→ {− logH,− logL,H,L}, (8.8)
of the single-energy system [10], which uses H and − logH as CNN input
channels. This provides a good baseline for dual-energy networks.
The third variant is the (r, θ) method. This is derived by transforming the In a monochromatic,
noiseless imaging
system, it would be
possible to
discriminate
materials using just
θ.
arctan2(_, _) is the
four-quadrant
inverse tangent.
log-log method into polar co-ordinates:
r =
√
(logL)2 + (logH)2 (8.9)
θ = arctan2(logH, logH). (8.10)
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In the monochromatic case, this gives θ-values that are constant as a function
of r. In the polychromatic case, the curves appear similar to the R-curve
method, but there is a better separation between materials at small r-values.
8.3.1 Dual-energy network architectures
The CNN architectures are based on the 19-layer very deep networks first
described by Simonyan and Zisserman [132], and have been shown to work
well in single-energy ATD [10]. The main modification to the original Si-
monyan and Zisserman [132] architecture, is the addition of batch normal-
isation layers [174]. In total, the networks contain 16 convolutional layers, 3
fully-connected layers, and a softmax layer to obtain the confidence that a
patch contains an SMT. The input channels are of dimension 256×256.
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Figure 8.3: Illustration of the single-energy one-channel (SE-1) and two-channel (SE-
2) CNN architectures used in the prior work [10] and operating on single-
energy inputs (IN), and the two-channel (DE-2) and four-channel (DE-
4) architectures employed in this work. Each network has a number of
convolutional layers (CONV) interspersed by batch normalisation (BN)
layers. The final convolutional layer feeds into the fully-connected (FC)
layers. The networks used in this work consist of 16 convolutional layers
and 3 fully-connected layers (not depicted in this figure).
Networks were investigated that have (i) two dual-energy input channels,
and (ii) four dual-energy input channels. It was found in previous work
that using separate input streams rather than channels, does not improve
performance [10]. Illustrations of these network architectures are given in
Figure 8.3. At first, each of the material discrimination methods are assessed
as two-channel network. For each method, the H and L images are trans-
formed into the feature space of that method, and each feature image fed
into the CNN as a separate input channel. Next the best performing two-It is possible that a
slight performance
improvement is
possible using 16-bit,
but network training
takes longer.
channel inputs are combined to construct a four-channel network, to see if
performance can be further improved. All inputs are rescaled to the range
0− 255 and cast to 8-bit.
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In all experiments, the CNN hyper-parameters weight decay and momen-
tum are fixed at 10−4 and 0.9, respectively. In most experiments, the learning
rate was decreased from 10−3 to 10−6 over the course of 30 epochs, this was
reduced (and number of epochs increased) in experiments, where training
was erratic. The mean image computed across the training set was subtrac-
ted from each input image. The training and evaluation were performed on
an NVIDIA TITAN X, which could handle a batch size of 50 images when
using four input channels. All CNNs were implemented and trained using
the MatConvNet toolbox for MATLAB [176].
8.3.2 Data, pre-processing and augmentation
The same Stream-of-Commerce (SoC) dataset, captured by a Rapiscan Eagle®
R60, as in Chapter 7 was employed.
Of the 1.2×105 benign images, the following dataset splits were employed:
• 1×104 full SoC images were reserved for testing. Of these 5×103 were
kept for the benign class, and a single SMT was projected into the other
5×103 as the threat class;
• From the remaining 1.1×105 images, 6.4×105 256×256 patches were
sampled for training. A small subsample of 1.25×104 patches is re-
served for computing the validation error when training the CNN, and
this is kept disjoint from the training patches.
The SMT images were acquired separately. In total, 700 SMT images were The SMT staged
threat examples were
collected by Rapiscan
Systems.
collected for a variety of different poses, types and models. The SMT in-
stances were extracted from the original scans to form a dual-energy TIP
library. To generate de-novo examples for training an SMT was randomly se-
lected from the TIP library and projected into the background patch. Pro-
jecting the same SMT instance into different images results in vastly differ-
ent appearances due to the translucency property of X-ray images and was
shown to be indistinguishable from real threat imagery in Chapter 6. The
dataset was made more diverse by the injection of realistic variations includ-
ing translations and flipping. SMT instances were kept disjoint between the
training, validation, and testing datasets.
Images were pre-processed according to Chapter 7.
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8.3.3 Training schemes
In this work, two modifications to the CNN training routine are tested. First,
TIP and data augmentation are performed on-the-fly, meaning that even if
background patches are reused, each instantiation will use TIP with a dif-
ferent SMT projected under different random conditions. This means that
there is a lot more variation in the threat class used in training. In the prior
work [10], training patches were computed prior to training and saved to
disk.
Second, a ‘spot-the-difference’ training scheme is proposed. In each train-
ing batch, each synthesised example in the threat class is identical to one in
the benign class except for the projected SMT. The rationale for this is that
it can improve CNN training since the network can quickly learn to focus
efforts on learning features for SMTs since the only discriminator between
the two classes is the presence of the, often heavily shielded, SMT. However,
this approach could also be disadvantageous since the network is exposed
to less variation.
8.3.4 Performance evaluation
The performance of the different systems was evaluated on full-sized con-
tainer images with a single SMT projected into the container or cargo. A
sliding window approach is adopted to analyse the whole image. Windows
of size 256×256 pixels are sampled with a stride of 64 pixels in both the ver-
tical and horizontal direction. For each window a confidence is computed
according to the output from the softmax layer. A confidence score for the
whole image is computed by taking the maximum of the window confid-
ences.
Performance is assessed in terms of the Area Under the Curve (AUC), and
false positive rates for fixed detection rates of 90% (FPR90), 95% (FPR95)
and 99% (FPR99).
To understand the full-image classification results, a heatmap of window
confidences is computed. This allows one to locate false positive or detection
signals, and is potentially a useful visualisation for operators to quickly
identify threats. However, since the heatmaps are computed by sliding a
256×256 window across the image, the resolution of the heatmap is poor. It
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would be beneficial to have a method of localising the SMT signal within this
region.
To this end, the method used by Zeiler and Fergus [177] was implemen-
ted, for determining the strongest cues in a window that the CNN has used
to detect SMTs. This works, by sliding a small occluding window across the
256×256 region. For each position of the occluder, the CNN score is com-
puted. If the occluder is blocking a part of the image that provides very
strong cues to the CNN, then this results in a much lower score. Thus a heat-
map can be constructed which has low scores corresponding to the most
SMT-like image parts, and in this way the detected SMT can be localised. This
is particularly useful for the smallest SMTs when hidden amongst complic-
ated background structure, or localising false positive detections.
8.4 results
First the new training schemes are tested on a single-energy network and
compared to Jaccard et al. [10], then the best scheme is adopted for training
and testing dual-energy networks.
8.4.1 Training schemes
Two-channel single-energy (SE-2) networks with inputs {− logH,H}, were
trained with (i) on-the-fly training without using spot-the-difference exam-
ples, and (ii) on-the-fly training whilst using spot-the-difference examples.
The results are summarised in Table 8.1. The 95% confidence intervals of
each of the performance metrics were determined by taking a bootstrap
sampling of the image scores and using the bias corrected and accelerated
percentile method. Analysis was performed with the same epoch for each
network to allow fair comparison, and the epoch was chosen such that the
validation and training errors had plateaued for both networks.
OtF? StD? AUC/% FPR90/% FPR95/% FPR99/%
N N 97.0 6.00 – –
Y N 98.5 [98.3,98.7] 1.66 [1.34,2.02] 8.83 [8.02,9.65] 30.9 [29.6,32.1]
Y Y 98.5 [98.3,98.7] 1.92 [1.55,2.31] 7.73 [7.07,8.53] 34.4 [33.1,35.8]
Table 8.1: Results on full cargo images, for the different training approaches: StD and
OtF. The SE-2 architecture with inputs {− logH,H} was used, as in Jaccard
et al. [10]. The values in square braces correspond to the 95% confidence
interval, obtained by bootstrap sampling with 1000 samples.
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In both tests, the performance was significantly improved over the ori-
ginal off-the-fly training scheme. However, using spot-the-difference did not
provide a statistically significant improvement over using just on-the-fly. Al-
though, intuitively, the spot-the-difference method gives help to the CNN by
allowing it to focus weight updates on learning features for SMT detection,
it does not yield a boost in performance. This is possibly due to the reduced
variability of images that the network is exposed to. A benefit of using the
spot-the-difference scheme is that batch processing time is improved. This
is because only half the number of patches have to be read from disk since
the same patches are used for the benign class and generation of the TIP
examples.
Overall, on-the-fly training improved the AUC by +1.5%, and the false
positive rate given 90% detection improved from 6% to 1.66%, and is thus a
significant improvement over the prior work [10].
8.4.2 Two-channel dual-energy networks
Next it is investigated how each material discrimination method performs
when used alone in a two-channel network. Table 8.2 shows the results, com-
plete with 95% confidence intervals as before. The H−L curve method, as ex-
pected from observing the material curves in Figure 8.1, does not perform
well in comparison to the other material discrimination methods. However,
there is +13% improvement on the single-energy network operating on just
on H, and so the H−L curve method of material discrimination does provide
some benefit. Similarly, the log-log method, yields a +2.8% improvement in
AUC and 9-fold improvement in FPR90 over its single-energy analogue (op-
erating on − logH).
The Σ−∆ novel variant offers a significant improvement on the H−L curve
method, boosting the AUC by >4% and giving a 4.5-fold improvement on
FPR90. This is expected from comparing the material curves, in Figures 8.1e
and 8.2e, since the latter has better separated materials in feature space.
However, it is surprising that the CNN cannot learn simple linear combina-
tions of H and L inputs to match the performance of Σ−∆.
The best performing material discrimination method was the {r, θ}method.
It outperformed all of the other DE-2 methods, yielding an AUC of 99.1% and
FFPR95 of 0.62%. It was found that the R-curve method failed to converge,
so results are unavailable. This is likely a result of the ratio of logarithms,
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Arch. Inputs/method AUC/% FPR90/% FPR95/% FPR99/%
SE-1 {H}† 89.0 47.0 – –
{− logH}† 96.0 9.00 – –
SE-2 {− logH,H}† 97.0 6.00 – –
{− logH,H} 98.5 [98.3,98.6] 1.66 [1.34,2.02] 8.83 [8.02,9.65] 30.9 [29.6, 32.1]
DE-2 {H,L} 92.2 [91.7,92.7] 34.4 [33.2,35.8] 52.2 [50.8,53.6] 68.5 [67.3,69.8]
{Σ,∆} 96.8 [96.5,97.1] 7.70 [7.00,8.45] 24.7 [23.5,25.9] 55.9 [54.5,57.4]
{− logH,− logL} 98.8 [98.6,99.0] 1.04 [0.78,1.34] 3.39 [2.92,3.92] 17.8 [16.8,18.9]
{α1,α2} 98.6 [98.4,98.8] 1.72 [1.39,2.09] 7.81 [7.09,8.63] 28.3 [27.0,29.5]
{r,θ} 99.1 [98.9,99.3] 0.62 [0.42,0.88] 2.18 [1.83,2.63] 17.8 [16.8,18.9]
DE-4 {− logH,− logL,H,L} 99.2 [99.1,99.4] 0.57 [0.37,0.80] 2.38 [1.97,2.86] 19.4 [18.4,20.7]
{− logH,− logL,∆,Σ} 99.5 [99.4,99.6] 0.08 [0.02,0.18] 0.36 [0.22,0.57] 15.5 [14.5,16.9]
{α1,α2,∆,Σ} 99.5 [99.3,99.6] 0.06 [0.02,0.16] 0.86 [0.63,1.18] 18.4 [17.4,19.5]
{r,θ,∆,Σ} 99.5 [99.3,99.6] 0.02 [0.00,0.12] 0.38 [0.24,0.58] 18.3 [16.8,18.9]
†results from Jaccard et al. [10]
Table 8.2: Quantitative results for all experiments. SE-N indicates single-energy ar-
chitecture with N input channels, DE-N indicates dual-energy architecture
with N input channels. The values in square braces correspond to the 95%
confidence interval, obtained by bootstrap sampling with 1000 samples.
and the difficulty of finding a sensible range to constrain the image pixels
to. The {r, θ} method deals with this by using the arctan2(_, _) function.
Overall, using dual-energy yields a +0.6% improvement in AUC and im-
proves FPR90 from 1.66% to 0.62%, for the same network configuration (DE-
2 versus SE-2). These improvements are statistically significant according to
the confidence intervals in Table 8.2.
8.4.3 Four-channel dual-energy networks
The baseline four-channel dual-energy method, with inputs {− logH,− logL,
H,L}, performs significantly better than its single-energy analogue with in-
puts {− logH,H}. The AUC is improved from 98.5% to 99.2% and there is
approximately a 3.5-fold improvement in FPR90. However, the method does
not perform significantly better than the two-channel {r, θ} method. When
swapping the {H,L} channels with {Σ,∆} channels, there is a large reduction
in false positives, and the network now outperforms all DE-2 methods.
Of the four-channel networks tested, the {− logH,∆,− logL,Σ} inputs per-
formed best across most performance metrics. However, there is no signific-
ant difference between the AUCs of the different methods. It seems difficult
to push beyond an AUC of 99.5% using dual-energy inputs.
In total the improvement in AUC using dual-energy as opposed to single-
energy (both using on-the-fly) is +1.0%, and with the new on-the-fly train-
ing scheme performance the improvement +2.5% over Jaccard et al. [10].
The false positive rate given 90% has improved from 6% to 0.08% by use
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of dual-energy and the on-the-fly training. Another way of expressing this
difference is that one can turn the detection rate up by +5%, but at the same
time improve false alarms by over an order of magnitude.
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Figure 8.4: Heatmaps of detection rate and false positive rate as a function of con-
tainer location. The greyscale image is the mean image across the test
set.
In Figure 8.4 heatmaps are shown of the false positive rate and the detec-
tion rate as a function of location within the container. The detection rate
heatmap was constructed using the threat mask for each TIP SMT. For each
pixel in the heatmap the detection rate was computed based on the threats
masks that overlapped with that pixel. For each SoC image, a SMT was pro-
jected into each window to build sufficient statistics. The heatmap of the
false positive rate was constructed using all image windows in the benign
test set. It is evident that the detection rate is close to 100% throughout the
cargo region of the container, however it drops significantly when SMTs are
projected into the bottom corner or close to the walls of the container. This
could be because there are fewer edge and corner patches in the training set,
and because these regions are dense, making the SMT signature less visible.
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The highest false positives rates appear in the cargo region of the image,
indicating that the majority of false positives are triggered from cargo and
not from the container structures.
8.4.4 Classification examples
In this section, some example classification results are provided for the four-
channel network which combines the log-log and Σ−∆ methods. The de-
tection threshold was tuned to give a 95% detection rate. Figure 8.5 gives
example detections. Some of these examples are very difficult for even hu-
mans to detect in a zoomed-view, so localisation heatmaps [177] are used to
indicate where the CNN is picking up strong SMT cues.
The strongest cues tend to be on the part of the SMT which is most visible
in the image. The fact that the cues are well-localised to the SMT, and not
diffuse over the projected patch, provides evidence that the network is not
picking up strong cues from potential TIP artefacts that are not located on
the SMT itself. This is particularly noticeable in Figures 8.5b and 8.5c, where
the majority of the SMT is shielded by very dense cargo, and the strongest
cues are located on the small parts of the SMT that are unshielded. In Figures
8.5a and 8.5e, the SMTs are densely shielded, however they are still visible in
the log-transformed image. In Figure 8.5d, the SMT has been concealed on
complicated background cargo, which makes it difficult to locate by eye.
Figure 8.6 shows examples of false positives. In Figure 8.6b the strongest
cues are located at the junction between the floor and two parallel metal
tubes. In this example, the false positive appears locally as SMT-like and is
also made out of a similar material. In addition, the detected objects in Fig-
ures Figure 8.6a, Figure 8.6c and Figure 8.6d, appear similar to components
of SMTs, and so the false positives are understandable in these cases.
In Figure 8.7, examples of false negatives together with the CNN inputs
for the SMT patch are given. In both cases the SMT cannot be seen, by eye, in
the inputs and thus there is very little information for the network to work
on. Detection in these cases are very difficult even for humans.
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8.4.5 Empty Image Projection
The EIP validation procedure, as presented in Section 6.5, was performed on
the baseline 4-channel dual-energy network. The results are summarised in
Table 8.3. The following observations are made:
1. A CNN system trained specifically to detect TIP can indeed learn to
exploit TIP artefacts, with slightly better than chance performance in
tests (1) and (3);
2. The TIP-trained system has learnt to exploit TIP artefacts, although not
as much as the system specifically trained to do so, since it performs
slightly better than chance in test (2);
3. In the cases where EIP patches can be detected with good localisation,
the EIP patch is projected onto an empty background (Figure 8.8) - in
these cases SMTs are straightforward to detect anyway;
4. The system trained on TIP as the threat class and EIP as the benign
class, yields very close to chance performance at detecting TIP artefacts
in test (5), thus it has been discouraged from learning TIP artefacts;
5. The system trained on TIP as the threat class and EIP as the benign
class, yields better performance than a system trained only on TIP.
Test # Trained on Tested on FPR90 FPR95 FPR99
(1) EIP vs benign EIP vs benign 89.6 94.5 98.7
(2) TIP vs benign EIP vs benign 89.8 94.7 98.9
(3) EIP vs benign TIP vs benign 89.6 94.5 98.7
(4) TIP vs EIP EIP vs benign 90.0 95.0 98.9
(5) TIP vs EIP TIP vs benign 0.46 1.78 18.9
(6) TIP vs benign TIP vs benign 0.56 2.38 19.4
Table 8.3: Empty Image Projection test results. Note that for change performance,
one would expect FPR90 = 90%, FPR95 = 95%, and FPR99 = 99%.
Therefore, even though a CNN can learn to exploit TIP artefacts the poten-
tial performance boost is very small and helps only when SMTs are projected
onto low density backgrounds for which SMT detection is straightforward,
and the effect can be removed by training on both TIP and EIP. The final
point above, that the system trained on TIP versus EIP performs better than
a system trained on TIP only, is interesting and unexpected. However, it can
potentially be explained by stochastic variation in the trained network or be-
cause the artefact-learning parameters in the network have been freed up to
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learn to detect actual SMT cues. In any case, it is likely that a system trained
and tested on real SMTs would provide similar performance to the system
developed on TIP in this work.
Figure 8.8 gives examples of EIP detection in test (1). Examples (a), (b) and
(c) show no localisation of the EIP patch, and so the detections are down to
chance. Examples (c), (d) and (e) show a localisation of the EIP patch and
thus it is likely that the CNN can detect these. It was observed when looking
at the test examples, that EIP detections were only well-localised when they
were projected onto low density empty container patches, and when pro-
jected onto cargo there were no localised detection. Therefore, in the cases
where TIP artefacts can be most exploited, SMT detection is straightforward
and so the artefacts make very little difference to overall performance met-
rics.
(a) (b)
(d)(c)
(f)(e)
Figure 8.8: Example detection for EIP-trained network on EIP test examples. The red
and black rectangles indicate the projection location for EIP. In cases
where the projection location coincide with a boost in detection signal,
the patches are projected onto empty parts of the container, where SMT
detection is trivial even for the worst performing single-energy networks.
In Figure 8.9, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for tests
(1), (3) and (5) are given. Chance performance on the ROC is equivalent to
a straight diagonal line through the origin. For test (1), the performance is
above chance for low detection rates and this corresponds to EIP onto empty
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patches. The performance drops slightly for test (2), and reaches almost
chance levels for test (3) when the network trained on TIP versus EIP to
discourage it from learning TIP artefacts.
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Figure 8.9: ROC curves for EIP tests (1), (3), and (5). A network trained on EIP versus
benign achieves above chance performance when tested on EIP or TIP
versus benign. This indicates that it is possible to train a network to ex-
ploit subtle TIP artefacts. When training is performed on EIP versus TIP,
the network achieves chance performance on classifying EIP patches, in-
dicating that it has been forced to ignore (not learn) TIP artefacts.
8.5 discussion
In this chapter, the use of trained-from-scratch CNNs on complex dual-energy
X-ray cargo imagery has been investigated. Dual-energy X-ray imagery can,
in theory, reveal information about the types of material in the image. Co-
upled with spatial information, it is hypothesised that CNNs can implicitly
learn to exploit the material information to suppress the number of false
alarms in ATD. This work has built upon other co-authored work [10], on
ATD of SMTs, by investigating three existing methods of cargo material dis-
crimination [5, 97, 98, 142] and three novel variants, and investigate how
they perform when fed to the CNN as separate input channels. Two changes
to the training scheme were also proposed, namely, on-the-fly generation
and ‘spot-the-difference’ threat and benign training pairs, complete with
data augmentation, on-the-fly. It was found that on-the-fly training provided
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a significant boost to test performance. However, that ‘spot-the-difference’
training offered no statistically significant improvement in performance, but
can offer some improvements in training speed.
In the dual-energy experiments, it was found that each dual-energy CNN
performed better than its single-energy analogue. This supports the hypo-
thesis that the CNN can implicitly learn how to decode material information
from dual-energy images in order to suppress false alarms. Moreover, it was
found that a four-channel input, consisting of the sum and difference of the
high and low images together with the log-transform of the high and low en-
ergy images, yielded the best performance in terms of the number of false
positives given detection rates of 95% and 99%. This system was capable
of detecting 95% of containers containing a single SMT, while raising 0.34%
false positives on benign containers. Overall, the improvement by exploiting
dual-energy and the new training scheme, resulted in a 2.5% improvement
in AUC, and a 100-fold improvement in the false positive rate when the de-
tection rate is fixed at 90%. Another way of expressing this improvement, is
that if the false alarm rate was kept at the level of Jaccard et al. [10] (6%) the
system can now detect 98.4% of SMT; an improvement of 8.4% in detection
over the previous state-of-the-art.
Furthermore, the EIP test procedure, introduced in Chapter 6, was applied
to the baseline dual-energy network. It showed that (i) it is possible to ex-
ploit TIP artefacts to give a slight performance boost, (ii) but the cases where
TIP artefacts can be detected are on empty container backgrounds where ATD
is trivial for CNNs, and (iii) the network can be forced not to learn TIP arte-
facts by projecting TIP artefacts into the benign class during training. Whilst
this provides encouraging evidence of high performance in real-life applica-
tions, the only concrete evidence would be to properly test the system on a
large dataset of real-life concealed SMTs. Such data was not available for this
thesis.
9
C O N C L U S I O N S
This chapter presents an overview of the research conducted, critic-ally reviews the most important novel contributions, and suggestsavenues for future research and development.
9.1 research summary
The unfettered movement of goods across borders is an economic necessity.
However, high throughput inevitably compromises security, and countries
are increasingly exposed to a diverse range of threats from Organised Crime
Networks (OCNs), terrorist networks, and even ‘legitimate’ companies. The
origin of this compromise is the reliance on human operators to pore over
insurmountable volumes of X-ray images in the search for threats, fraud, or
contraband. To the operators, the task is akin to searching for needles in
an ever-growing field of haystacks. The field; the vast global container fleet
that constitutes the global supply chain. The haystacks; the diverse range
of confusing legitimate items that fill a 40 ft shipping container. And ever-
growing because the number of containers in the fleet continues to grow
each year.
The current security protocol for monitoring the flows of goods in cargo
containers is already ill-equipped under the current threat-levels, and this
is going to worsen in the future as the amount of trade continues to grow.
The security protocol typically consists of three layers:
(i) selection of containers based on a risk analysis, specific intelligence
from policing operations, or at random;
(ii) the Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) of the selected containers to form a
radiographic image of the container and its contents which is inspected
by a human operator;
(iii) if a threat, fraud, or contraband is found the container is sent for phys-
ical inspection which is a long, arduous and expensive process.
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The grand goal of the Container Security Initiative (CSI), introduced in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks, was to mandate total inspection of the whole
container fleet. However, this goal has been far from realised, with some
estimating that only 4% of containers are imaged [3] and even fewer images
are actually inspected. The other 96% of containers, although deemed lower
risk, could and sometimes do contain threats or contraband.
There has been little headway in the use of automated image analysis
techniques to reduce or relieve the burden on human operators. Far more
attention has been paid to the automated analysis of passenger baggage
images in airport security because (i) there is a more imminent perceivable
threat from terrorism, (ii) it has, until recently, been better funded by govern-
ments, and (iii) the problem of analysing baggage imagery is more tractable.
The technical contributions in this thesis have investigated ways to reduce or
relieve the burden on human operators through the use of automated image
analysis applied to complex transmission X-ray image of cargo containers
and vehicles.
Some large-scale X-ray systems are required to move past the container
or vehicle to form an image. During this movement the imaging array may
wobble which can lead to noise, artefacts or geometric distortions in the im-
age. These wobble effects can reduce the ability of the operator to quickly id-
entify threats since they reduce the quality of images and can also effect the
precision of material discrimination. In this thesis, a method was introduced
to measure and correct for wobble noise and artefacts. The method relied on
the use of Beam Position Detectors (BPDs); imaging detectors rotated by 90◦
so that they can measure the profile of the X-ray beam across its width. This
beam profile encodes information about the position of the beam-centre. If
tracked through the scan the amount of wobble can be estimated across
the image. However, estimation is not simple since the beam is attenuated
by arbitrary objects in the scene. An algorithm was developed for estimat-
ing wobble based on BPD measurements. To estimate the beam position at
a particular instance, a Bayesian fusion was performed of (i) an instantan-
eous estimate from that scanning instance, and (ii) a prior estimate based on
previous beam position estimates. The Bayesian fusion meant that if the in-
stantaneous estimate is very confident then it contributed more to the fused
estimate; if it was uncertain then the prior estimate was relied upon. This
enabled superior beam position estimates particularly in difficult cases. The
instantaneous estimation was based on a Random Regression Forest (RRF)
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operating on the estimated beam profile before it interacts with the scene.
The prior estimate was obtained by fitting an Auto-Regression (AR) model
to a training set.
With these wobble estimates the image could be corrected for wobble.
The correction was derived by considering a model of image formation in
the presence of a wobbling detector. It was found that several other imper-
fections in the scanning apparatus complicated wobble correction, and so
methods to estimate these and their corrections were also proposed. The
correction method was tested on (i) images of an air-only scene, and (ii)
images of scenes containing objects of increasing complexity. The former
was useful for quantitatively evaluating the improvement in image quality
by the wobble correction method, and the later was useful for qualitative
evaluation. It was found that the wobble correction method yielded an 87%
improvement in image noise due to wobble.
A problem in training and evaluating Machine Learning (ML) based sys-
tems for Automated Threat Detection (ATD) in security, is the scarcity of
data. For machines the data problem for threat items means that it is difficult
to train sophisticated ML-based systems without overfitting, and difficult
to evaluate performance due to the accuracy paradox. Potential solutions in-
clude:
(i) the collection of large amounts of staged threats, which is particularly
expensive for cargo;
(ii) treating ATD as a one-class anomaly detection problem, but this is dif-
ficult and is likely to result in lots of false positives unless the benign
dataset is sufficiently large;
(iii) transfer-learn systems trained on other modalities where data is plen-
tiful, however this is unlikely to perform as well as a bespoke-trained
network.
Another solution is to learn from human operators. It has been shown that
the rarer a threat item, the lower the performance of a human operator at
detecting that threat item. In aviation baggage, the remedy was to introduce
Threat Image Projection (TIP). TIP works by injecting a Fictional Threat Image
(FTI) into baggage images. This (i) can be used in Computer-Based Training
(CBT) of operators, (ii) exposes the operator to more threat items to reduce to
combat the prevalence effect, and (iii) allows the performance of operators
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to be evaluated. Motivated by an analogy between humans and machines, a
TIP framework was developed for cargo.
The TIP framework proposes a number of variations that can be applied
to the threat before projection, and can be used as data augmentation to
boost the number of unique examples when training ML-based systems.
Such methods have been used in the mainstream computer vision com-
munity to improve performance and prevent overfitting of Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs). The other advantage of TIP is that, when testing
systems, one can control a number of conditions in the testing to build a bet-
ter picture of system performance. The method for extracting and projecting
threat items was validated experimentally. TIP images were compared qual-
itatively and quantitatively to real threat images, and it was found that the
two were indistinguishable. However, still concerned that a system can learn
to exploit potential TIP artefacts, such as halos and subtle changes in noise
distribution, to artificially boost performance, a method coined Empty Im-
age Projection (EIP) was introduced. The aim of EIP is to project just the TIP
artefacts and not the threat itself. Using a series of tests involving EIP, one
can test whether systems are capable of achieving improved performance
on TIP imagery over real imagery. Both TIP and EIP were utilised in the final
two technical contributions.
A large proportion, 20%, of the global container fleet are declared-as-
empty. These containers are convenient and cheap for criminals to smuggle
contraband either in legitimate or false container partitions, or unhidden in
rip-on/rip-off attacks. False declared-as-empty containers can also be used
to avoid tariffs and sanctions, or can be a health and safety hazard if placedIndeed, false declared-
as-non-empty
containers can also
pose safety hazards,
but it is difficult to
think of criminal
reasons to do so, and
it is not reported in
the literature.
Perhaps errors or
theft can lead to false
declared-as-non-
empty
containers.
in an empty-only container stack at ports. An automated system, capable of
verifying whether declared-as-empty containers are truly empty, can there-
fore be used used to inspect 20% of all containers. It does not need to detect
specific threats; any foreign object in the container is an indication of illegal
behaviour or error.
Automated Empty Container Verification (ECV) is complicated by the di-
verse range of appearances of declared-as-empty containers, and because
small amounts of smuggled contraband can appear similar to container
damage, packaging, or detritus. A system for automated ECV that operates
on full-sized images was proposed. The system is based on the Random
Forest (RF) classification of local geometric features together with the co-
ordinates of the analysis window. It is hypothesised that the addition of the
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window coordinates as a feature, allows the RF to implicitly learn the range
of appearances at different locations within the container and avoids the
need to segment the container into different regions and learn a separate
classifier for each region. The system is trained using the TIP framework to
generate examples of synthetic non-empty containers. It is tested on both
real non-empty containers from the Stream-of-Commerce (SoC) and TIP im-
agery. The test on TIP allows (i) for non-empty containers much more diffi-
cult than those found in the SoC to be generated, and (ii) for performance to
be assessed as a function of difficulty (volume and density of the load) and
location. The system is able to detect 99.3% of non-empty containers in the
SoC whilst raising 0.7% false positives, and is capable of detecting >93% of
loads similar in size and density to 1.25 kg whilst raising 1% false alarms.
The final contribution of this thesis was a system for ATD based on com-
plex dual-energy X-ray cargo images. Several methods for exploiting dual-
energy measurements in CNNs were explored and compared. Three of these
methods were based on existing methods for material discrimination in the
literature, and three were novel variants. The aim was to provide a CNN
with material information that it could use to implicitly learn about mater-
ials in order to suppress false alarms in ATD. For material discrimination
methods used alone as input channels, it was found that the best perform-
ing method was a novel variant ({r, θ} method). Combining two methods,
together as input channels, lead to a 100-fold reduction in false alarms over
other co-authored work not presented in this thesis [10]. Moreover, the EIP
framework was used to show that the system can obtain a very small per-
formance boost due to TIP artefacts. However, this effect could be removed
by training the system on both TIP imagery and EIP imagery so as to encour-
age the system not to learn cues from TIP artefacts. To best knowledge, this
is the first time that dual-energy cargo imagery has been used for the pur-
poses of automated image understanding, and the first time CNNs have been
applied to raw dual-energy measurements, in any field.
9.2 review of contributions
The most pertinent novel contributions of this work are summarised as fol-
lows.
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literature review The first review of the field of Automated X-ray
Image Analysis for Cargo Security. Due to the relevant infancy of the field,
no previous review had previously been published in the literature. The
review covered all aspects of image analysis, including image pre-processing
and image understanding. The published version of the review [7] is longer
than the version presented in this thesis, with more analysis on the future
direction and promise of the field.
wobble measurement A novel method of measuring detector wobble
in large-scale transmission radiography was developed. The method relied
on rotating a few imaging detectors by 90◦, to form BPDs which measure
the profile of the X-ray beam across its width. During a scan the BPDs are
obscured by arbitrary objects in the scene, thus complicating wobble estim-
ation. The proposed solution used a RRF model to obtain an instantaneous
wobble estimate, and an AR model to determine an estimate based on previ-
ous estimates. The RRF and AR estimates were then Bayesian fused to form
a superior estimate of wobble.
wobble correction A novel method for correcting image intensity
variation due to detector wobble was presented. The method was derived
by considering a model of image formation in the presence of a wobbling
detector. Wobble correction also relied on the estimation of misplacements
and rotations of individual imaging detectors that can complicate wobble
correction. The correction method, when combined with the measurement
method, was able to correct for 87% of image intensity variation due to
wobble. This work, and wobble estimation, extends the work of Rogers et al.
[11], which achieved a wobble correction of 70%.
tip, data augmentation, and eip A method for TIP in cargo was
proposed and validated experimentally. The TIP method relies on the Beer-
Lambert law, and the experimental validation shows that there is no qualit-
ative or quantitative difference between a real threat image and its equival-
ent TIP image. Methods of injecting natural variation into TIP imagery were
proposed as a form of data augmentation, useful for training ML-based al-
gorithms. Moreover, due to concerns that the ML systems in this thesis could
learn subtle artefactual cues present in TIP imagery, an EIP method was pro-
posed and applied to improve confidence that this was not occurring. The
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aim of EIP is to project just the TIP artefacts and not the actual threat. Ac-
cording to the literature, this was the first proposal of using TIP to train ATD
algorithms, and the first time an EIP was proposed. Thus, there was no prior
state-of-the-art in cargo to compare to, but the TIP method was used in the
next two chapters which do achieve state-of-the-art performance.
empty container verification The first ML-based method for ECV
was presented. The method works by RF classification of individual image
patches. The features included fixed geometric features and the coordinates
of the patch within the image. The use of window coordinates as a feature
allowed the RF model to learn the location-specific range of appearances
of an empty container and overcame the need to segment the image and
apply a separate classifier to each image region. The method was trained on
TIP-generated non-empty examples and real empty examples from the SoC.
The proposed ECV method outperformed a previous method reported in the
literature when tested on the SoC, and was also tested for very small TIP-
generated adversarial loads representative of smuggled cocaine. The system
was also validated using EIP. The system achieved a 99.3% detection rate and
0.7% false positive rate for real SoC images, and extends the work of Orphan
et al. [66], which achieved an accuracy of 97.2% with 0.4% false positive
rate. The evaluation was also extended to include loads resembling small
amounts of smuggled cocaine, and the system was able to detect 93% of
1.25kg with a 1% false alarm rate.
dual-energy automated threat detection A method for detect-
ing so-called Small Metallic Threats (SMTs) in complex dual-energy cargo
imagery was presented. According to the literature, it was the first time in
cargo that ATD has explicitly operated on images measured at different en-
ergies. The motivation was that the algorithm can learn to suppress false
positives by using material information derived from the dual-energy meas-
urement. The method employed a trained-from-scratch CNN, trained on TIP
imagery with data augmentation, and significantly improved on the prior
work of Jaccard et al. [10], decreasing the false positve rate from 6% to 0.08%,
for 90% detection. The system was also validated using EIP, which showed
that there was no evidence that the system was exploiting potential cues
from TIP artefacts to boost performance. Although this can still not be com-
pletely ruled out, unless a test is performed on real threat imagery.
170 conclusions
9.3 criticisms and future work
As with all research, whilst this thesis has provided several important con-
tributions to automated cargo image analysis, it has opened up several more
avenues of research. It is recommended that these are addressed in future
work.
9.3.0.1 Wobble
In this thesis, the effects of wobble noise and artefacts manifesting as image
intensity variation were investigated. This wobble is due to the movement
of the detector boom from side to side like a swinging pendulum. However,
very severe wobble can make the detector boom move up and down relative
to the source. In such cases, wobble manifests as a geometric distortion in
images, where straight horizontal lines in the scene become wobbly lines
in the image. This can also affect the ability of the operator or algorithm
to detect threats. So correction of geometric distortions due to wobble is an
area for future research.
In addition, the wobble measurement method struggled when large and
extremely dense objects occluding the BPD during the scan leading to a low
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) and poor instantaneous estimates. One can also
imagine scenarios where the BPDs are completely occluded such that there
is no signal reaching it at all. In these cases, extra information is required to
measure wobble. A possible way of providing this information is through
the use of extra measurement devices, such as accelerometers, placed on the
detector boom to improve the prior beam position estimate in cases where
the instantaneous estimate fails. Moreover, wobble estimation could also be
improved by using more BPDs or even a 2D imaging array. A 2D imaging
array could be expensive, but would also result in better quality images
since one would obtain more samples of each point in the scene.
9.3.0.2 Real test data
Although every effort was made to validate the use of TIP in training and
testing ATD, through experimental validation and the proposed EIP method,
the only truly conclusive test is on real data of smuggled threats. Such data
was not available during this thesis, and is very difficult to obtain for cargo.
However, in the future real data should be obtained and used for testing
purposes. Until cargo data is available, a simple and meaningful approach
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is to switch the system over to airport baggage data. Baggage data is much Varied baggage
threat data is also
easier to stage, than
loading and
unloading a 40 ft
container.
easier to obtain, and the methods used here are equally applicable to bag-
gage. The system would be trained in exactly the same way using TIP, but
it would be tested on real baggage threat examples, to test whether the per-
formance on TIP matches the performance on real data. If it does not, then
one can discover why not, and use this to improve the TIP used in training.
9.3.0.3 Positional information
It is likely that better ECV performance can be obtained using a dual-energy
CNN approach similar to the method used in ATD. Perhaps, it would also be
beneficial to give the CNN positional information, so that the CNN can learn
the expected range of appearances across the container, as it was found
with the RF. This is a potential avenue for future research. It is also likely
that for ATD, positional information can also boost the performance. For ex-
ample, a system performing threat detection based on oriented Basic Image
Features (oBIFs), or similar Bag-of-Words (BoW) approaches, would benefit
from positional information, since relatively rare container structures such
as metal roof bows, can appear similar to threats. However, it is unclear
whether such information would help much for CNN approaches because
performance is already very high. It was noted however, that the CNN-based
ATD performed worst in the bottom corner of the container. This region
tends to be dense making ATD more difficult than other parts of the con-
tainer, however it is not as dense as some of the loads in which the system
was still capable of detecting threats. Perhaps this could be improved by the
use of positional information, or it could be because threats were less likely
to be placed in the bottom corner during training and therefore the CNN was
exposed to fewer of such examples.
9.3.0.4 Anomaly detection
When human operators inspect cargo images, they use two methods: (i)
threat detection, and (ii) anomaly detection. Threat detection looks for the
tell-tale silhouette of the threat in the image. As the X-ray image becomes
more cluttered and the threat is placed in more complex or dense surround-
ings, detection of this tell-tale silhouette becomes more difficult. In these
cases, operators rely on spotting anomalies that may be indicative of a threat.
Criminals who have knowledge of X-ray screening may try to shield a threat
using dense materials or complicated, confusing clutter. The ATD algorithm
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developed in Chapter 8 detects threat silhouettes, and works even in cases
where there is dense or confusing clutter. However, in cases where the threat
is completely shielded such that there is no threat information left, detec-
tion fails. In such cases, an Automated Anomaly Detection (AAD) algorithm
could be used to assess the suspiciousness of the shielded regions that may
be indicative of smuggling activity and flag them up to border staff. For
example, a dense region may be suspicious relative to the other content or
due to its positioning. AAD would also be useful for other reasons, including
but not limited to: (i) detection of false partitions; (ii) detection of emergent
threats which an ATD algorithm has not been trained on; (iii) detection of
unusual weight distributions that can be indicative of smuggling.
AAD can also overcome the data problem, because such systems only need
to be trained on benign data, which is easier to obtain. However, it is likely
that an AAD system will generate high numbers of false positives unless a
very large amount of benign data is used. AAD is a complicated problem,
but systems able to obtain performance similar to or better than human
operators, could provide a significant boost to cargo security, and so remains
an important avenue of future research.
9.3.0.5 Generalisability
There are questions on how well the ECV and ATD algorithms generalise
to other types of cargo scanners with slight differences in image proper-
ties. It would be worthwhile assessing the performance of the algorithms
developed for the Rapiscan Eagle® R60, directly on other scanners. If the
performance does not generalise well, then can it be improved by adding
more data augmentation or learning a function that maps image appear-
ance between scanners?
9.4 concurrent work
Most research that was published concurrent to this thesis were summarised
in the literature review. However, there has been some recent work by the
ACXIS project [178, 179], which has not been discussed in this thesis. TheAutomated
Comparison of X-ray
Images for Cargo
Screening (AXCIS).
work focusses on providing tools for assisted inspection. These tools include:
• Image standardisation: The project has developed a tool for standard-
ising X-ray images captured from different cargo scanners, with the
aim of developing algorithms capable of ATD across a range of devices.
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This includes adjustment of the image contrast, and geometric trans-
formations to standardise the acquisition geometry [178].
• TIP: The project has developed tools for synthesising X-ray images
from 3D Computer Aided Design (CAD) models that can then be pro-
jected into real X-ray images. In addition, they have developed a TIP
method based on the Beer-Lambert law and similar to the method pro-
posed in Chapter 6. They call this method ‘image blending’, and give
a visual comparison between TIP and a real threat image [178]. How-
ever, they are not compared quantitatively, but the authors state that
‘According to expert judgement by customs officers and X-ray imaging
experts, the [method] produces realistic results’ [178]. It is unclear wh-
ether the TIP imagery is used in, or proposed for, direct training of
algorithms.
• Cigarette detection: Few technical details of the algorithms are given.
However, images are pre-processed with Block Matching 3D (BM3D),
as it was found to perform better than several other approaches in-
cluding: Gaussian filtering, bilateral filtering, anisotropic filtering, and
Non-Local Means (NLM) [178]. No details of the detection algorithms
are given, but Visser et al. [178] show an example of detection where
a container is half-filled with cigarettes, and they state ‘[cigarettes] are
typically transported in large quantities and appear in X-ray scans as
homogeneous regions with specific textures due to the common way
of packaging layers of cartons into boxes’. This implies that the al-
gorithm is based on texture recognition and is designed for detecting
only very large quantities of cigarettes.
• Image comparison: for the purposed of aiding narcotics detection, the
project has developed a tool for comparing an image with a refer-
ence benign image. In this, the user will select an analysis Region-
Of-Interest (ROI), and a similar ROI is found in a reference database
by comparing ‘intensity and structural features’ [178]. The two ROIs
are registered by computing Speeded-Up Robust Features (SURF), and
filtering pairs of keypoints using a nearest neighbour approach and
RANdom SAmple Consensus (RANSAC) [178]. Based on these keypo-
ints, an affine or homographic transformation is determined. With the
images registered, the images are then compared by creating a dis-
tance map using adaptive thresholding and morphological filtering.
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This difference map can be used by operators to identify anomalies
relative to the reference image [178, 179].
• Other functions: The project has also developed tools for counting the
recurrence of a manually selected ROI [178, 179], and for weight estim-
ation. However, few technical details are given.
Previously, we defined a number of historical stages in the development
computer vision algorithms. These stages, included:
(i) algorithms completely hand-crafted by experimentation and intuition;
(ii) features hand-crafted based on intuition and experimentation, with the
features classified using ML techniques; and
(iii) the features and their classification learnt directly from data.
The ACXIS project demonstrates that there is a concerted effort in Europe
to improve inspection procedure using automated image analysis. However,
it also demonstrates that this effort is still stuck in stages (i) and (ii). But
there are indications that future research will include the used of CNNs [178]
bringing the project to stage (iii).
9.5 future of the field
It is not difficult for one to imagine a future where the global supply chain is
fully automated. Signs of it are already beginning to emerge with delivery
companies experimenting with the use of drones [180] for parcel delivery
and driverless delivery vehicles [181], and the recent opening of a fully auto-
mated London Gateway Port [55]. The need for automation is driven by the
need to cope with the increasing throughput demands. And with increasing
levels of automation in logistics, it is likely that the levels of throughput will
grow even faster than they do today.
On the screening side, there are now commercial scanners that can scan
containers in less than a second, thus preserving high throughput. The main
limitation in terms of both security and throughput, is the use of human
operators, who have many undesirable features, including: (i) their suscept-
ibility to bribery and blackmail, (ii) their inconsistent performance in terms
of accuracy and time, (iii) their need for holidays and breaks due to illness,
(iv) their expensive training, and (v) the difficulty of scaling them.
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This thesis has proposed methods to assist human operators, which is es-
sential as the volumes of trade continue to grow. With future developments
in artificial intelligence, it is not inconceivable that human operators will
eventually be replaced altogether, or freed up to perform the more difficult
tasks such as physical inspection and intelligence gathering.
Innovations in automated inspection may drive innovations in hardware.
For example, if algorithms are capable of outperforming humans, then the
scanning hardware can be tweaked to allow higher scanning speeds. Scan-
ning at faster rates leads to lower resolution and to a lower SNR, but al-
gorithms could still obtain high performance by learning from vast numbers
of examples. In addition, there may be the development of novel scanner
designs that are optimised for algorithms rather than humans. In particular,
scanners could become driven by artificial intelligence and adapt scanning
to current risk levels, or intelligently adjust scanning to focus on regions
that are suspicious or difficult to penetrate.
With increased automated inspection, is it possible that new attack vec-
tors will emerge? Criminals, as intelligent and rational actors, will invent
and trial new ways of defeating security systems. One clear example would
be increased use of cyber-attacks on port security systems. Such attacks
have already been documented [182], but perhaps they will become more
commonplace as the modus operandi of using human agents becomes more
difficult. Such cyber-attacks could have several goals:
(i) as denial of service, to prevent algorithms from accessing resources
such as manifest information or cargo images;
(ii) as denial of service, to force ports to switch back to human image
inspection only;
(iii) as a means of poisoning data with false data, so that systems, particu-
larly those using online learning, become corrupted;
(iv) as a means of spoofing incorrect algorithm decisions to cause distrust
of new systems;
(v) as a means of algorithm theft, so that algorithms can be probed by
adversarial artificial intelligence to generate new smuggling methods
capable of defeating automated systems.
As with all new security technologies, heed of these potential attack vectors
is needed if the technology is to be a success.
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Nevertheless, it is clear that future algorithmic developments will play an
important role in lowering the burden on human operators in their search
for needles in the ever-growing field of many haystacks.
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